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ABSTRACT 
This work is divided into four broad chapters. The first, 
discusses historical background to the concept and the rules govern-
ing nationalization of foreign-owned property in general, the second 
chapter deals with the question. of payment of compensation for 
nationalized foreign-owned property, the third is concerned with the 
role of foreign investments in African economic development and lastly 
the fourth chapter is devoted to case studies of nationalization measures 
in respect of selected African countries. 
Regarding the rules of international law governing nationalizat-
ion measures, it is argued in the first chapter that, before the 
Second World War, when nationalization measures were not popular, 
international law concerned itself more with general acts of exprop-
riation of private property. Although expropriation is related to the 
concept of nationalization, the two however, are distinct legal 
phenomena. 
It was during the Middle Ages that international law developed 
rules to regulate expropriation acts. The rules which emerged, 
required that expropriation be carried out in furtherance of public 
purpose and upon payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation. 
This rule is attributed to natural law, the rationale of which is the 
protection of the 11 acquired rights 11 (droits acquis). 
After the Second World War, when acts of nationalization became 
popular, the same rule developed during the Middle Ages to regulate 
acts of expropriation was applied to regulate and protect foreign 
investors from acts of nationalization by the host states. It was 
therefore claimed that like expropriation, nationalization is lawful 
if it is carried out in furtherance oftpublic purpose and is 
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accompanied by payment of adequate, prompt and effective 
compensation and without discrimination. 
This principle has been stated in all leading text books, in 
statements issued by foreign offices of capital exporting nations, 
in bilateral commercial treaties, in conventions drafted by inter-
national agencies, in judgments of national courts and in statements 
. -
issued by foreign offices of capital exporting nations, and in 
statements issued by multinational ·corporations. 
Although the requirements of public purpose and non-discrim-
ination have been readily accepted by the international community, 
the rule which requires payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation has received a considerable amount of opposition from 
capital importing countries. This is so because t~e norm which 
requires payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation is 
inconsistent with the definition of nationalization. Reference of 
such controversies to international tribunals by deploying concept 
of dimplomatic protection, would have been the best way of resolving 
the conflict. The major obstacle in this regard however is the fact 
that the concept of diplomatic protection itself, has not received a 
universal acceptance in the international community. The most vocal 
opponents of this concept are the countries adhering to the concept 
of national treatment. Because of non-acceptability of traditional 
norm regarding payment of compensation upon nationalization of 
foreign-owned property, new norms were evolved by nationalizing 
states. 
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Compensation for Nationalized Property: 
As it has already been pointed out, classical international 
law requires that nationalization like expropriation, be carried out 
in furtherance of public purpose, without discrimination and be 
accompanied by prompt payment of adequate and effective compensation. 
Althoug~ almost all. nations which nationalized foreign-owned property, 
with exception of USSR, paid some form of compensation upon national-
ization, it is submitted that there is no established rule of inter-
national law requiring nationalizing states to pay prompt adequate and 
effective compensation. It is also argued that payment of some form of 
compensation by nationalizing states has not been due to existence of 
an established rule of customary international law dictating the same, 
but it is mainly due to other factors. The factors which influence the 
nationalizing states to pay some form of compensation are mainly 
political and economic in nature. It should be remembered that it was 
the developed countries which were affected by these measures. The 
Soviet Union's view regarding the requirement of compensation upon 
nationalization of foreign-owned property, has always been that which 
denies the existence of an obligation to compensate at all. The main 
argument used being that her nationalization measures which took place 
after the 1917 October Revolution, covered the properties of Russians 
and aliens alike and therefore, the question of compensation could not 
arise. This is the same argument used by those states advocating the 
concept of national treatment. What should be noted with regard to 
Soviet nationalization, together with those of other Socialist states 
is the fact that, public ownership of major means of production and 
- -
exchange is regarded as the ultimate goal and therefore superior to 
individual's rights to private property. This is obviously different 
from those states with capitalist or mixed economies, where although 
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the notion of social function of property has become increasingly 
popular, private ownership of property is still the backbone of 
the social-economic system. It is therefore not an accident to 
note that legal principles and rules are developed to protect 
private property the rule under discussion being not an exception. 
The USSR 1s attitude towards payment of compensation may have 
a bearing on the attitude of other developing countries on the same 
. 
issue, especially the Latin American countries which, like USSR, 
advocate the concept of national treatment. It may be far fetched, 
to say that, the recent United Nations Resolutions stressing on 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources have been influenced by 
USSR 1s attutide towards private property, but what is certain is the 
fact that the capital importing states found the notion of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as a means towards economic self-
determination. 
Various doctrines have been used to justify the claim for prompt 
adequate and effective compensation. One of the principles of law 
more often -relied upon implies that nationalization of foreign 
property is illegal and therefore a foreign investor should be paid 
restitution in kind and if not possible, full compensation to remedy 
the wrong. 
Examination of restitution as a remedy in the context of 
nationalization cases, shows that unless there are Treaty provisions 
restricting nationalization, restitution is not a remedy to be used 
in cases of nationalization. 
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The Charzow Factory Case (1927) PCIJ Ser. A No. 9 helps to 
demonstrate this point very clearly. It was held in obiter 
that the remedy applies where there is violation of Treaty provisions 
only. 
Another principle relied upon is Pacta Sunt Servanda. This 
is a basic principle of law of Treaties, requiring parties to respect 
tre?ties to which they have entered into. This principle does not 
apply to nationalization cases because the law applicable in nation-
alization is municipal law of nationalizing nation and not international 
law. 
Those who support the concept of internationalized contracts 
argue that, the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda applies to this 
class of contracts as well as to treaties. It is argued in this 
dissertation that the concept of internationalized contract is a 
falacy because it has no juridical foundation and therefore the 
principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda does not apply to nationalization 
cases. 
Other justifications used by the advocates of prompt adequate 
and effective compensation are the concepts of "unjust enrichment 11 
and respect for "acquired rights 11 • The first principle simple means 
that a country should not unjustly enrich itself to the extent of 
the value of the property nationalized. This basically is an equit-
able principle requiring payment of some form of compensation and 
does not necessarily mean that compensation should be prompt adequate 
and effective. Depending on the equities involved, compensation pay-
able may be based on different formulae. Since the new norms 
advocated by developing countries are '·acceptable by the larger majority 
of International Community they help to indicate the way on how the 
I 
rule of customary law will be formed .. \As regards "acquired rights 11 , 
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which demand immunity of private rights acquired through Municipal law 
from nationalization, it is submitted that this immunity no longer 
stands. This is so due to emergence of a notion of soci~l value 
of property which became more popular after the Russian 
October Revolution. This revolution has made serious inroads into 
·the hegimony of private property and has made the doctrine of freedom 
of private property, no longer hegimonic or sacrosanct. 
In case of concession agreements having "stabilization clauses", 
it has been argued that because of the concept of acquired rights a 
host state may not pass a law to revoke the rights vested in the 
original agreement. The contention put forward in this work is that, 
whether there are stabilizing clauses or not concession agreements 
are governed by Municipal law of a host state, and therefore can be 
changed at any time by a host state through a municipal law. 
Writing of publicits, decisions of international courts and 
awards of arbitral tribunals have also been used to justify payment 
of prompt adequate and effective compensation. Apart from the 
Texaco Arbitration Award which supports the application of 
restitution in cases of nationalization all other sources mentioned 
do not lend support to the rule. 
The norm requiring payment of full compensation represented by 
the formula "prompt adequate and effective 11 developed by capital 
exporting states, to protect their investments abroad, has been 
rendered inapplicable in modern times. This is so because the 
developing countries have formul.ated 'new norms in accordance with the 
concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
-7-
In brief, therefore, the present law governing nationalization 
of foreign-owned property and especially the payment of compensation 
thereof, may be summed up as Modus Vivendi between on the one hand, 
the states which profess economies of a more or less laissez-faire character 
comprehensively protecting private property, and on the other hand, 
---those states which organize their·economies with a ·measure of public 
owne.rship in view especially of poor economic conditions. 
The new norms put forward by developing countries range from 
excess profit deduction to claim for "appropriate compensation", the 
last norm enjoy? considerable amount of support from developing 
countries. 
The history of the claim for "appropriate compensation" can be 
traced from the famous U.N. Resolution 1803 of 1962 in which the 
notion of Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources was asserted. 
Under Article 4 of the 1962 resolution "appropriate compensation" is 
to be paid in accordance with international law. The concept of 
appropriate compensation was emphasized in the subsequent resolutions 
e.g. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3117 (XXVII), the resolution on 
New International Economic Order, and charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. It is true that these resolutions have no law 
creating effect. However, it is the main argument of this paper that 
the new norms developed by the developing nations through these 
resolutions do represent the will of larger majority of international 
community, and therefore form a basis for progressive development of 
the law and speedy consolidation of customary rules hence they are 
de lege ferenda. 
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The Role of Foreign Investments in African Economic Development: 
This section of the study seeks to show that the logic of 
post independence economic policies of most of the African countries 
has been that of encouraging private investments, which had the effect 
of creating a foreign-owned and controlled manufacturing sector. 
Alongside this there was also the creation of the indigenous 
capitalist class created to ultimately 11 take over 11 from the foreign 
investors. It was the indigenous capitalist class which influenced 
their governments to adopt policies geared towards Africanization, 
Indigenization and joint-venture. The driving force of these policies 
was the notion of economic independence. These policies affected 
mainly small and medium scale business enterprises but left the 
multinationals intact. The reason for this difference being an 
analysis of their roles in economic development as seen by most of 
the host states. Because of this policy foreign investments were 
initially encouraged and allowed to enter almost all sectors. After 
sometime, when most of the African states realized that the multinationals 
are getting.out of hand, some countries attempted to limit their 
activities by way of imposing limitations. At the same time the 
more radical countries attempted to nationalize some of the activities 
formally under their control. This however does not imply that 
foreign investments were not encouraged or protected. There are 
instruments such as Foreign Investment Protection Acts (FIPA) in 
almost all African countries geared towards protection of foreign 
investments and promising some form of compensation in case of 
nationalization. 
Regarding foreign investment protection as a whole this study 
seeks to demonstrate that investment protection policies on the part 
of capital exporting countries e.g. suspension of bilateral assistance, 
-9-
withdrawal of support, etc., are not as effective as the bilateral 
treaties are in protecting foreign investments abroad. 
It has also been demonstrated that, foreign aid sanctions 
against states taking foreign investments without payment of 
prompt .adequate and effective .compensation have been generally 
counter-productive. 
Although the investment guarantees provided by most of the 
develop1ng countries are of little legal effect, they however help 
the foreign to know investment policies of a particular country. 
This study has also demonstrated that some alien investors are 
capable of satisfactorily using their capital in atmospheres of 
economic nationalism, provided that they are assured of some sort of 
monopoly and smooth operation through joint-ventures with state-
owned Companies. In this way they stand to gain more in the final 
analysis and they are, contrary to the general belief, not deterred 
by nationalization, indigenization or Africanization measures. 
Nationalization in Selected African Countries: 
Most African countries, like other developing countries, regard 
the right to nationalise foreign-owned property as o~e deriving from 
the right of nations to economic self-determination. This can be 
achieved through various ways. The general framework however, has 
been laid down in the General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over natural resources. Because of this, African countries 
see no reason why they should adhere to the classical interD~~iQnql 
law rule, which requires payment of prompt adequate and effective , 
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compensation because, doing so will defeat the whole philosophy of 
economic self-determination which they seek to implement through 
nationalization of major means of production or exchange. 
Although the African countries refuse to adhere to the "Hull 
rule", there has been very few cases where compensation for national-
ized property was totally denied. In most cases nationalization 
measures have been followed by promises to pay some form of compen-
sation, using such formulations as "full and fair" in case of 
Tanzania, 11 Book-Value 11 of the assets nationalized, to be paid out 
of future profits as in the case of Zambia and "Lump Sum" compensation 
reached through negotiations between the interested parties in as was 
the case with Zaire. 
One common feature in African nationalizations is that although 
there had been some protests regarding the form of payment of compen-
sation, with exception of Libya, most of the disputes were settled 
amicably through negotiations. The final settlements were in most 
cases reached as a matter of compromise and therefore some of the 
legal principles discussed were compromised. Reaching an acceptable 
settlement was regarded as a necessity by both parties because each· 
needed the other. While the nationalizing states needed the multination-
als to invest and manage other ventures, the multinationals on the other 
hand wanted to be assured of their continued existence, albeit in 
different forms. Demonstrating this point the Chief Executive and 
Managing Director of Lonrho, Mr. Tiny Rowland described an agreement 
signed recently under which the Tanzanian Government will pay his 
Company TShs. 155.0 million (in local currency) as compensation for 
-11-
the Company's assets taken over in 1978, as 11 an acceptable compro-
mise representing full and fair compensation to LONRH0 11 (Daily 
News 13/9/83) the money will be used by the Company for other 
investments in the country. 
In brief therefore, the African case studies examined 
expecially the broad cases of nationalization of Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zaire demonstrate how the notion of appropriate compensation 
has been used as an alternative to.full compensation in keeping with 
the general theme discussed above that the new norms will grow into 
fully fledged acceptable rules of customary international law. 
l. 
INTRO DUCT ION 
The consequences which follow nationalization of foreign-owned 
property, pose the most difficult problems of modern international 
law. The major problems are mostly centred not on the right of nations 
to nationalize foreign-owned property within their boundaries, but 
on the conditions which should govern the exercise of this right. 
While the developing countries, as well as many Eastern countries, 
maintain that a state has an unlimited right to nationalize foreign-
owned properties or assets located within its territory and that 
there is in international law no rule universally accepted in theory 
or practice which makes it obligatory the payment of compensation,1 
the rule accepted and supported by many govt:rnments, scholars and 
jurists in Western countries is that expropriation is lawful only 
if it is for a public purpos~, is nondiscriminatory and is accomp-
anied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 2 
This departure from classical international law rules, regarding 
expropriation of foreign-owned property and payment of compensation, 
advocated by the developing countries, may be regarded as part of 
the general attempt by the new States to revise the traditional inter-
national law rules to accommodate their present needs. 3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
In as far as this field is concerned, the need which the new 
See: 11 The Mexican Note to the United States dated 
3 August, 1938 11 , 32 AMJIL (1938), l8l. 
·see: 11 U.S. Statement on Economic Assistance and Investment 
'security in Developing Nations, l9th January, 1972 11 , 
,11 (1972) ILM, 241. 
See, e.g. S. Sinha, New Nations and the Law of Nations (1967), 
2q; R. Anand, New States and InternationaZ Law (1972), 57. 
States have tried to accommodate is none other than economic 
independence. After the Second World War, when most of the 
developing countries emerged from colonialism, these new states 
. 
aspired to force themselves from the bonds of foreign capital, 
representing in their eyes, colonialism and imperialism. 4 
Nationalization of major means of production and -exchange-was 
therefore considered to be vital, for the achievement of economic 
2. 
independence. Having realized the existence with their aspirations, 
these countries attempted to formulate nEW norms to govern national-
ization measures based on doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. 5 
Nationalization of foreign owned property however is by no 
means a new phenomenon nor is it restricted to developing nations 
only. What should be conceded however, is the fact in recent times 
it has been carried out more in the developing world than elsewhere. 
This dissertation will attempt to examine the historical as well 
as economic background to the concept of nationalization, the 
conflicting norms regarding assessment and payment of compensation the 
role of foreign investments in African economic development and 
finally case studies of African nationalization measures will be 
examined with the view of finding out the African state practices as 
far.as assessment and payment of compensation are concerned. 
4. · To use the words of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, "Po 1 i ti ea 1 Independence 
did not mean anything if the economy was still controlled by 
former colonial masters or by any other neo-colonialists 11 • 
K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism;'' 
1965 Pp.15-36. 
5. See A. Akinsanya 11 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
and the Future of Private Foreign Investments in the Third 
World". 18 (1978) IJIL Pp.175. 
This work being bascially a legal text, extreme care has 
been exercised not to indulge into non-legal arguments. This 
3. 
however is not to say that they are not relevant or are not connected 
with the legal arguments. In fact most of the problems discussed 
in the text are the result of political decisions based on economic 
and nationalistic reasons. These factors have been dealt with in this 
study where it was deemed necessary for the understanding of certain 
legal phenomena. 
' 
4. 
CHAPTER ONE 
NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY 
A GENERAL SURVEY. 
Almost all writers on the subject of nationalization of foreign-
owned property have attempted to define the essential characteristics 
of the term nationalization. 1 The best definitions however, are those 
which attempt to reflect its political as well as economic motivation. 
This is important because these are the characteristics which identify 
nationalization from other forms of taking of private property. 2 Among 
the writers who adopt such a method, is Foighel, who defines national-
ization as the compulsory transfer to the state of private property 
dictated by economic motives and having as its purpose the continued 
and essentially unaltered exploitation of particular property. 3 
1. For studies dealing with this subject see, I. Foighel, National-
ization~ Copenhagen, 1957; G. White, Nationalization of Foreign 
Property: London, 1961; A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees 
to Foreign Investors:New York, 1962; K. Katzarov, The Theory 
of Nationalization: The Hague, 1964; C.F~ Amerasinghe, State 
Responsibility For Injuries to Aliens: Oxford, 1967; D.P. 
0 1 Conne11 , Internatwnal Law, vo 1 . 2, 2nd edn, London, 1970, 
pp. 780-790; J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 
8th edn., London, 1977, p. 326; D.W. Greig, International Law, 
3rd edn., London, 1979, p. 579; B.A. Wortley, Expropriation 
in International Law: Cambridge, 1959, pp. 129-133; see also 
F.A. Mann, 11 0utline of a History of Expropriation of Foreign 
Property 11 , 35 AMJIL (1941), pp. 243-63; B.A. Wortley, 11 The 
Protection of Property Situated Abroad 11 , 35 Tulane law Rev. 
(1961), pp. 739-66; U.O. Umuzorike, "Nationalization of 
Foreign-owned Property and Economic Self-Determination 11 , 
6 EALJ, pp. 76-99; I. Brownlie, Principles of "Puhlic Inter-
national Law: Oxford, 1979, 3rd edn., pp. 531-51; A.A. 
Akinsanya, The expropriation of Multinational Property in 
the Third World: New York, 1980. 
2. See I. Foighel, supra note 1, p. 19; on what constitutes 
taking jn International Law see Sohn and Baxter, 11 Responsibility 
of States for injuries to Aliens" 55 AMJIL (1961 ), p. 558; · 
G.C. Christie, "What constitutes a Taking of Property under 1 
International Law? 11 , 38 BYBIL (1962), 310-11. 
3 . Foi ghe 1 , Ibid. 
5. 
Gillian White on the other hand, summed up her discussion on 
the subject by defining nationalization as an act which sets in motion 
a legal process whereby private rights and interests in property are 
compulsorily transferred to the State or some other organ created by 
-the State with the view of future exploitation of those rights and 
interests by and for the benefit of the State. 4 
Another writer who adopted this definition is Katzarov, who 
summarized his discussion on nationalization by saying that it is a 
superior kind of transfer of specific assets or activities which are 
means of production or exchange into assets or activities of the com-
munity, with the view to their utilization in the public interest. 5 
According to all these writers therefore, what distinguishes 
nationalization from other forms of taking, such as expropriation and 
confiscation, is its economic motivation or as Katzarov puts it, a 
public interest of superior order. 6 It is important to note that although 
these writers tend to agree that nationalization and expropriation are 
generally related in several respects they are of the view that it is 
the motivation behind the concept of nationalization as well as the 
means by which they are implemented, which set it apart from the indi-
vidual acts of expropriation. 
This distinction however has not been accepted by other inter-
national lawyers. Among those who voiced an opposition to a distinction 
between nationalization and expropriation is O'Connell, who while dis-
cussing the meaning of nationalization, said that, 
4. G. White, supra note l, p. 50. 
5. K. Katzarov, supra note l, p. 160. 
6. Ibid.: Expropriation in simple terms is defined as the 
compulsory acquisition of property by the State. The taking 
of land for laying of a railway or building of a school would 
be the best example of it. 
Nationalization is not a word of art; hence as 
such has no place in the language of international 
law. It has been popularly employed to describe 
the process whereby certain industries or means 
of production, distribution or exchange are in 
pursuance of social or economic policies concentrated 
in public hands .... Should the process involve the 
transference from private to public ownership of 
movable and immovable property, debts and tangible 
things of value then it is one of expropriation. 7 
6. 
According to this view, which is also supported by other international 
lawyers,8 the term nationalization has no specific meaning in inter-
national law parlance but is only employed vaguely to imply a process 
which is known already as expropriation. Incidentally, this is the 
view which seems to be adopted by most of the writers on the subject, 
especially those from capital exporting countries, who tend to consider 
the phenomenon of nationalization from the point of view of foreign-
investors and come to a conclusion that whatever form a taking of private 
property may take, its effect on the foreign investors is the same. 
In pursuance of this line of thought, some have argued that the essence 
of the matter is the deprivation by State organs of a right of property 
either as such, or by permanent transfer of power of management as well 
as control.~ It is probably true that from the point of view of a 
foreign owner it makes no difference whether the taking of his property 
by the State is labelled nationalization or expropriation. This is 
not the same as saying that the concept of nationalization is unknown 
in international law parlance: to say so will be the same as under-
lining the old position in international law which needs serious recon-
sideration in view of the recent developments reflected in various 
General Assembly resolutions recognizing, among other things, the right 
7. D.P. O'Connell, supra note 1, p. 843. 
8. B:A. Wortley, Expropriation in Internationai Law: Cambridge, 
1959, p. 532. 
9. See, e.g. Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 532. 
7. 
of nations to nationalize foreign-owned property.lo 
Apart from those who consider nationalization as being synony-
mous with expropriation because of the effects they have on the 
foreign-owner, some consider these two phenomena as synonymous because 
nationalization is a species of expropriation and that form should 
not be allowed to take precedence over.substance. 11 
According to this view, the essence of the matter with which 
international law is concerned, is deprivation of a right to property 
by a State organ. 12 Again, although this may be true, it is also 
true that international law is concerned with the right of States to 
nationalize foreign-owned property. 
Expropriation of Private Property: A Historical Survey 
A study of history of the concept of expropriation of private 
property, indicates that at different stages of history, individuals 
were liable to have their private prope'.tY taken away from them by 
the State. 13 This is a fact which is attested to by the long struggle 
about the conditions and restrictions which could be put upon the 
power of States to expropriat~ private property. 
Although the idea of limitless right of ownership of property 
was evident in different times, it was attacked by prominent scholars 
and philosophers of the time. Gierke, for example, attacked the 
idea of limitless right of ownership to property as far back as the 
10. See E. Jimenez de Arechaga, ''The State Responsibility for Nation-
alization of Foreign-owned Property", 11 N.U.J. Int'l Law and 
Pol. (1978) with various General Assembly Resolutions on 
Permanent Sovereignty over natural resources cited therein. 
11. For the view that Nationalization is a species of expropriation 
see C.F. Amerasinghe, supra note l, p. 129. 
12. See I. Brownlie, supra note l, p. 532. 
13. F~A. Mann, supra note l, p. 189. 
8. 
second half of the nineteenth century. 14 Almost simultaneously in 
Germnay, Rudolf van Ihering, criticised the individualistic concep-
tion of property by referring to it as "an expression of the insatiab-
ility and the greediness of egoism 11 • 15 Vinding Kruse on the other 
hand stated that, "the unconditional inviolable nature of the right 
of property remains but one of those magnificent phrases which it is 
so easy to shout from the house-tops in the enthusiasm of a revolution 
and in the dawn of constitutions but which in the more sober after-
math it is impossible to live up to 11 • 16 
What all these scholars try to demonstrate in these different 
formulations is the simple fact that the right of a sovereign to 
expropriate had always been assumed and treated as superior to the 
right of property ownership. 
This, however~ is not in any way to suggest that the frequency 
with which States expropriated private property, say during the period 
of the Laissez faire economies, is the same as that which is now 
experienced with the extension of public sector in many economies. 17 
The right of a State to expropriate private property has always 
been closely associated with the concept of sovereignty. It is by 
virtue of sovereignty rather than ownership of the property expro-
priated that the supreme authority in the State has always derived 
14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., p. 190. 
16. The Right of Property (Translated by Federspiel), 1939, p.7; 
Also cited at p.19 in F. Mann, supra note 13; See also 
I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 11 The Social Function of Property and 
Property Protection in Present Day Internationa 1 Law" in F. 
Kalshove et al. (eds), Essays on Development of IntePYLational 
Legal Order:Nijhoff, 1980, pp. 79-80, where he says that the 
notion of social theory of property was known by St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-74) although it is true by the present day legal 
thinking and practice more weight is attached to the social 
function of property than wa~ the case in the past. 
17. Brownlie, supra, p. 532. 
' 
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18 power to take property. It is believed however that the develop-
ment of international law rules regarding expropriation can be traced 
as far back as the Middle Ages when the concept of sovereignty had 
19 become a power vested in one person. It is also thought that it 
was during this period that the concept of expropriation for public 
purpose also emerged. 20 
The developments which took place in relation to this concept 
during the Middle Ages were very well summarized by Gierke as follows: 
The history of theory of expropriation takes, 
in the main, the form of a process whereby defin-
ite bonds are set to an expropriatory right. 
As to the total nature of these bonds it was generally 
agreed that the supreme power should not arbitrarily 
interfere with the vested rights but only 11 ex justa causa 11 - a principle to which some attributed 
the force of an absolutely binding rule of law and 
which other maintained as a rule capable of being 
transgressed by the sovereign in all or at least 
in certain cases ...• With increasing emphasis, 
however, the important principle was developed 
that in case of expropriation for reasons of public 
benefit compensation was to be paid at public 
expense. 21 
Gierke 1s conclusion that public policy permits interference with 
private right if it is accompanied by payment of compensation, found 
22 
support in the writings of Lucas de Penna, who, in the 14th century, 
wrote about the concept of expropriation of private property. 
The idea is also said to have been well established in the Statutes 
18. This view is frequently ascribed to Grotious. See e.g., Mann, 
supra note 1, p. 192. 
19. G. White, supra, p. 41; the use of the term Middle Ages is often 
very confusing as there is no clear cut definition of the term. 
According to Chambers Encyclopedia (1950 edn.), vol .9, p. 385, 
the Middle Ages lies between the fall of Roman empire and 15th 
Century. To the historians of 17th and 18th centuries this was the 
- period of general ignorance and incivflity, and they made little 
attempt to differentiate its stages and activities. 
20. G. White, supra. 
21. Gierke, Na'tu:r>al law and the Theory of Society 1500-1800 (Trans-
lated by Ernest Barker, 1934), p.1641 F. Mann, supra note 1, pp. 
201-2. 
22. w., Ulmann, The Medieval idea of Law as represented by Lucas de 
Penna3 1946, p. 230. 
l 0. 
of Medieval cities of Italy and by 1600 it was embodied in the general 
law of Italy. 23 
Having seen the develppment of the concept of expropriation 
for public purpose, one would like to pursue the reason behind the 
development of such a concept. 
As already pointed out, it was during the Middle Ages that the 
concept of sovereignty had become a power vested in one person. With 
this concept of sovereignty, the sovereign was regarded as the source 
of positive law and his power in this regard was considered to be 
inalienable and indivisible. Because of this power, the sovereign 
could dispose of any property based on positive law. 24 This power 
however was limited to positive law domain only. This means therefore 
he could not interfere with what was referred to as "the acquired 
rights" of his citizens, without proper justification. The reason 
behind this limitation is that the institution of private property 
was believed to have originated from "Jus Gentium", the right flowing 
from the natural law and not positive law. It was also believed that 
the sovereign was bound by the rules of natural law, while he bound 
himself to his subjects through a social contract, the binding force 
being derived from natural law through the principle of "pacta sunt 
servanda 11 • 25 
The notion of public purpose derived from the natural law shares 
the general weakness inherent in the natura) law itself, in that there 
is no authoritative body which can determine the State's public purpose 
other than the State itself. Together with this weakness, in modern 
23. See Calisse, A History of Italian Law (translated by Regislar, 
London, 1928, p. 690; F. Mann, supra, pp. 79-80. 
24. See Gierke, Political Theories of ~fiddle Ages (Translation),, 
Cambridge, 1938. 
25. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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times, the distinction between the rights derived from positive law 
or natural law remains of historical importance only. This is even 
more so if one considers the fact that in modern times the unlimited 
right to property is increasingly denied. The present day legal think-
ing and practice attach more importance to the social function of 
property than was the case in the past. This is true not only in 
socialist states, which already have reduced to a great extent the 
role of private property in favou~ of collective or State ownership 
but also in Western countries where there is an increasing trend to 
attach more importance to the social function of property. 26 This, 
however, does not mean that these States have completely done away 
with the requirements of public purpose and payment of compensation 
which are still regarded as important elements in international law 
rules regulating expropriation of foreign-owned property. 
What may be said in brief therefore is that although in modern 
times lawyers do not concern themselves with the source of a right 
to· expropriate, the existing rule of public international law which 
requires expropriation to be carried out only in furtherance of public 
purpose and upon prompt payment of adequate and effective compensation 
has its origin in the natural law era, formulated to protect "the 
acquired rights 11 • 
The right of States to exproprh1te 'is now so cl ear that hi story 
is not needed to explain it. Most of the modern constitutions for 
instance, confer the power of expropriation. This power may exist 
even if it is not expressly provided for in the constitution. In 
order to illustrate this point, one needs only to see one U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, in which the court held that it was inherent and 
26. Seidl-Hohevelden, supra note 16, p. 80. 
12. 
incidental to the powers expressly allowed to the Federal government 
and therefore existed notwithstanding the silence of the Federal 
Constitution or the absence of the States consent. 27 
-Nationalization 
It is not a very easy exercise·to·determine theexactpoint .. in · 
time in which nationalization as a distinct legal entity emerged. 
However, the time immediately following the Second World War may be-
chosen as a starting point in a discussion of the concept of national-
ization~ This time is important because it was not until after the 
Second World War that the world experienced widespread acts of nation-
alization. This was the period that most of the capital importing 
States gained their political independence which, according to the 
view expressed by some leaders of these countries, does not amount to 
full independenre unless accompanied by economic independence. 28 
Nationalization of natural resources industry together with other major 
means of production and exchange was considered as the most important 
way of attaining economic independence. 
According to a study conducted in relation to measures of 
nationalization 39 per cent of 878 instances of nationalization which 
occurred between 1960 and 1974, took place in newly independent African 
countries. 29 Considering the fact that most of these countries became 
independent during that time, the findings of this study support the 
proposition that the newly independent states regarded the nationalization 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Kohl V. United States (1876), 91 U.S.A.49 at p. 451, per 
Strong, J. 
See U.O. Umuzorike, supra note 1; D.P. Ghai, 11 Concepts and 
Strategies of Economic Independence 11 , 11 JMAS (1973): 
K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, 
1965, 15-36. 
See U.N. General Assembly Report of Economic and Social Council 
on 11 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 11 , U.N. Doc. 
A/9916 supp. E/5425. 
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of foreign-owned property as a means towards the attainment of the 
much needed economic independence. 30 
Having seen the emergence of these widespread acts of national-
ization one would like to see if there were any special rules formu-
lated by public international law to.cater for this hitherto uncommon 
phenomenon. The answer to this is 1 no 1 • What happened on the other 
hand was that the same rules which developed in the Middle Ages to 
regulate acts of expropriation were applied to nationalization measures 
which had emerged. This may be due to the reasoning dominant among 
international lawyers at that time, that the overriding consideration 
is the effect the taking has on the foreign-owner and not the form 
that it takes. Whatever the consideration may be, what.in fact happen-
ed is that the traditional international law rules developed to regu-
late expropriation were extended to nationalizations as well. Hence 
the law required that for nationalization to be lawful it should be 
-
carried out in furtherance of public purpose, without discrimination 
and on payment of compensation to the owner of the nationalized 
property. The traditional international law rule stated in leading 
textbooks, 31 in Statements issued by foreign offices of capital 
exporting countries, 32 in bilateral commercial treaties to which 
capital exporting nations have been parties, 33 in co~ventions drafted 
30. See e.g., how Zambia and Zaire,nationalized their mineral rights 
from BSA and Union Miniere respectively, just a few months after 
independence in G. Lanning and M. Mueller, Africa Undermined, 
Penguin Books, 1979, pp. 196-256. 
31. See e.g., D.P. O'Connell, supra note l, pp. 780-90; J.G.Starke, 
supra note 1, p. 326; D.W. Greig, supra note 1, p. 579. For a 
qualified view see G. White, supra, p.15 and B.A. Wortley, supra, 
p. 129. 
32. U.S. Department of State Statement for the Promotion of Invest-
ments and Nationalization, 30 December 1975 (1975) 15 ILM, 186. 
33. Egypt-U.K. Agreement for the Protection of Investment, 11 June 
1975, 14 (1975) ILM 1470; Singapore-U.K. Agreement on the Prqtection 
and Protection of Investments, 22 July 1976, 15 ILM (1976),591. 
Article 5 of both agreements use the formula 11 Prompt, adequate 
and effective 11 compensation and refer to obligation to pay market 
value of the property. : 
14. 
b . . 1 . 34 . . d t f t. 1 t 35 d y intern at i ona agenc1 es, rn Ju gmen o .na 10na cour s an 
arbitral tribunals 36 and in statements issued by multinational 
corporations, 37 is that when property belonging to a fa.reign 
national is expropriated, States should pay "prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation". 
34. See e.g. OECD Draft Convention on the protection of Foreign 
Property (Dec. 1962). 
35. See e.g. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Chilean Copper Nationalizat-
ion before German Courts", 69 AMJIL (1975), 110. 
36. See e.g. Award on Merits in the dispute between Texaco overseas 
Petroleum Company/Cali.fornia Asiatic Oil Company and the Govern-
ment of Libyan Arab Republic, 16 ILM {1978), p.l. 
37. E.g., Kennecott Copper Corporation, Expropriation of El 
Teinente (excerpted in R.B. Li.llich, Valuation of_ Nationalised Propert!_-. 
in International Law, vol.2, Virginia, 1972, p.82); See also 
M. Sornarajah, 13 JWTL (1979), p.108. · 
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Public Purpose 
The right of nations to expropriate foreign-owned private 
property is not without limitations. One of the basic limitations 
public international law has imposed, is that which requires that 
expropriation should be exercised only if doing so will further a 
public purpose. The aim here is to avoid retaliatory measures 
whi.ch are generally, not motivated by any economic policy of the 
country concerned. 
The question which follows therefore is whether this limitation 
applies to cases of nationalization as well. 
Examination of various decisions regarding nationalization cases 
tend to confirm the proposition that this limitation applies to 
expropriation and nationalization as well. 
In Sabatino ca.J. for instance, the U.S. circuit court of appeal 
held that the retaliatory purpose behind the Cuban nationalizations, 
deprived them of validity because they lacked a true public purpose. 
But in the Shufeldt Arbitration case2 which concerned the 
cancellation of a concession, th~ arbitrator took a contrary view, 
virtually recogning the absence of limitation on public purpose. 
And a PCIJ 1 s dictum in oscer chinn case3 often quoted as an authority 
on this point is not really conclusive either way. 
During the settlement of disputes following the Mexican oil 
expropriations, the British Government insisted on this requirement, 
while the Mexican Government asserted that public purpose may be 
determined by each state at its ownidiscretion. 4 
l. 3 IIM (1964) 381: 56 AMJIL (~962) 1058. 
2. (1930) USA vs. Guatamale, 2 UNRIAA 1095. 
3. 
,...._ - ,.... '''.-!+ ~ r ...... ""'"" ........... n 
-~------· - ·- -
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When the Government of Ceylon nationalized assets and facilities 
of the three oil companies used for the importation and distribution 
of oil, the Government explained that at the time when there was an 
imperative need for putting all capital assets within the country to 
economical and beneficial use, 11 the Government would have been 
failing in its duty to the people of this country, if it had required 
the.Ceylon Petroleum Corporation to provide itself with entirely 
new equipment and facilities such as petrol pumps and petrol 
stations 11 • 5 
It would appear that the explanation given by the Ceylon 
Government is enough to establish the existence of a public purpose 
and that for the purpose of law, it does not matter whether the 
nationalization was total or partial. 
The same reasoning was used by the Ceylon Government in the 
total nationalization of petroleum business in 1964. When Burma 
nationalized foreign banks in 1962 the reason given was that, 11 a 
business which can command huge sums of public money is not fit to 
be left in private hands. 6 This was also regarded as a public 
purpose to justify nationalization. The text writers however are not 
in agreement on the issue especially as regards to nationalization. 
Writers such as Domke7 and Schwarzenberger8 regard it as a necessary 
limitation just as it is in the case of other expropriations. Domke 
5. Hansard (House of Representatives, Ceylon), 20 FEB., 1963. 
6. The Hindustan Times, 24Feb.,.1963. 
7. Domke (1961) 590. 
8. 9.J. Pub. L. (1960) 156 9 Ibid. 
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points out however that, the determination of public interest by 
nationalizing government could hardly be challenged unless it were 
totally beyond any reasonable limit. 9 Herz, on the other hand, 
goes to the extent of saying that, 11 the purpose and motivation are 
entirely irrelevant as far as legal consequences are concerned in 
that even in extreme cases where a state takes foreign property 
without giving any reason or motivation, international law does not 
contain any special rule dealing with such cases in any way different 
from ordinary expropriation for public purpose 11 • 10 
The recent codification drafts contain references to the require-
ment of 11 pub l i c purpose 1111 but do not go beyond mere pronouncement. 
They do not say whether absence of public purpose will render the 
taking unlawful. According to weight of authorities it would appear 
that the view which requires the existence of public interest has more 
·support than that which says it is irrelevant. The principle however 
cannot be said to have been established beyond doubt, especially in 
cases of nationalization. Since the definition of nationa~ization 
presupposes a taking of property in the public interest, the only 
limitations that can be imposed are that nationalization measures 
should be bona fide and that the host state should not go beyond 
reasonable limits in determining reasons for nationalization. 
9. Ibid. 
10. J.H. Herz 11 Expropriation of Foreign Property 11 35 AMJIL (1941) 
255. 
11. Garcia Amador, ILC Yearbook (1961) II 47; The Harvard Draft 
of 1961 Art. 10. 
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These are the only limitations that can be consistently imposed. 
The fact that it has not been questioned whether the modern 
nationalizations were carried out in public interest explains 
the acceptance by international community that nationalization 
measures are essentially a product of a certain economic policy 
and therefore irrespective of acceptability of this policy by those 
affected by the measures, the existence of a public purpose is . 
obvious. 
In brief therefore although it has not been established beyond 
doubt it applies to nationalization measures in the same way as it 
applies to expropriation cases, its application is not in any way 
harmful as the notion of public purpose is pre-supposed in the 
definition of nationalization itself. The major problem however is 
the application or determination of this limitation. Because what 
constitutes a public purpose for one country may not be regarded as 
a public purpose for another. It is therefore, suggested that 
although the notion of public purpose is an important limitation 
in avoiding retaliatory measures, what should be emphasized is the 
fact that the measures should be bona fide and in determining 
reasons for nationalizations host.states should not go beyond 
reasonable limits. 
19. 
Non Discrimination 
Absence of discrimination is another limitation imposed by 
traditional international law, on right of to expropriate foreign-
owned property. 
, What it really means is that in exercising its right to 
expropriate foreign-owned property, a state should not discriminate 
aliens of one nationality in favour of those of another. This 
however does not imply that if a host state nationalizes all the 
shares in a company owned by citizens of a nation A, it should also 
do the same in respect of a company owned by nationals of a country B. 
What is expected is that, when properties of aliens belonging to 
different nationalities are expropriated the host state should refrain 
from awarding differential treatments when dealing with the question 
of payment of compensation. 
It should probably be pointed out that this limitation, like 
other principles discussed above, was developed to take care of 
exproprietory measures, before acts of nationalization became popular. 
If this is the case, the question which follows immediately is 
whether this limitation applies to nationalization measures as well. 
A study of case law relating to nationalization measures tend to 
favour this view. 
In Cuban Nationalization cases of 1960 (43 Dept. of State 
Bulletin (1960) pg. 171) for example the United States protested 
against the discriminatory nature of the Cuban Nationalizations 
which affected the properties of ,United States nationals only as 
being retaliatory. 
20. 
Whatever can be said regarding the merits or otherwise, of the 
American objection, it is important to note that the limitation was 
applied in a case involving nationalization. Apart from a few 
instances where the notion of non-discrimination was categorically 
rejected, the principle appears to enjoy a wide acceptance in the 
international community, as representing a fundamental principle of 
justice. 
One of the few instances in which the principle of non-discrim-
ination was rejected is in a recent German decision,1 where it was 
alleged that the equality meant that equals must be treated equally 
2 
and therefore differential treatment of unequals was admissible. 
This statement was used to justify differential ·treatment by 
former colonial people towards companies owned by former colonial 
masters. The principle of non-discrimination was also rejected in 
cases involving post-war nationalizations in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
3 
Bulgaria and Rumania. Although these countries finally entered 
into treaties with states of affected aliens regarding payment of 
compensation, it is not clear whether there was agreement between the 
parties regarding illegality of discriminatory nationalization. 
There is evidence that this principle is acceptable even to some 
4 
Eastern European Communist countries., and it has support of some 
Draft Conventions. 5 
1. W.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschpijen and N.V. Sanembah-Matchapi] 
1959, cited in C.F. Amerasinghe, Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
3 
4. 
See G. White's Analysis Supra note 1, pg. 211. 
C.F. Amerasinghe, Supra pg. 139. 
5. See e.g. Garcia - Amador 1 s Final Draft, Article 9 Int. Law . 
Commission Yearbook (1961) ii, p.47; Article 10 of Harvard .
2
'. 
Draft (1961), P.558. , 
21 • . . 
In view of easy acceptability of this principle, it is safe 
to conclude that the principle of non-discrimination is in general 
a sound one, because it is based on a fundamental principle of 
justice and is vital to oraered relations based on mutual respect be-
tween states. Since there is no evidence to suggest that discrimin-
ation is vital to the efficacy of nationalization, the presumption. 
is that the principle survives even in regard to nationalizations. 
Payment of Compensation 
Payment of compensation to the owners of the property affected 
by the nationalization measures is another limitation imposed on a 
State's right to nationalize foreign-owned property. 
The rule which is supported by all leading cpaital exporting 
countries, already discussed, is that expropriation is lawful only 
if prompt payment of adequate and effective compensation is paid 
to the alien owner of the expropriated property. u As expropriation 
and nationalization are considered to be synonymous in traditional 
public international law, this requirement also applies to acts 
of nationalization. This means that nationalization, which is 
regarded as an exercise of territorial sovereignty, here becomes 
lawful subject to payment of compensation. This view however is 
6 . See notes 31 , 32, 33, 34, 36 and 37 above; see a 1 so U. K ·-' s- --
Statement to the Indonesian Government of 20th July, 1965 
(1965) BPIL, pp.199-200. 
J 
not accepted by some members of the international community, 
expecially capital importing nations as well as some prominent 
publicists and as such it ~an hardly be said that the rule is 
established in international law. 
22. 
Discussing the requirement of -payment of compensation, Foighe-1 
points out that, "although international legal opinion largely 
assumes that compulsory acquisition of private property entials a 
liability to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation, this 
requirement has not been established as a rule of international 
law 11 • 7 Foighel is not the only publicist on the subject to hold 
this view. John Fisher Williams pointed out that "apart from the 
support that this rule enjoys from prominent jurists and many 
lawyers of great eminence, the doctrine is found to have less 
ri 
support in the realm of actual international law 11 • 0 
The question of whether the rule which requires the payment of 
7, Foighel, supra note 1, pp. 1-2. 
n. Fisher Williams, "International Law and the Property of 
Aliens", (1928), BYIL, pp. 1-2.i 
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prompt,adequate and effective compensations established in inter-
national law is examined in the next chapter of this work, where a 
detailed study of this rule is made. However, an examination of 
terminology employed in this rule is in order. 
Prompt 
The requirement that compensation should be paid promptly has 
always posed a problem as to the exact meaning of the word "prompt". 
The United Kingdom's understanding of the term "prompt" is that 
which was expressed in its memorial in the AngZo-Iranian oiZ company 
9 The term 11 prompt 11 however refers to the time at which case. 
payment of compensation should be made rather than the time at which 
it should be assessed.10 
There has also been some pronouncements to the effect that 
prompt compensation means immediate payment in cash. 11 Some govern-
ments however are prepared to admit that deferred payment may be 
regarded as satisfying the requirement of prompt compensation, in 
accordance with the rule of international law if the total amount 
to be paid is fixed promptly, allowance for interest for late payment 
is made and the guarantees that future payment will be made are 
satisfactory so that the person to be compensated may, if he so 
desires, raise the full sum at once on the security of future pay-
12 ' ments. , The existence of all these different interpretations shows 
that despite the general requirement that Gompensation should be paid 
9 . 
10. 
11 · 
12. 
ICJ Pleadings AngZo-Iranian oil company case. pp. 105-6. 
Per Permanent Court of I nterna ti ona 1 Justice in Chorzow Factory 
Case (1938), PCIJ Ser. A. No. 17, pp. 48-9. 
See e.g., the Arbitration between the U.S. and Norway relating 
to the question of contracts for the building of ships in the· 
U.S. in Scott, Hague Court Reports (1932), p. 77. 
The government of United Kingdom is prepared to admit this. 
See D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 
2nd Ed., London, 1979, p. 455. 
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promptly, international law has not formulated a rule stipulating 
the exact time at which compensation should be paid. What is certain 
however is the fact that the term 11 prompt 11 refers to the time at 
which compensation should be made and in the absence of universally 
accepted time, it would seem that each case will differ from another, 
depending on the circumstances of each case. 
Adequate 
Classical international law also requires that compensation 
paid in event of expropriation of foreign-owned property should not 
only be prompt but it should be adequate. The term 11 adequate 11 is 
also quite vague and as such is capable of different interpretations. 
Principles such as restitituo in integrum and equity have been used 
to suggest that adequate compensation means at least the payment of 
market value of the property expropriated.13 
The requirement of market value as representing adequate compen-
sation has been rejected by third world countries, which have been 
responsible for most of the nationalizations in recent times. 
Discussing this question, one writer concluded that the theory 
of adequate compensation which demands full compensation as a 
condition to legitimize a taking, has a defect in that it rests on 
the assumption that private property represents an absolute right 
13. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, 
spoke of 11 compensation ... in convertable foreign exchange, equi-
valent to the full market value thereof 11 ; see also Statement 
of U.S. Department of State, note 32, supra, which says, 11 the 
acceptance of less than market ~alue by U.S. nationals does not 
constitute acceptance of any other standard by U.S. government 11 ; 
also see D.A. Gantz, "The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of 
Negotiations and compensation for Foreign Property 11 , 71 AMJIL 
(1977), 474; for equitable principle to suggest payment of 
market value see e.g. F. Francioni, "Compensation for National-
ization of Foreign Property: The Borderland between Law and 
Equity", 24 ICLQ (1975), 255. :, 
25 
14 
that will not admit legal destruction without reparation. The 
author continues that this proposition fails as a general principle 
of law of nations,in view ~f the considerable emphasis the modern 
States have given to social function of property. Whether this is 
the right explanation is arguable. However there is evidence to show 
that there is an increasing number of situations in which capital 
exporting countries have accepted or permitted their citizens to 
accept amounts less than the market value of the expropriated pro-
perty.15 This leads to a conclusion that the requirement that market 
value must be paid upon expropriation is no longer valid in inter-
national law. 
Examination of various State practices indicates that it is 
possibly due to vagueness of the international law standard regard-
ing adequacy of compensation on one hand and the rejection of market 
value standard by the Third World nations that States have not acted 
consistently on this issue. Various countries have paid or accepted 
amounts of compensation according to different economic, political 
and other_~on-legal motives.16 
Although the term 11 adequate 11 was originally interpreted as 
meaning full market value of the property affected, State practice 
14, J.A. Rohwer, 11 Nationalization: International Minimum Standard 
- Chilean Excess Profit Deductions 11 , 14 Harvard Int.L.Journal, 
p. 385. 
15. See M. Sornarajah, supra note 37, p. 104, where he says that, 
considering that in international law it is the State of alien 
whose property is expropriated without compensation which suffers 
injury, a State's tacit consent to settlements on principles 
other than market value could give rise to inference of the 
State 1 s acquiescenGe in other standards of compensation... . _,. 
16. For U.S. State Practice, see G. White, supra not l, p. 14; 
see also the standard 11 Full and fair 11 compensation in 
Tanzania Nationalizations, in A.~J.Bradley, 11 Legal Aspects 
of the Nationalizations in Tanzania 11 [1967], EALJ, 
pp. 149-76. 
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seems to indicate that adequate compensation is that which bears 
some reasonable relation to the value of property affected. This 
value will of course differ according to the valuation method 
adopted in computing compensation payable. 
Effective 
The term effective refers to the currency in which compensation 
has to be paid. It means that the amount of compensation payable 
should not only be adequate and paid promptly but must be of real 
economic value. Like the other two terms already examined, the rules 
of public international law are not developed to the extent of formu-
lating hard and fast rules regarding the requirement of currency in 
which compensation is to be paid. Although in most cases claimants 
demand payment in convertable currencies, what may be regarded as 
effective compensation depends on the use the claimant desires to 
make of the compensation funds. If, for example, he intends to 
re-invest them in another sector of the economy within the country, 
it makes no sense to pay him 'or for him to demand payment in convert-
able currency. On the other hand, if he wants to take it overseas 
it will be unfair to pay him in local currency. In brief therefore, 
compensation in local currency or in transferable form may const,itute 
effective compensation, depending on the circumstances of each 
t . 1 17 par icu ar case. 
In conclusion therefore, althoµgh it is mainly the Third World 
countries which reject the so-called 11 Hull rule 11 requiring payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, it is now evident 
that even some of those who supported the rule tend to agree, in 
view of overwhelming opinion to the contrary, that it no longer 
1~ G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law, 
1969, p. 11. 
/ 
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represents the equitable.formula. -
Diplomatic Protection 
The concept of diplomatic protection occupies a very important 
position in a discussion involving the question of State responsi-
bili-ty-·for injuries to aliens abroad. This is so because in classi-
cal international law, it is the State of the alien whose rights 
are alleged to have been violated which suffers injury, and therefore 
it is his State of nationality and not the alien himself which can 
institute a claim before an international tribunal against the defend-
ant -State. If a State decides to take a claim on behalf of its 
national, that State is said to have exercised its right of diplo-
matic protection over its national . 19 
There seems to be a consensus among various prominent publicists 
that the principle of diplomatic protection with its modern features 
20 
was not developed before the l9th century, for it was not until 
this particular time, with the coming of the industrial revolution 
that the actual need for diplomatic protection emerged. During this 
time, merchants and other businessmen went to live outside their own 
19, 
20· 
See e.g., R. Dolzer, 11 Ne1v Foundations of the Law of Expropriation 
of Alien Property 11 , 75 AMJIL (1981), 558, in which he says that 
the so-called 11 Hull rule 11 was not formulated to disfavour develop-
ing countries but it was applied among and against Western States 
before most of the modern states emerged through decolonization 
process. ,, 
The doctrine of diplomatic protection has been described as the 
elementary principle of international law in Barcelona Case [1970] 
ICJ Rep. 3; 32-31; M:zvrormnatis Palestine Concession Case [1924] 
PCIJ Ser. A. no.2; Nottebohm Case [1955] ICJ Rep~ 4, 24. 
See e. g., E.M. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad: 
New York, 1970; F.S. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals: New York, 
1970, p.46; Dawson and Head, International Law National 'h1ibunals 
and Rights of Aliens:Syracuse Uni. Press, 1971, p. 2. See also 
B.A. Wortley, 11 The Protection of Property Situated Abroad 11 , 35 . 
Tu.lane Law Rev. (1961}, pp. 739-66; R.B. Lillich, "The Diplomatic 
Protection of Nationals Abroad: An elementary Principle of Inter-
national La1v Under Attack 11 , 69 AMJIL (1975), 359; S.N. Guha Roy, 
"Is the Law of Responsibility of States to injuries to Aliens a 
part of Universal International Law? 11 , 55 AMJIL ( 1961), pp. 863-91 · 
\ 
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countries in greater numbers in search of raw materials for the 
growing factories which had just begun to develop in Europe, 
Because of this, there also emerged a general concern in Europe, 
· where these merchants originated, over the treatment accorded to 
peaceful aliens living abroad. The concern arose because, until 
this time, the only remedies available to the aliens were those under 
mu·nicipal law of the host States and therefore they were applied 
. 21 
equally to aliens and nationals alike. This concern over the need 
to protect aliens living abroad was reflected also in the publication 
at this particular point in time of Vattel 's influential work entitled 
"The Law of Nations 11 in which he advanced a thesis that a State has 
22 
a duty to its subjects' and that a State that injures a person or 
property of the subject of another State commits an injury against 
the State for which it could become responsible. 23 
States started practising the principle of diplomatic protection 
by placing their complaints for redress on the basis of international 
commity and maintenance of friendly relations. 24 In this way, there 
devel oped--a body of precedent whi eh made it customary to make these 
demands as claims of right. 25 By the middle of the 19th century, 
governments habitually treated the question of diplomatic protection 
as a legal question and they justified interposition by appealing to 
21, F.A. Mann, supra note 1, p. 192; E.M. ~orchard, supra note 61, 
p. 7 • 
. 22. This duty is unde rs toad to mean a duty to of fer protection. 
· 23, See E. De Vattel, The Law of Nations, Bk II, p. 136. (Classics 
of International Law Edn.), C. Fenwick Trans. 196. This work 
was not written by Vattel in l9th Century but it became more 
publicised during this time because the thesis injury to an 
individual is injury to his State was found to be appropriate 
at that time. 
24, F.S. Dunn, supra note 61, p. 55~ 
25. Ibid. 
29. 
26 
the principles of international law and writings of publicists 
and settlement of dispute in this way gradually became institutional-
ized. 
, 
Through this practice therefore, there emerged a body of rules 
regulating the treatment which may be accorded to foreigners. This 
body of rules ·is what is sometimes referred to as the minimum standard 
of international law on the protection of property abroad, which may 
be reduced into the following major points: 
1. That a State is entitled to protect its nationals in another 
State from gross injustices at the hands of another State, 
even if applied equally to the subjects of such other State; and 
2. A State is entitled to protect its subjects in another State 
from injuries to their property resulting from measures in 
application of which there·is discrimination between them and 
the subjects of the other States. 27 
Like other principles of international law already discussed, 
the concept of minimum standard of justice for the protection of 
citizens abroad did not receive the same amount of support in all 
sections of the international community. Some of its critics dis-
missed it as no more than the ideas which are conceived to be 
essential for a continuation of existing social and economic order.2b 
The ideas embodied in the principles of diplomatic protection and 
minimum standard of justice received a considerable amount of opposi-
tion from capital importing States, especially the Latin American 
countries. These countries advocated a counter theory of national 
26, Ibid. 
27,. A. Fachiri, 11 Expropriation and International Law 11 [1925], «' 
BYIL, pp. 159-71. 
28. F.S. Dunn, "International Law and Private Property Rights", 
Columbia Law Rev. (1928), 175. 
30. 
treatment in the form of what was to become 11 the Calvo doctrine 11 
named after an Argentinian writer who developed the theory in his 
29 
extensive treatise on the Jaw of nations published in 1868. 
Before examining the details of the Counter theory contained 
in the Calvo clause, a brief survey of some procedural rules of the 
principle of diplomatic protection will be necessary. 
Nationality of Claims rule 
The requirement of nationality of claims is based on the under-
standing that it is the link of nationality between a State and an 
individual which gives a State the right to exercise its diplomatic 
30 
protection on his behalf. However in cases of 11 delegated 11 protection 
or when a State exercises protection over the nationals of a protect-
orate or a trust territory31 it is the criterion of the link of 
nationality between the individual and the 11 protected 11 State which is 
operative. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Penevezys-
Saldustisks Railway Case, affirmed in 1939 that, 
In the absence of a special agreement, it is 
29. For Calvo clauses, see R.B. Lillich, 11 Diplomatic Protection of 
Nationals Abroad 11 , 69 AMJIL (1975), 359; D. Shea, The Calvo 
Clause (1955), p. 19; Judge Ammonn 1.s separate opinion in 
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co.Ltd. [1970] ICJ, Rep. pp. 
290-95; see also Guha Roy, note 61, supra; A.V. Freeman, 
11 Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the challenge to 
Interna ti ona 1 Law 11 , 40 AMJI L ( 1:946), 121. 
30." 11 Delegated Protection 11 as disti·nct from 11 Protection Status 11 is a 
term used by Borchard, to denote the state of fact when the 
interests of one sovereign State is confided in the territory 
of another to a third state on .temporary basis. See, -E.M •. 
Borchard, note 61, supra, pp. 471-5; See also C. Parry, 11 Plural 
Nationality and Citizenship with special Reference toCommonweal th'', 
30 BYIL (1958), p. 257. 
3~. Pablo Najera claim (1928), UNRA, vol. 5, p. 466. 
'· 
the bond of nationality between State and 
individual which alone confers upon the State 
the right of diplomatic protection.32 . 
31. 
The rule of nationality of claims therefore ensures that as from the 
time of occurrence of the alleged injury until the time of making 
of the award, the claim must continuously and without interruption 
have belonged. to a person or series of persons having the nationality 
of the State by whom it is put forward and not having nationality of 
33 the State against which it is put forward. 
This rule requires that there should be continuity in the nation-
ality of the claimant. The principle of continuity has received 
a considerable amount of .criticism, mainly because it allows incidental 
matters such as change of nationality by operation o~ law, including 
cession of territory, to affect reasonable claims. If the legal 
wrong is to the State of origin, then the wrong has been committed 
and matured at the time of injury and is unaffected by subsequent 
changes in the status of the individual.· 34 
The essence of the rule of continuity would seem to be aimed at 
preventing individuals from choosing a powerful protecting State by 
a shift of nationality. However, the view would not appear to support 
the application of the principle in ceases of involuntary change of 
35 
nationality brought about by death or State succession. It is 
obvious that the rule is based on the presumption that individuals 
have one nationality at a time but in prac~ice this is not always 
th~ case. There are a considerable number of instances in which 
people have been found to have dual or multiple nationalities. The 
32 PCIJ Ser. A/B No.76; See also Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) 
Judgment of April 6, 1955, ICJ Rep. 1958, p. 23. 
33. I. Brownlie, supra note l, pp. 481-2; c.f. Amerasinghe, 
supra note l. 
34. Brownlie, ibid. 35. Ibid.~ p. 482. 
32 
interesting question in this regard is which of these States would 
have the right to bring a claim under diplomatic protection. 
The International Court of Justice considered this particular 
36 
problem in Nottebohm Case, and came to the conclusion that, 
According to the practice of States to arbitral 
and judicial decisions and to t~e opintons of 
writers, nationality is a legal bond having as 
its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interest and sentiments 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights 
and duties..... · 
A State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid 
down [with regard to Nationality] are entitled to 
recognition by another State unless it has acted 
in conformity with the general aim of making the 
legal bond of nationality in accord with the 
individual 1 s genuine connection with the State 
which assumes the defence of its citizens by means 
of protection as against other States. 
[emphasis supplied] 
According to the principle of this case therefore in case of 
dual or multip.le nationality the right to bring a claim is exercised 
only by the State with which the alien has the stronger and more 
genuine ties of nationality. 
Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
Exhaustion of local remedies is an important rule of admissibil-
ity which applies to the cases involving diplomatic protection, a's 
opposed to cases of direct injury to the State. 
The rule simply requires that an individual alien or a corpora-
tion should exhaust the legal remedies available in the host State, 
37 
before his claim can be admissible on the international plane. The 
rule was confirmed by an i_nternational tribunal in the Interhande.Z 
3£. Not·tebohm Case, supra. 
37. The rule of exhaustion of local remedies may be avoided by 
agreement. See Brownlie, supra, p. 496; C.F. Amerasinghe, 
supra, p. 169; Borchard, supra, p. 818. 
33. 
case, where it was said that, 11 The rule that local remedies must 
be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted, is a 
well established rule of c~stomary international law. 38 
Apart from the attention it has received from various publicists, 
the rule also has been invoked on several occasions before the Perman-
ent Court of International Justice and the International Court of 
39 
Justice-· and before other internatonal tribunals. 40 
The main consideration behind this rule seems to be that it is 
difficult if not impossible to say whether an injury can be imputed 
to the State before the c~aimant brings and exhausts all the actions 
and proceedings provided for in the State where the injury is alleged 
to have happened. 
41 
Borchard- who made a detailed study on the subject of diplom-
atic protectior., outlined several reasons for this limitation on 
the principle of diplomatic protection. One of the reasons that he 
gave for the rule of local remedies is that people going abroad are 
presumed to take into account the means furnished by the local law 
3e, [1959] ICJ, Rep. p. 27. 
39, See note 78 supra. 
40, See, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (1925) PCIJ 
Ser. A.No.5; The German Interest in Upper Silesia Case (1925), 
PCIJ, Ser.A. No.6; The Chorzow Factory Case (1927) PCIJ Ser. A. 
No. 9; The Affaire Losinger and-Company~ .order of 27 June .1936.,, 
PCIJ Series A/B No. 74; The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case 
(1939) PCIJ Ser. A/B No.76; The Electricity Co. of Sofia Case 
(1939) PCIJ Series A/B No. 77; 'Anglo-Eranian Oil Co. Case (1952) 
ILJ Rep. p. 99; Ambatielos Case 1953, ICJ Reps. p.13; Nottebohm 
Case (1959) ICJ, Reps. p. 14; The Interhandel Case (1959) ICJ 
Reps. p. 11; The Aerial Incident Case (1959) ICJ Reps. p. 132; 
and The Barcelona Traction Case (1964), ICJ Reps. p. 12. 
41, Borchard, note 1 supra, pp. 817-8. See also the critique 
of Borchard's formulation in C.F. Amerasinghe, supra, p. 171. 
34. 
for the redress of wrongs. Secondly, he said that the right of 
sovereignty and independence warrants the local States in demanding 
the freedom of their court from interference and the assumption that 
they are capable of doing justice. Thirdly, the home governments of 
the complaining alien must give the offending government an opportun-
ity of doing justice to the injured person in its own regular way and 
thus avoid, if possible,international action. Fourthly, if the 
injury is committed by an individual or_ minor official, the exhaustion 
of local remedies is necessary to make certain the the wrongful acts 
or denial of justice is the deliberate act of the State and, fifthly, 
if it is the deliberate act of.the State, it will show that the 
State is willing not to right the wrong. 
Whether these are the real reasons for the rule of local remedies 
is arguable. However, what may be said briefly is that it is a 
limitation to the rule nf diplomatic protection in that it requires 
that where there is a remedy, it must be sought. Only if sought in 
vain and a denial of justice established, does diplomatic protection 
become proper. 
The Scope of the Rule 
In a discussion involving the rule of local remedies, the 
question which should be considered is 1whenare the local remedies 
deemed to have been exhausted?' 
It has been suggested that the.question whether local remedies 
have been exhausted is a matter which can be verified objectively. 
It will be sufficient for example, to know whether the decision is 
final or not. If a final decision nas not been given, it can not be 
argued either in law or fact, that the remedies open to the claimant 
35 
42 have been exhausted· and it cannot be said with certainty what is 
the form or scope of the act or omission complained of, on which 
43 
international claim is founded. 
Another important question in relation to the rule of exhaustion 
of local remedies is whether in pursuing the local remedies, the 
alien is expected to exhaust administrative and legislative as well 
as judicial remedies. 
Discussing this aspect of the rule; Amerasinghe44 pointed out 
that although textwriters generally discuss the rule of exhaustion 
of local remedies on the assumption that it is limited to the remedies 
of judicial nature, international law practice shows that there is 
no cogent evidence to suggest that practice has accepted this broad 
definition of local remedies. In his own view, the author concluded 
that the concept of local remedies covers only remedies which enjoy 
a judicial character, although it is not confined to regular courts 
45 
of law· and that aliens should pursue and exhaust administrative 
remedies only if they enjoy a character which ensures impartial 
determination of disputes according to the law and not purely by 
46 
discretion. The administrative tribunals and the like may fall 
under this category of exhaustible remedies, if they share the 
required character and particularly, if they are subject to control 
by ordinary courts as this ensures impartiality and determination 
42. F.V. Garcia-Amador, Third Report on 11 International responsibil-
ity: [1958], vol. II, YBILC, pp. 43-73. 
43.. Ibid. 
4-4 • C. F. Amerasi nghe, supra note 1, 169-99. 
45 . Ibid. 
46. Ibid., p. 190; see also The Phosphates inMorocco Case [1938], 
PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 74 in which.the French government argued 
that local remedies were not exhausted as it was open to the 
Italian company to have recourse to civil court adjudicating 
upon administrative questions.1 
according to law. 47 · 
Exceptions to the Rule 
The rule of local remedies may be inapplicable in international 
proceedings for different reasons. This may be in cases where only 
a· declaratory judgment is sought,48 or·where the rule has been waived 
by .a treaty, or where there has been a forfeiture of the benefits 
49 
of the rule by estoppel. Apart from these situations, there is 
also an exception to the rule of local remedies which concerns the 
content of the rule itself. This is found in a situation whereby 
the application of the rule for one reason or another is bound to 
be futile. A common situation where an alien claimant is not expect-
ed to,exhaust the remedies available in the defendant State is where 
there is reason to believe that an outcome is a foregone conclusion. 
In the Finnish Ships Arbitration50 for example, it was held 
that a claimant was not under an obligation to resort to an appeal 
which was obviously futile and that the complainant was not compelled 
to take his case to the highest Court in any circumstances. It 
was enough if the remedy merely appeared to be futile. 
The rule evolved in the Finnish Ships Arbitration was also applied 
47 C.F. Amerasinghe, ibid., p. 191. 
~8. See e.g., The German Interest in Upper Silesia Case (1926), 
PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 6. 
49. See the French government's argument in The Norw_egian Loans 
Case (1957), !CJ Rep. 407; for the principle of estoppel as 
a general principle of International Law, see The Temple of 
Preah Vinear Case (1962), ICJ, Rep., p. 6. 
50. 3 .UNRIAA (1934), p. 1504; see also A.P. Fachiri, 
11 The Local Remedies Rule in Light of the Finnish Ships 
Arbitration" (1936), BYBIL, pp.: 19-36. 
'· 
37. 
51 by Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case, in which the 
issue of non-exhaustion of local remedies was raised, although not 
deciped upon. In his separ.ate opinion Judge Lauterpacht said that 
the Norwegian objection was good because it was not clear that resort 
to Norwegian courts would be absolutely futile. 
d 52 h . ·1 In Interhan ei Case, t e court s1m1 arly held that there was 
a possibility of success in American courts for the Swiss company 
and that it could not be said that there were no remedies available 
Judge Armond-Ligon (dissenting) however was of the view that because 
a further unknown period would have to elapse before remedies were 
exhausted, ten years already having passed, such remedies were too 
slow and could not be called adequate or effective remedies and could 
53 
therefore be disposed with. 
Absence of jurisdiction over the matter has also been held to 
be a good ground to exempt an alien from exhaustion of local remedies.54 
However, for an international tribunal to rule whether the local 
tribunal had jurisdiction over the matter or not, it must have a 
look at the provisions of relevant domestic law. The practice adopted 
by most international tribunals is that unless there is clear evidence 
', ' 
of lack of jurisdiction on the part ·of a local tribunal, they will 
55 
not examine the municipal law. 
Absence of bias is another factor which will justify an excuse 
56 from resorting to local remedies. In Robert E. Brown Case, an 
51. Note 90,supra. 52. Note 79, supra. 
53. Ibid. 
54. See Panevezys-SaZdutiskis Railway Case (1939), ICIJ Ser. A/B 
no. 76, p. l 9. 
55. See D.R. Mummery, 11 The content of the Ru 1 e to exhaust Local 
Judicial Remedies 11 , 58 AMJIL (1964), p. 401. 
5G. (1923) {U.S.A. v. G.B.), 6, UNRIAA, p. 120. . 1· 
38. 
international tribunal held that the alien was excused from taking 
his claim to local courts because they were at that time completely 
under the control of the government. In its own words, the tribunal 
said that the local remedies were ineffective on the grounds that 
the courts had been 11 reduced to submission and brought into line with 
a determined policy of the executive to reach the desired result 
regardless of constitutional guarantees and limitations 11 •57 
The rule of this case therefore illustrates the well established 
principle that where the executive branch dominates the courts, 
58 judicial remedies against executive actions need not be pursued. 
Finally denial of justice by the judicial organ of the State 
is also regarded as a good reason for excusing an alien from the 
obligation to resort.to local remedies. Denial may take the form 
of undue delay or a mere denial of access to the courts. It may 
also take the form of gross deficiency in administration of judicial 
59 process. 
In EZ Oro ~fining and Railway Company Case, 60 it was held that 
a court's delay in taking action for nine years was sufficient to 
make it insufficient remedy. 
Opposition to the Principle of Diplomatic Protection: The Calvo 
Clause 
During the formative years in the development of the concept 
of diplomatic protection, there also emerged a counter-theory which 
57. Ibid., p. 129. 
58. See note 96, supra. 
59. See Harvard Law School, Research in International Law II, 
Responsibility of States (1929), p. 134. 
6Q. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases [1931-32], 
No. l 00. 
39. 
was to be known as the theory of non-intervention. The need for 
this theory emerged with the realization by some Latin American 
scholars that there w.as a te.ndency among some developed countries to 
abuse the principle of diplomatic protection. These scholars thought 
therefore that if this tendency were left unchecked, there was a danger 
of some of the weak developing countries losing their territories. 
Like the exponents of the principle of diplomatic protection, these 
scholars turned to Vattel and seized yet another famous passage from 
his 11 Law of Nations 11 to justify their opposition to the concept of 
diplomatic protection. The relevant passage says that, 
[A]s the administration of justice necessarily 
requires that every sentence pronounced in due 
form and by the court of last resort, be regarded 
as just and executed as such. When once a case 
in which foreigners are involved has been decided 
in due form, the sovereign of the litigants may 
not review the decision. 
To undertake to inquire into the justice of a 
defitive sentence is an attack upon the jurisdiction 
of the court which passed it. 
The passage continues that a sovereign should refrain from interfering 
in suits of his subjects in foreign countries, except in cases where, 
"Justice has been denied or the decision is clearly and probably unjust 
or the proper procedure has not been observed, or finally in cases, 
where his subjects have been discriminated against 11 • 6i 
Out of this passage the Latin American scholars formulated an 
argument that court decisions should be final in cases involving 
nationals and foreigners. The exception being in cases where there 
is clear evidence of denial of justice. This concept of equal treat-
mentor national treatment, which is said to have originally been 
developed to encourage foreign immigration, was used to support an 
argument that foreigners are entitled to no better treatment than 
61. E. de Vattel, note 64, supra. 
h . l 62 t e nat1ona s. 
The most articulate and famed proponent of this revised version 
of national treatment doct~ine is the erudite Argentine diplomat 
and legal scholar named Carlos Calvo. He formulated a comprehensive 
theory to restrict diplomatic protection, which he set forth in 
detail in a monumental six-volume work published in 1896. 53 , 
The Calvo Clause is based on two principles which may be briefly 
summed up as follows: 
(1) The sovereign State being free and independent, enjoys the 
," 
right on the basis of equality and freedom from interference 
by other States either through force or diplomacy; and 
(ii) Although aliens should be acc~~ded equal treatment with 
nationals, they are not entitled to rights and principles not 
accorded to nationals. Therefore, they must seek redress for 
grievances exclusively in local courts. 
These twin concepts of the principle of non-intervention are 
the core of what is regarded as the Calvo doctrine, which is a 
corollary of the doctrine of equal treatment which is today accepted 
by most Latin American States as being a principle of international 
64 
law. 
The Calvo Clause may take several fonns. It may consist of 
stipulations to the effect that the aliens concerned shall be satis-
fied with the remedies offered locally, under municipal law. Some-
times the aliens concerned enter into agreement with local governn~nt 
62. See F. Dawson 11 International, Law, National Tribunals and Rights 
of Aliens: The Latin American Experience 11 , 21 Va.L.Rev.(1~68), 
718-21. 
53. The original version of his work is in French, entitled Le 
Droit International Theorique et pratique: Paris, 1896. · 
64. See, D. Shea, The Calvo Clause A Problem of Inter-American 
Inte1?national Law and Diplomacy, (1955), pp. 4-5. · 
41. 
undertaking to submit any dispute among them to a local tribunal. 
In some cases however, the Clavo Clause embodies a more direct and 
broader waiver of diplomati~ protection, when it provides that any 
dispute that may arise shall in no circumstances lead to an inter-
national claim. The effect of such a provision is to bring a foreigner 
to an equal footing with a national for the purpose of that particu-
lar contract or concession. In the contract which was in issue in 
the North American Dredging Company Case for example, foreigners 
65 
were deemed to be nationals for the purpose of the contract. 
Some countries, mostly Latin American countries, have constitutional 
and legislative provisions· requiring contracts entered into between 
State and aliens to include a Calvo Clause of the type mentioned 
6b 
above. 
Despite the support that the Calvo doctrine enjoys from the 
Latin American States and other developing countries, some scholars, 
especially those from capital exporting States, argue that the Calvo 
Clause is nothing more than the reaffirmation of the rule of local 
remedies because according to this school of thought, 11 the clause 
will be ineffective if it purports to prevent the State of national-
ity from exercising the right of diplomatic protection under inter-
national law 11 • 67 
Whatever one's views about the Calvo Clause are it would appear to 
be wrong to consider the clause, even if c~nceived in a way which 
prevents the exercise of diplomatic protection, to be useless or 
65. (1926) A UNRIAA, p. 26. 
56. For various forms of the Calvo Clause see E. Egleton, 
The ResponsibiZity of States in Internationai Lcau: 
New York (1928), p. 203. 
67. See e.g., D. Shea, supra. 
42. 
superfluous because in practice it has, within this limited scope, 
enabled States to resist successfully international claims, which · 
·68 
but for the existence of the clause would have been admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Nationalization of foreign-owned property is a phenomenon 
.--
closely related to the concept of expropriation which has in modern 
times become a separate legal phenomenon recognised in international 
law. Due to its close relationship and resemblance to the concept of 
expropriation, some publicists have often considered it as being not 
different from the general acts of expropriation. This is the case 
because invariably those who hold this view tend to consider these 
two concepts from the point of view of a foreign investor and hence 
conclude that these two phenomena have the same effect on the alien 
owner whose property has been taken over by the government. Because 
this view seems to be dominant among international lawyers, the rules 
developed in the Middle Ages to regulate expropriaton are used also 
to regulate acts of nationalization. 
Although some of these rules are readily accepted in the inter-
national community, the rule requiring payment of compensation has 
received a considerable amount of opposition, especially from capital 
importing States~ which are responsible for most of the nationaliza-
tion measures in recent times. 
Because of the controversy regarding what should be the right 
rule of international law applicable to nationalization acts, there 
has emerged the need to refer the disputes between the parties to 
international tribunals, in accordance with the principle of 
68. Ibid., Garcia-Amador, note 83,,supra, p. 31. 
43. 
diplomatic protection which enables a State of nationality to 
institute a claim in international tribunals on behalf of its 
citizens. The major obstacle in this regard however, is the .fact 
that the concept of diplomatic protection itself is not universally 
accepted. Its application has been limited considerably through 
~he concept of national treatment. 
. \. 
44. 
CHAPTER TWO 
COMPENSATION FOR NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 
The rule of traditional international law is that, expropriation 
of foreign-owned property is lawful if it is accompanied by payment 
of prompt adequate and effective compensation. 1 
The amount of support that this rule enjoys from the Governments 
and Scholars of capital exporting countries has already been 
demonstrated. 2 
The question which follows therefore is whether there is a duty, 
in international law, to pay compensation in cases of nationalization. 3 
While capital exporting countries maintain that there is such a duty 
under international law, to compensate even in case of nationalization, 
the Soviet Union and some of the capital importing countries have taken 
the view that there is no obligation to compensate at all. 4 
Examination of treaty practice of most of the European countries 
indicates that various nationalization measures were followed with 
signing of treaties apparently acknowledging an obligation to pay 
compensation.5 
However it is worth noting that these treaties were concluded 
out of economic necessity and therefore they should be interpreted 
on the background of special circumstances. 
l. This rule is stated in most of the international law text books 
see e.g. I. Brownlie, The Princi'Ple of Public International Law 
3rd Ed. Clarendon, Oxford, 1979 ·pp, 337 - 41; DP. O'Connell, 
International Law Vo l . II 2nd .·Ed. : London, 1970. 
2. See note 47 Chapter One, Supra.c 
3. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Ibid. pg.,·143. 
4. Vyshinsky, The Law of Soviet State (1948) pg. 179. 
5. Drucker, 10, l CLQ (1961) 238. ll 
/ 
This being the case, and bearing in mind that no prior 
explicit statement about the existence of a duty to compensate 
has been made by the East European countries, one can conclude 
45. 
that such a duty is not automatically recognised by these states. 
A·survey of legislation in countries which have nationalized 
foreign-owned property, shows that the majority of nationalization 
laws contain provisions concerning the liability of the national-
izing state to pay compensation. Some text-writers and commentators 
on the other hand disagree on the proposition that there is a duty 
to compensate although the majority of them are in favour of the 
- . 6 
view. 
International case law does not contain any clear pronouncement 
relating to a duty to pay compensation in cases of nationalization 
and recent codifications are also divided on the question of 
t . 7 compensa ion. 
State practice for both post-war and pre-war periods indicates 
that with-exception of the Soviet Union, arrangements were in most 
cases made for the payment of some form of compensation. This means 
therefore that apart from the exceptions mentioned above, the rec~nt 
developments in the rules of international law seem to favour the 
propsotion that there -i's a liability to pay compensation in case of __ . 
nationalization. 
6. 
7. 
See a list of authorities in wortley PP. 34. 
.Compare Garcia Amador 1 s final Draft" ILC Year Book (1961) ii 47, 
with the Harvard Draft of 1961, Article 10 which requires 
compensation as an obligation. 
As a further evidence of the rule of law requiring payment 
of compensation, it is significant to note that eighty-seven 
members of the General Assembly of the United Nations voted in 
favour of a resolution which stated that 11 in case of national-
ization expropriation or requisition, the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in the 
state taking such measures in exercise of its sovereignty and 
in accordance with international law 11 • 8 
46. 
In view of what has been discussed above it may be summed up 
that the existence of a duty to compensate is obviously established. 
What is not clear is whether payment of prompt adequate and effect-
ive compensation is part of our law. 
Different justifications have been used to support the applicat-
ion of this rule. Principles such as restitutio in integrum 
and equity however, have been used widely by the advocates of this 
rule, to suggest that adequate .compensation means at least the 
payment or the market value of the proµerty expropt'"iatet.1. 9 
8. See General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 14th December, 1962. 
9. For the use of equitable doctrines to suggest liability to 
pay makret value compensation, see F. Francioni, 11 Compensation 
for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Borderland between 
Law and Equity 11 • 24 (1975), ICLQ 255; D.A. Grantz, 11 The 
Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiations and Compensation 
for Foreign-Property11 , 71 (1977), AMJIL, 474; see also 
M. Sornarajah, 11 Compensation for Expropriation: The Emergence 
of New Standards 11 , 13 JWTL (1979), 109. 
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The Changing and Differing Attitudes on the Status of Private Property 
The concept of limitless right of ownership of property has been 
a subject of criticism for a long time. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century for example, scholars who advocated the right of a 
sovereign to expropriate private property for public purpose, 
criticised this notion. The right of a sovereign to expropriate had 
always been regarded as superior to the right of private property 
ownership. With the extension of public sector in many economies the 
notion of social function of property has received more weight than 
was the case in the past and this is generally so in capitalist as 
well as socialist countries. 
In developed industrial countries however the notion of social 
function of property has not developed beyond the provision of 
justification for expropriation of private property on public purpose. 
In the Easter Block, especially the USSR, the notion of collect-
ivist property put forward by the October Revolution, has made serious 
inroads into the concept of freedom of private property. The 
nationalization measures which followed, demonstrate that not only 
private property was taken without compensation but also foreign-
owned property. The justification being that public or communal 
ownership of property is superior to private ownership and in-keeping 
with the socialist ideals i.e. keeping all major means of production 
and exchange under communal ownership. In fact it is the major pre-
occupation of this social economic system. 
The current legal thinking and practice of Soviet Russia 
together with most of the Eastern European countries, practising 
socialist ideology, favour the concept of social function of property, 
and this is hardly surprising for the legal thinking reflects the 
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dominant ideology. This trend has been found more recently in the 
developing countries through various eleborations deriving from the 
11 right of nations to self-determination 11 found in various U.N. Resolutions 
on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, showing that these 
nations, like the USSR and the Eastern European countries do not regard 
freedom-of- private property whether local or foreign-owned-as being 
supreme to communal ownership. The only difference of course is that 
unlike the Soviet Union the developing countries acknowledge the 
existence of duty to compensate. It is because of this difference 
in attitude on the status of private property between developed 
industrial countries on the one hand and socialist and developing 
countries on the other, that even the rule developed to protect 
private property, requiring payment of prompt adequate and effective 
compensation upon n-tionalization is not acceptable to developing 
countries as well as to the Eastern European countries. 
While the Soviet Union has flatly denied the existence of a 
duty to compensate, the develo·ping countries and some Socialist 
States have adopted norms other than that favoured by capital 
exporting countries. 
K~~LILU~1un as a Kemeay 't::1 • 
International law and practice supports the application of the 
principle of restitutio in integrum as a remedy in specific 
l 
circumstances. In Chorzow Factory Case for example, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice established a strong obiter dicta to 
the effect that restitutio is a remedy at international law, where 
there is violation of treaty provisions. The Court stated that, , 
The actual principle contained in the notion of 
illegal act ... is that reparation must, as far 
as possib]e, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would in all possibility have existed, if that act 
had not been committed. Restitution in kind or if 
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding 2 to the value which a restitution in kind would bear. 
In view of what the Court said in this case, it is obvious that 
the possible availability of the remedy of restitution arose princi-
pally under the specific treaty provisions concerned. Thus the rule 
is applicable in.cases where a special remedy has been created by 
a treaty or compromis.3 
This view however, has been rejected in some instances. In 
Texaco/CaZiasiatic Arbitration~ for example, Professor Dupuy," the 
sole Arbitrator considered the authorities of Chorzow Factory Casr:E 
Ma,vrorrorzatis Jerusalem Concession Case,6 The Temple of Preah Vinear 
') 
Case7 and the Ma,rtini Case8 and came to the conclusion that resti-
tution in kind is an appropriate remedy for the breach of guaranteed 
concession agreements. It would appear·that the sole arbitrator did 
9 
not consider as vital, the fact that in Chorzow Factory Case the 
l· The Chorzow Factory Case (Claim for Indemnity), PCIJ Ser.A. 
No. 17, p.47. The Principle of restitutio in integrum was also 
discussed in Texaco Arbitration, 17 (1978), ILM, p. 1. 
2· Texaco Arbitration, ibid. 
3. See R. White, "Expropriation of Libyan Oil Concession: Two 
Conflicting International Ar~itrations 11 , 30 ICLQ (1981), p.l. 
4. 'Texaco Arbitration, supra. 
5. 
7· 
8· 
9. 
Note 4, supra. 5. [1925], P.C.IJ, Ser.A, no.5. 
[1962] ICJ, Rep.6. 
2 RIAA (1930) 975,1002 Trans (Italy v. Venezuela):25 AMJIL (1931) p.554 
Note 4, supra. 
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question of restitution in kind was considered in obiter dictwn, 
because of the specific treaty provisions. 
10 
The Tempie of Preah Case, -- which involved a decision regarding 
possession of a territory between two States, may be regarded as a 
case whose principJe does not_warrant general application, because 
-the remedy of restitution in kind was given only because it was found 
that, in the circumstances of the case, the award of damages or other 
forms of remedies was impossible. The Ma.rtini Case 11 which is also 
relied upon to support Dupuy's point of view, is not relevant as the 
question of restitution was hardly in issue. 
Brownlie seems to support the views expressed by Judge Lagergren 
in B.P. Arbitration, 12 when he said that "in many situations it is 
clear that a remedy which accommodates the internal competence of 
governments while giving redress to those adversely affected, is to 
be preferred: restitution is too inflexible". 13 
In view of what has been discussed above, what then can be said 
to be the position of restitution in kind as a remedy for nationalisa-
tion of foreign-owned property? 
14 
Apart from Dupuy's decision in Texaco/Caliasiatic Arbitratio~, 
international law and practice tend to indicate that restitution 
in kind is a proper remedy only where there is breach of treaty 
provision restricting nationalization or in cases where other remedies 
are practically impossible.15 
10 • 
12.· 
13 . 
15 . 
Note 10, supra. 
See B.P. Ex loration 
Libyan rab Republic 
note 1 , p. 383. 
I. Brownlie, ibid. 
{, 
11. Note 11 , supra. 
v. Government o he 
Brownlie, supra, 
, 14. Texaco Arbitration, supra. 
In territorial claims cases su.ch as in the Temple of 
Preah Case~ (1962), ICJ. Rep.,p. 6. 
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Full Market Value 
The interpretation that adequate compensation means at least 
full market value of the property expropriated as put forward by 
lawyers from capital exporting States, 1 has not been accepted by 
the capital importing States, which have been responsible for most 
of the recent nationalization measures! 
It is also interesting to find out that, despite the repeated 
demands the governments of capital exporting countries make for full 
market value formula, they have in certain cases accepted compensation 
well below the market value of the property concerned.3 This could 
be interpreted to imply that States are not only prepared to accept 
other standards of compensation, but also that the requirement that 
" 
full market value should be paid, has not yet been well established 
by State practice as a rule of customary law. This being the case, 
. it would be proper at this juncture to see if there is a duty under 
international law, to pay compensation at all. 
1.. 
2. 
3. 
See note 3, supra: The U.S. State Department's Statement on 
Foreign Investments and Nationalizations~ 30th December, 1975, 
15 ILM (1976), 186; The !3ritish Government's Statement in a 
note to Indonesian government of July 1964 in (1964) BPIL, 
pp. 199-200. 
See the Report of the U.N's Economic and Social Council on 
"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources", U.N. Doc. No. 
A/9716 (1974); L. Rood, "Compensation for Takeover in Africa", 
11 (1975), JILF&Econ.521; A. Akinsanya. "Host Government's 
responses to Foreign Economic Control: The Experience of Selected 
African countries", 30 ICLQ (1981}, p.768 and S.K.B. Asante, 
"Restructuring Transnational Agreements 11 , 13 AMJIL (1979), pp. 
341-55. 
See e.g., The Lump-sum Compensation following Post-War expropria-
tions in A. Rado, "Czechoslovakia Nationalization Decrees: 
Some International Aspects", 41 AMJIL (1947), pp. 795-806; 
z. Rode, "The International Claims Commission of United States 11 , 
47 AMJIL (1954), 615; Treaty between U.K. and Czechoslovakia, 
BTS No. 61 (1949) Cmnd. 7799; and U.K. and Poland, BTS, No.10 
( 1947) , Cmnd 7626 . · 
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Use of Force 
Examination of State practice regarding the existence of a duty 
to pay compensation in cases of nationalization, indicates that, 
with the exception of Soviet nationalization following the October 
1917 Revolution, some arrangements were in most cases made for 
payment of some form of compensation.4 In case of the Post-war 
nationalizations, compensation agreements were concluded between the 
nationalizing States and the States of the affected aliens. One of 
the problems surrounding these agreements is the fact that it is 
difficult to determine whether they were reached out of opinio iuris 
sive neccessitatis, or as a result of diplomatic shrewdness on the 
part of the States of aliens. 5 
Foighel 6 observed that, 
It is mainly because of this, that 
although the compensation treaties tend to support 
the view that nationalization should be followed 
by payment of compensation, they may not be used as 
evidence of an established rule of international law, 
because the States entitled to compensation were great 
Powers on which compensating States depended 
financially and economically.? 
-· 
Apart from the usual economic dependence discussed above, there 
i~ evidence to show that some of these agreements were reached through 
threats and other forms of coercion on the part of nationalizing 
States .8 
Whether these agreements were secured through coercion or not 
---------- - - --
4" 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8.· 
C.F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens: 
Oxford, 1967, p. 164. 
Amerasinghe, ibid. 
L Foighel, Nationalization: Copenhagen, 1957, p .. 14. 
Ibid. 
See e.g. Compensation Agreement between U.K. and Yugoslavia 
of 23 December, 1948, and that between U.S.A. and Yugoslavia 
of 19 July 1948 in Foighel, ibid.; see also A. Drucker, 
11 Compensation for Nationalized Property 11 the British 
Practice, 49 AMJIL (1958(, 477. 
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is arguable. But assuming that this was the case, the question 
which follows is whether coercion has any effect on these agreements. 
Apart from the general prohibition on the use of physical force 
by a State on another, International case law and practice do not 
provide much guidance on the question of economic or political 
coercion. 9 
There have been however, several attempts to codify the rule 
regarding the use of force in securing treaties. The first generally 
accepted rule in international regulation of coercion was the Hague 
Convention of 1907, which codified the Drago doctrine, 10 forbidding 
the use of force by a country for collecting contract claims owing 
to its nationals. 
1-
The United Nations Charter codified a much broader prohibition 
on the use of force between nations, 11 which is applicable to treaties 
through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties~ 2 The Vienna 
Convention has the effect of invalidating the treaties obtained 
through the use or threat of use of force)3 Like other attempted 
codifications, the one contained in Article 52 of the Vienna Conven-
tion does not specifically s~y whether the word 'force' includes 
force other than physical force. An attempt to construe Article 52 
of the Treaty to include force other than physical force has not 
. 14 been received very favourably by some countries. There was an 
9. D.F. Vegts, 11 Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangement 11 , 
72 AMJIL (1978), 28. 
10. The official name is 11 the Convention Respecting the Limitation 
of the Employment of force for the Recovery of Contract Debt,1907 11 • 
11. See Article 2 of Paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. 
12. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27; 63 AMJIL 875 (1960). 
13. Articles 51 and 52 of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
14. D.F. Vegts, supra note 27, p. 28. 
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attempt to amend the Vienna Convention to include economic and poli-
tical pressure, in its definition of the term 'force' but the amend-
ment did not gb through and it was subsequently withdrawn. A comprom-
ise resolution was however passed by the General Assembly which 
denounced the use of economic, political or other type of measures 
·to coerce other States with the view of obtaining subordination 
15 
or advantage of any kind. In view of the fact that the General 
Assembly resolutions have no law creating effect,16 one would say 
that, although the Law of Treaties does not contain a statement 
making treaties reached through economic and political coercion void, 
there is nevertheless an opinion expressed through the United Nations, 
abhorring such practice. 
Coercion Through Aid 
In modern times economic and political pressure against nation-
alizing States is normally exerted through an institution of foreign-
aid. This is found to be the most effective way, as the Third 
World countries who are responsible for most of the recent national-
izations depend on foreign aid from capital exporting States for 
their economic development. 
The capital exporting States have often used foreign aid in its 
15. General Assembly Resolution 2625, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28), 121, 
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); 9 JLM (1970), 1272. 
16. For those who generally do not recognise General Assembly 
Resolutions as having a binding legal nature, see G. White, 
11 A new Inte rna ti ona l Economic order? 11 , 16 VA. J. INTL. ( 1976),. 
223, 230; Arangio-Ruiz, "The Normative Role of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles 
of Friendly Relations" (1972), Recueil des Cours 419, 434-518; 
S. Schwebel, "The effect of resolutions of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Customary International Law", 73 ASIL Prodg. 301, 
302 (1979); J. Stone, "Conscience, Law, Force and the General 
Assembly" in Essays in Tribute to Wolfgang Friedmann, 
W_ilner (Ed.), 1979, pp. 333-37; See also Texaco Arbitration 
(Award on Merits) (1979), 35 ILR, 389; 1979 ILM, p. 1. 
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various forms, to put pressure on some nationalizing States which 
do not comply with the rule which requires payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. An amendment to United State's 
Foreign Assistance Act 19631 is a good example of devices used by 
capital exporting States to exert pressure through foreign aid. 
According to this amendment the President is empowered to suspend 
assistance to any capital importing nation which nationalizes or 
nullifies a contract with a U.S. controlled business entity, without 
promptly meeting compensation standards considered to be required 
by international law. 
In another amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, 1963, the 
U.S. Congress included a provision to the Act, which stated that 
"the United States will terminate aid to any less developed country 
which by December 31, 1965, has not signed an agreement with the 
United States, to institute the Investment Guarantee Program". 2 
Although the programme is said to be popular both to foreign investors 
and capital importing countries, the effect the threat of terminating 
foreign aid cannot be underestimated. In view of the fact that there 
is no clear statement of law _declaring treaties entered under threat 
of economic and political pressure as void, the best approach to adopt 
would be to interpret these agreements in the light of special 
circumstances attending them. 
1. 
2. 
Hickenlopper Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, 1963, 
22 USC. 2370; see a 1 so H. Brown-, 11 The Use of Foreign-Aid 
as an Instrument to Secure Compliance with International 
Obligations", 48 (1964) ASIL (Proc.), 210; F. Kirgis, 
noevel opments in the Law and Institution of Inte,rnationa 1 
Economic Relations 11 , 64 AMJIL (1970), 106-38. 
See Foreign Assistance Act, 1963, ibid.; see also 11 The 
Investment Guarantee Program", in R. Lillich, The 
Protection of Foreign-Investments, Six Procedural Studies, 
1965, Syracuse University Press, pp. 147-64. 
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Paota. Sunt Servanda 
Those who argue in favour of liability to pay compensation as 
a duty. founded in the general pr.inciples of law recognised by civil-
ized nations, single out the principle of Pacta. Sunt Servanda 1 as 
being a foundation of this duty. This, in other words, means that, 
if a State has undertaken by way of a concession or economic develop-
ment agreement, to protect foreign investors against nationalization, 
a breach of such undertaking constitutes an international delinquency~ 
But if this view is right, it will be the same as saying that these 
agreements are elevated to the level of treaties, thereby bringing 
into play tlie-norm Paota Sunt Servanda, which :j·s a rule applicable to 
treaties among sovereign States. Those who support this formulation 
suggest that the principle of Pacta. Sunt Servanda does not only apply, 
to treaties but also to international agreements between sovereign 
·States and foreign nationals. 3 This cl aim whi eh has the effect of 
elevating multinational corporations to the level of sovereign States 
has been upheld in a recent arbitration Award.-4 The Award said that 
internationalization of certain contracts entered into between States 
and a private person does not confer competences comparable to those 
of a State. ~he tribunal contin~ed·to say that, the private person 
is only given those capacities which enable him to act internationally 
l. This is the fundamental principle of Law of Treaties which 
basically means, treaties are binding upon parties and must 
be performed in good faith. See. McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(1961), 493; Sorensen, (ed.), Manual of Public International 
Law (1968), 175 and J. Kunz, 11 The Meaning and Range of the Norm 
Pacta Sunt Servanda 11 • 39 AMJIL (1945), 180-97. 
2. For this view see, W. Fri.edmann., Law in a Changing Society, 
2nd. Edn., Penguin Books, 1972, p. 487. 
3. ,This argument was advanced in Losingel Case (1936), 
PLIJ Ser. C. No. 78, p. 32; See also Hans-Wehberg, 
11 Pacta Sunt Servanda 11 , 53 AMJIL ( 1959). 
4. See Texaco Arbitration, supra note 4. 
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in order to invoke the right resulting to him from an international-
5 
ized contract. 
This view has been rejected by many writers some of whom support 
the notion of internationalized contract on different grounds. 
However, the concept of internationalized contract law has been 
described as a myth, having no basis in any juristic principle, 
strengthened only by repetition and given respectability in some 
arbitral awards.6 
According to those who support the notion of international 
contract, the terms of such contracts can not be unilaterally changed 
by legislations of host States, as such changes amount to breach of 
contract, which is a violation of international law.7 Consequent 
to such violation, the foreign Party whose property is nationalized 
has a right to claim restitution, or in the alternative, prompt, 
8 
adequate and effective compensation. 
Those who are against this view maintain that under the new 
international economic order, corporations would always be governed 
5. For those who support the notion of internationalized contract 
see e.g. R.B. Lillich, "The current Status of Law of State 
Responsibility for injuries to Aliens 11 , (1974), ASIL (Proc.); 
F.A. Mann, 11 Wrong in National ··and International Law", 48 BYIL 
(1977), p.l; for a different view see M. Sornarajah, "The Myth 
of International Contract Law", 15 JWTL (1981), pp. 187-217, 
and A .A. Fatouros, "The Internationa 1 Law and the Internati ona 1-
i zed Contract", 74 AMJIL (1980), pp. 134-41. 
6. M. Sornarajah, ibid. 
7. C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 Choice of Law in Concession Contracts" 58 
AMJIL (1964), 881; see also F.A. Mann, 11State Contracts and State 
Responsi bi 1 i ty", 54 AMJIL ( 1960),, 574; R. Brown, "Choice of Law 
Provisions in Concession and Related Contracts" (1976), 39 
MLR 625, 632. 
8. See e.g. E.J. de Arechaga, 11 State Responsibility for the 
Nationalization of Foreign own~d Property", 11 NYUJ INT 1 L 
L & Pol (1978), p. 179; F.V. Garcia-Amader, "The Proposed 
New International Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law 
Governing Nationalization and Compensation by Foreign States 
for the Taking of Alien owned eroperty", 13 VJTL (1980), 51. 
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by municipal law of the host State, more particuarly where a contract 
involves the exploitation of mineral resources in the host State.9 
Unjust enrichment 
The principle of unjust enrichment has also been used to justify 
payment of compensation in cases of nationalization. The argument 
behind this rule is that in taking property which belongs to foreign 
investors, the host State enriches itself at least to the extent of 
the value of the property taken, if not also to the extent of future 
profits that would accrue from the property.1 Because of this, 
international law requires payment of compensation to offset the unjust 
enrichment. In other words, what is said here is that it is not 
equitable for a host State to take advantage of its position to enrich 
itself at the expense of foreign investors. 
But if the basis of this principle is equity~ it may also be 
argued that, equity also requires that an account of past relation-
ship between parties be made. This would be particuarly relevant 
in cases_where concession agreements or other contracts were entered 
while the host State was still a colony or a dependence of the 
investor's home State. The theory of past relationship actually , 
formulated a basis of excess profit deduction principle in Chilean 
nationalization law. 2 
The Chilean nationalization law authorising excess profit 
9. The political aspects of the Third World's movement towards 
a new International Economic Order have been described in 
R.F. Meagher, An International Redistribution of Wealth and 
Power: New York, 1979; R.L. Rothstein, Global Bargaining; 
Princeton, 1979. 
1. See. B. Cheng, "The Rationale for compensation for expropriation" 
(1948) 44, Grotius Transactions~ 267. 
2. See J. Rohwer, "Nationalization - International Minimum Standard 
- Chilean Excess Profit Deduction", 14 Harvard Law Jour., 376; 
(contd) 
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deduction may be deficient in that it did not indicate the way 
in which the excess profit was to be computed. However the fact 
that ~t was even put forward shows that the principle of unjust 
enrichment as an equitable concept can be used by either party. 
Acquired Rights 
The doctrine of acquired rights has also been used to support 
the norm of full compensation. 
The notion of acquired or vested rights (droits acquis) has been 
developed in different areas of law such as State Succession and 
intertemporal conflicts, besides nationalization. This notion has 
the effect of upholding the status or legal rights which had been 
acquired under the municipal law of a State and make them respected 
1 
as a matter of international obligation. 
The notion of acquired rights was originally conceived as having 
the effect of creating immunity from expropriating legislation. 2 
According to this view expropriation measures having the effect of 
destroying a private right to property, amounts to tortious act 
against a foreigner who would be entitled to restitution as full 
damages. 
2. (contd) A.N. Heiben, 11 The Chilean Copper Nationalization: The 
Foundation for the Standard of 'appropriate compensation", 23 · 
(1974), Buffalo Law Rev. 765; F. Orego-Vicuna, 11Some Inter-
national Law Problems Posed by Nationalization of the Copper 
Industry by Chile", 67 AMJIL (1973), 711; R.B. Lillich, "The 
Valuation of Copper Companies in Chile nationalizations", 1972 
ASIL (Proc.), 212; Chilean Law No. 17450, reprinted in {1971) 
ILM 1071. 
1. O'Connell, supra note l,·p. 305~ 
2. This extreme view had its origin in Chief Justice Marshall 1 s 
decision in U.S. v. Perchamn, 7tPeter 1 s U.S. Supreme Court 
Reports, p. 86. This early reference to the principle of respect 
for acquired rights was followed by a series of judicial 
decisions and diplomatic statements by U.S. Courts and 
Department of State. 1--
\ 
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The United State's stand, in relation to Mexican nationaliza-
tions, brought about by its 1917 Constitution reflects this point 
of view. The Department of State demanded strict restitution in 
respect of properties belonging to American citizens and refused the 
Mexican offer of compensation for any damages which could have been 
. proved. 3 But this extreme notion of the pri nci p 1 e of acquired 
right could not stand the test of time. Faced with an obstacle of 
reconciling the alleged principle of i~munity from expropriation 
with an internationally accepted practice which acknowledged the 
right of sovereign States to expropriate foreign-owned property, 
the supporters of the principle of acquired rights were forced to 
limit its scope to imply an obligation to indemnify the expropriated 
alien. 
One writer, commenting on this principle, said that, 
There is little doubt that the respect for 
acquired rights is a principle well established 
in international law ... this does not mean that 
these [acquired rights] may not be interfered with 
at all. The doctrine merely indemnifies the title-
holder from complete and arbitrary destruction of 
-their interest.4 
This view finds support in a number of old judicial decisions 
especially those given in the period preceding the first World War. 
Cases such as The Reverend Jonas King (1830), 5 The Delagoa Bay 
Railway 'case, 1836,6 The Portuguese Religious Properties Case 19107 
and the Permanent Court of International Justice decision in Chorz01.J 
Factory Case 8 are regarded as the leading support on the theory 
3. ·-see Lippman, "Vested Rights.an,d Nationalism in Latin America" 
[1926-27], ForeignAffairs, p. 353. 
4. D. O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (1967), 266. 
5. Whiteman, Damages in InteI'YUltionai Law, Vol. II, 1389. 
6. 39 British and Foreign States Papers, 410, 904. 
7 . Whiteman, Supra, vol. III, p.·.n694. 
8. PCIJ, Ser. A. No. 17, p. 46. 
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that to comply with the notion of acquired right, compensation should 
put the expropriated owner in the same position as he was before 
the taking took place. 
From what has been discussed therefore, it is obvious that the 
doctrine of acquired right is also based on the notion 'Of"equity,· 
influenced and shaped by an individualistic philosophy which does 
not take into account social value of property. It is no accident 
therefore in Third World countries1 notions such as this, embracing 
the theory of sanctity of private property, could not be allowed to 
stand as an obstacle against the generally accepted philosophy advo-
eating socialization of major means of production and exchange, 
through nationalization measures. 
But what happens where the property rights are protected by 
Contracts or concessions bearing stabilization clauses? In such 
situations one may argu.e that since the guarantees contained in 
stabilization clauses were granted under the municipal law of the 
host State, the principle of sovereignty would allow the host State 
to change the conditions in accordance with the municipal law, if it 
can be shown that there has been a change of circumstances. If this 
is accepted, a change in economic aspirations may be sufficient to 
allow a host State to am~nd its law affecting property under a 
concession. 
This argument is however not acceptable to those who argue in 
favour of internationalized contract, according to whom the law appli-
cable to these contracts is international law rather-than municipal 
law. But since it has already been demonstrated that the notion of 
internationalized contract has no basis in any juristic principle, 9 
9. See note 41, supra. 
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it is submitted that in absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, 
the law applicable in such cases would be domestic law of the 
nationalizing State. 
Writings of Publicists 
Like judicial decisions, writings of publicists are regarded 
as the secondary means of determining the rules of international 
law. 1 
The question whether there is an international law rule requir-
ing payment of compensation in event of nationalization measure, is 
one in which the views among academic writers are most divergent. 
Even those from capital exporting countries do not seem to agree on 
this point.2 This taken together with the fact that the notion of 
full compensation has been refused by the lawyers of capital import-
ing countries, one can hardly be justified in saying that this notion 
is shared by a large number of jurists in the international community. 
Emphasizing the requirement that the notion should be approved by the 
great majority of sensible men, one jurist observed that, 11 in order 
for a rule of international law to be regarded as established, there 
should be something more than th~ declaration of the jurists. And 
if the rule is to be so manifestly embodying natural justice or 'the 
reason of the thing' as to be at once, of its own force, as part of 
law, such a principle must show that it has been approved if not 
semper ubique ab orrmibus at any rate by great majority of sensible men, 
whenever it has emerged for consideration, within the limits-of modern 
and perhaps classical civiliza.ti.on 11 • .3 
1. 
' 2. 
3. 
See Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice. 
B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law~ 
Cambridge 1959, p. 33. 
J.F. Williams, 11 International Law and the Property of Aliens 11 
(1928) BYIL, pp. 1-4. 
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Decisions of Tribunals 
The decision which is widely relied upon as a leading authority 
on the·requirement of full compensation is that of Permanent Court 
of International Justice in Chorzow Factory Case. 1 In this case 
-- -the Court was called upon to determine the construction to be put 
on the German-Polish Convention and decide on certain provisions of 
the Treaty of Versailles. In its decision, the Court observed in an 
obeter dictwn that, the owner of expropriated property would be 
entitled to restitution in kind. Although this principle was first 
stated in an obeter dictum those who use the Case to demonstrate 
the establishment of the rule of full compensation have argued that 
"the principle was expressed in such general terms that it is diffi-
cult not to view it as a principle of reasoning havjng the value of 
2 
a precedent··. 
Commenting on the effect of this decision on the establishment 
of the rule of full compensation, one writer said that, 11The Chorzow 
Factory Case so often resorted to as the source of wisdom on legal 
remedies for the taking of property, spoke of restitution in kind of 
nationalised property only because the violation of a treaty which 
provided for the taking of property subject to compensation under 
certain defined circumstances 11 • 3 
Another case in which there was some support for the norm of 
4 full compensation is the Anglo Iranian Oil Case. In this case Judge 
l. PCIJ, Ser. A. No. 17, p. 46. 
2. See ·Texaco Arbitration, 17 ILM .(1978), p. 32. The doctrine of 
precedent does not apply equally in international law as it 
applies in common law. , 
3. R. Baxter in fore\'mrd to R. B. Li 11 i eh, Valuation of Nationalized 
Property in International La.w, .Vol. I: Virginia. 
4. [1952] ICJ, Rep. 93, p. 151. 
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Carneiro (dissenting) argued that, full compensation for expropria-
tion of property must be paid as such a rule is a prerequisite of 
international co-operation in the economic and financial fields. 
This dictum was obviously based on the belief that foreign invest-
ments are necessarily beneficial to both capital importing States 
and foreign investors and there-fore the norms that, protects these 
investments should be stabilized. The Judge categorically observed 
that, when there are so many countries in need of foreign investments 
for their economic development, it would be a mistake to expose 
such capital without restrictions or guarantees to the hazards of 
5 legislations of countries in which such capital has been invited. 
It is probably true that there is a great demand for foreign 
investment in the developing countries. But to suggest that these 
countries' effort to control their economies through nationalization 
measures is hazardous, is to refuse to see the whole issue in its 
proper perspective. 
. 6 In Barcelona Tract~on Case, Judge Gros stated in his separate 
opinion to _the effect that, nationalization of regular kind \'JOuld be 
fo 11 O\'Jed by payment of compensation. But as the Judge was referring 
to a situation between two European States such as Belgium and Spain 
one may conclude that this view is based on a particular reginal law. 
The reginal customary international law sometimes has the effect of 
setting up certain standards higher than that g~nerally accepted in 
inte.rnational law. 7 The best example of this is found in OECD 
countries' endorsement of the full compensation standard in the 
8 proposed multilateral investment guarantee convention. 
5 . Ibid. 6 . [ 1964] , I CJ Rep. 
7. H.W. Baade, [1968], ASILProc. 47. 
8. Ibid. 
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Arbitral Awards 
Apart from the decisions of international tribunals, arbitral 
awards have also been used to justify the application of full 
compensation theory. The Lena Goldfields Arbitration_, is one of 
the most relied upon. But what should be pointed out in relation 
to this·- Award, is-fhe fact tfiaf-guarantees against expropriation 
wer.e given to the investors by the host country prior to actual 
expropriation measure. 
The most recent award in support of this view is the Texaco 
b . . 2 Ar 'Z-t;rat'Z-on. The sole Arbitrater in this case made a statement 
accepting the principle of restitution in kind, despite the over-
whelming view that restitution in kind is a proper remedy only where 
there is a breach of treaty provisions restricting nationalization 
or in cases where other remedies are practically impossible.3 _ 
Official and Unofficial Statements 
Various standards of compensation have been articulated by 
governments and official bodies in the'ir claims regarding investment 
disputes. The most important of such disputes is that between the 
United States and Mexico, 1 in which various diplomatic notes were 
exchanged, indicating different views of these two governments as to 
the compensation that was payable. While the Mexican notes denied 
the existence of a universally acceptable principle which made the 
payment of adequate compensation obligatory, the American notes 
l. 3. Whiteman, Damages in International Lcav> 1737-40; Nussbaum, 
11 The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields Limited and the 
Soviet Government 11 , (1950), 36 Cornel Law Qrt., 31. 
2. Te..~aco Arbitration> supra. 
3. See notes 16,_17, and 18, supra. 
1. See L. Kunz, "The Mexican Expropriations 11 , 17 NYULQ ( l 940), 
327. 
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insisted on the existence of such a norm. The dispute was finally 
settled through the parties agreeing to the sum recommended by an 
international commission. 
In another dispute which involved the United States and Guata-
mala regarding expropriation of land taken over from the United Fruit 
Company, Guatamala argued that tax value was the proper method of 
valuating compensation due. The government said that, 11 it would be 
neither just nor lawful for the State to give such properties a valu-
ation higher than that which the company itself had given to them 
and which served as a basis for taxes 11 • 2 The United States protest-
ed this method of assessment and as one would expect, emphasized 
the requirement of full compensation. 
If these statements can be regarded as representing the opinion 
of States concerned, one is bound to conclude that the developing 
countries involved in the disputes examined above, believe that there 
is an obligation under municipal law, 3 to provide some form of 
compensation, although they reject the view that legality of a nation-
alization measure is contingent upon payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation. Some of the developing countries, mostly 
Latin American countries, believe that aliens should not expect any 
reparation if such right is denied to the nationals due to some 
overwhelming economic consideration and national interests. This 
view is in direct conflict with the principle of international mini-
mum standard which is stressed by the governments of capital exp9rt-
ing States. One author who supports the application of international 
') 
'-. 
3. 
8. Whiteman, Digest, 1158. 
See e.g., The Mexican Government 1 s note to the United States• 
Government, in 32 AMJIL (Supp.}(1938), 196-7 which, in reply 
to United States' note~ it said that Mexico admits in obedience 
to her law that she is under obligation to indemnify in an 
adequate manner. 
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minimum standard said that, 
There is a standard of justice, very simple, 
very fundamental, and of such general acceptance 
by all civilized countries as to form part of 
international law of the world. The conditions 
upon which any country is entitled to measure 
the justice due from it to an alien by the justice 
which it accords to its citizens is that its 
system of law and administration does not conform 
to this general standard. If any country's 
system of law and administration does not conform 
to that standard, although the people of the country 
may be content to live under it, no other country 
can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a 
satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens. 4 
From an analysis of possible sources of international law under-
taken above, it is obvious that there is absence of unanimity as 
to what should be the standard of compensation for nationalized pro-
perty. The common feature in all examples seen above is the assert-
ion on the part of capital exporting countries, of the existence of 
a rule requiring the payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation while capital importing States on the other hand deny 
the existence of such a rule. Even if it is assumed that there is 
sufficient support for the norm' requiring full compensation in the 
sources traced above, it should be emphasized that the context in 
which this norm evolved has undergone a tremendous change. The norm 
emerged when most of the capital importing States were colonies or 
dependencies of other countries and therefore not full members of the 
international community. Economic nationalism which followed the 
emergence of these countries from colonization together with the 
increased bargaining strength that these new States acquired, are 
changed circumstances that produced new norms with sufficient strength 
to displace the norm requiring full compensation, which never had 
4. E. Root, 11 The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad 11 [1910], ASIL (Proc.), 21; A. Akinsanya, Expropriation of 
MuZtinationai Property, p. 41. 
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the abso1ute support of internationa1 community to be regarded as 
1 aw. 
New Nonns 
Having denied the existence of a ru1e requiring payment of ful1 
compensation, the capita1 importing countries developed new norms 
to regulate the payment of compensation for nationalized property. 
The need to formulate these new _norms emerged out of their desire 
to use nationalization measures as means towards economic self deter-
mination which regards the payment of full compensation a contra-
diction. 
Excess Profit Deduction 
One of the new norms deve1oped is deduction of excess profit 
from the amount of compensation due. This has been asserted by a 
more radical group within the developing world, especially those 
adhering to 11 dependence 11 school of economics. The basis for this 
norm is in their relationship with capital importing countries, the 
foreign companies reap excess profit and therefore upon termination 
of such relationship, the companies should pay back what they had 
l 
exploited. 
Chile is among the first countries to give this theory legal 
effect, through her 1971 Constitutional Amendments. Under this, 
Chi1e nationalized forty-nine percent shareholding in Kennecott and 
Anaconda, the American Copper Mining Companies, which were operating 
in joint venture with Codelco, a State-owned company. According to 
the nationalization law, compensation for the nationalized shares 
See N. Girvan, "Expropriating the Expropriator: Compensation 
Criteria from a Third World View Point", in R.B. Lillich, 
Valuation, vol. III, p. 167. 
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as well as the assets of these two companies was to be in book value 
as determined by Comptroller General. After the amount payable had 
been determined by the Comptroller General, the President was empower-
·2 
ed to determine the amount of excess profit to be deducted. 
The major criticism which the Chilean excess profit formulation 
-
faces is that, the determination of excess profit is arbitrary as 
the relevant law did not indicate the formula through which excess 
profit was to be determined. 3 
This formula however, may be useful in similar cases provided 
there is a genuine way of determining the excess profit made by the 
foreign company. It is more particularly attractive in extractive 
industries of the Third World Countries where investments were largely 
made in the context of unequal relationship. But care should always 
be exercised against blanket application of this formula as it can 
very easily be abused. 
Claim for Revindication 
Another claim which emerged i~ that nationalization is a revindi-
cation for which no compensation is necessary. This claim was made 
by the government of Peru in the La Brea Y. Parinas dispute. This is 
' 
very similar to the claim for excess profit deduction in that they 
both completely deny the legitimacy of profits made by the foreign 
investors. Although this norm may be justified in some specific 
circumstances it would be unfair to make its application universal. 
Claim for Appropriate Compensation 
The history of this norm, which enjoys the support of most of 
2. See 10 ILM (1971), p. 1067. 
3 .- _ Ibid.; R. Mi skesse 11, Foreign Investment in Copper Mining in 
Papua New Guinea and Peru (New York), 1977. 
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the Third World Countries can be traced from the United Nation's 
General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 in which the notion of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources was asserted. 
Under Article 4 of this Resolution, "appropriate compensation 
is to be paid in accordance with international law 11 • 4 The major 
problem associated with the wording of this resolution is lack of 
a definition for the term "appropriate compensation". It is precise-
ly due to this ambiguity that some commentators construed the term 
"appropriate compensation" to mean 11 prompt, adequate and effecti ve 11 
compensation. 5 This problem however, has already been resolved by 
a series of later resolutions passed by the World body, which made 
clear the intention of those who voted for Resolution 1803. 
The subsequent resolutions include Resolution 3117 (XXVII) 
which seek to give each State the right to determine the amount of 
"possible compensation 11 , 6 the Resolution on New International 
Economic Order, which asserts the right of each country to determine 
the amount of compensation 7 ~nd the Charter of Economic Right and 
Duties of-States which says that 11appropriate compensation 11 should 
be paid in accordance with the State's relevant laws and regulations~ 
This trend was followed in the resolutions of United Nations Agencies 
such as the United Nation's Conference on Trade and Development 
( UNCTAD) _9 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
D.B. Furnish, 11 Peru Domestic Law Aspects of the La Brea Y. 
Parinas Controversy 11 (1970), Ky.L.J.,531. 
See Para 4, ·GAOR 1803 (XVII) of 1962: P.J. O'Keefe 11 United 
Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 11 , 
8 JWIL (1974), 239. . 
Ibid. 
13.ILM (1974) p. 238; 
13 ILM (1974), p. 715. 
68 AMJIL ( 1974~ 381 . 
83. 13 ILM (1974). 
UNCTAD Resolution 3016 (XXVII) of 1973. See le ILM (1974). 
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Status of Resolutions 
The quest1on whether the concept of Permanent Sovereignty as 
embodied in the recent General Assembly Resolutions could be consid-
ered as constituting customary international law, was for the first 
time considered in Texaco Arbitration.1 Prof. Dupuy, the sole 
Arbitrator concluded that these resolutions do not have law creating 
effect. This view is supported by Gillian White, who categorized 
the Charter for Economic Rights and Duties of States as representing 
only a collection of policy prescriptions.2 She said further that 
the Charter can have legal force only if and so far as, "it declares 
or restates existing principles or rules of international law 11 ? 
According to this view these resolutions do not have the legal force 
because they were not accepted by capital exporting countries. If 
this is correct and since the value of such resolutions as evidence 
of the 11 opinio juris 11 of States can not be denied, one may say that 
these resolutions indicate the direction towards which customary 
ifllternational law will be shaped in the future. An examination of 
State pra~tice today, regarding payment of compensation indicates 
that a custom confirming the !)Orm of appropriate compensation is in 
the process of formation. 
Discussing the 1 egal effect of these resol uti.on!?, Brownlie 
pointed out that, 
In general these resolutions are not binding 
on member States but when they are concerned 
with general norms of international law, then 
acceptance of the opinions of governments in 
the widest forum for the expression of such 
opinions. Even when they are framed as general 
principle, resolutions of this kind provide a 
l. 35 ILR (1979), 3~; 17 ILM (1978), l. 
2. G. White, 11A New International Economic Order?", 16 Va.J.INT. 
L., (1976), 330. 
3. Ibid. 
CONCLUSION 
basis for progressive development of the Zai.u 4 and the speedy consolidation of customary rules. 
[emphasis mine] 
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The norm requiring payment of full compensation represented 
by the formula "prompt, adequate and effective" developed by capital 
exporting countries to protect foreign investment abroad has almost 
been rendered inapplicable in modern times. This is so because the 
developin~ countries which have now joined the international 
community have formulated new norms in accordance with the concept 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Although there is 
no uniform practice regarding the payment of compensation amongst 
the developing countries, circumstances and equities involved in 
new norms should be assessed and applied whenever possible. This 
should be the duty of the international community as a whole as it 
will be futile to cling to the monolithic norm of full compensation 
as it is not only difficult to establish it as a rule of t~aditional 
international law, but also because it is unacceptable to a large 
majority of States. 
4. J. Brownlie, supra note 1, p. 4. 
CHAPTER THREE 
FORIEGN INVESTMENTS AND AFRICAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
' ; ,-
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This study would be incomplete if no attempt was made to examine 
the role of foreign investments in economic development of African 
States. This chapter therefore, will examine the nature of foreign 
investments in general and the part they play in African economic 
development. Finally, the future of foreign investments in Africa 
will be examined, in view of the recent nationalization measures. 
Foreign Investments in General 
Like any other country in the world, African States would like 
to improve the living standard of their people through economic 
. 
de.velopment. These countries are aware also that economic develop-
ment can be brought about only through economic exploitation of 
natural wealth by employing capital, skilled manpower and technologi-
cal know-how. It is also common knowledge that while most of these 
countries are endowed with abundant natural wealth, they seriously 
lack the other components necessary.for economic development. 
Because of this shortage, these States, like other developing countries, 
look to developed countries for a supply of the components in differ-
ent forms. The most common practice however is for these countries 
to attract foreign investments, which are normally accompanied by 
skilled manpower and technology. 
The developed countries on their part have responded to this 
need differently. The general trend is .~hat they have, for a number 
of different reasons, given aid or grants, short-term credits and more 
importantly, made investments in differ~nt development projects. 
I 
I 
... 
Aid or Grants 
The term 1 Aid 1 is normally used by different people to mean 
different things. However, the term is used here to mean a grant 
or an outright gift from one State to another or from an institution 
in one country to another institution in a different country. In 
other words, the use employed here should be distinguished from other 
meanings such as foreign aid or economic aid which do not necessarily 
mean an outright gift. 1 Aid in this context, is naturally given by 
one friendly country to another with the aim of helping the latter 
to overcome a certain difficulty. Sometimes aid may be geared towards 
general economic development, although in a great number of cases 
it is given as relief for a specific problem. Former Colonial Powers 
are the traditional donors in their efforts to help their former 
colonies, especially in their early days of nationhood. 2 However, 
other countries such as U.S.A. and Japan, U.S.S.R. and China, which 
are knm'ln not to have possessed colonies, are among the major aid 
donors. 
There are a number of reasons, mainly politically oriented, 
behi~d the giving of aid. The one officially proclaimed is the con-
cern of the donor for the recipient's economic development and general 
·1. The tenn 1 aid 1 is sometimes used widely to include even 
Private Investment, see e.g. OECD, The Flow of Financial 
Resources to Less Developed Countries, 1961-65 (Paris, 1967), 
p. 3. Aid is also used to imply long-term low interest loans 
as well as grants as contemplated by Special United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), seegenerally Public 
and Private Investment in Economic Development, International 
Chamber of Commerce, I.C.C. Brochure, Nu. 179. 
2. Britain, for example, gave various grants to her former 
colonies under her Colonial development Programmes. These 
former colonies also received Treasury grants of various 
sizes. See, Cmnd 237. 
"\ 
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welfare, based on purely humanitarian grounds. 3 Whether this is the 
real justification or not is a matter which will not be examined here, 
suffice to say that the subject of foreign aid has attracted some 
considerable concern and controversy amongst scholars. 4 
Short-Term Credit 
Short-term credits normally assume the form of export credit 
arrangements made by the export firm in a developed country in order 
to enable an importing establishment in developing countries to 
import capital goods from that country without the necessity of paying 
for the goods immediately. This being the·case, it is true, as it has 
been rightly pointed out, that much as the system helps the capit-
al importing countries as a credit facility, it also helps most of 
the industrialized capital exporting countries to increase their 
export sales.5 The importance of increased export sales to these 
countries can be appreciated more if one considers the level of compet-
ition amongst firms of different nationality producing similar 
industrial goods. Important as it may be, short-term credit, mainly 
due to its short-term nature, does not form part of the long-term 
investment capital requirement for economic development in capital 
3.· On this subject, see, e.g., H.B. Chenery, "Optional Pattern of 
Growth and Aid~ The .Case Study of Pakistan", Pakistan Develop-
ment Review, Summer, 1966, p. 209; Teresa Hayter, Aid as 
Imperialism (Penguin Books, 1971);, H.J.P.~Arnold, Aid for 
Developing Countries,London, 1962, and J. Bhagwati and R. 
Eckans (eds), Foreign Aid (Penguin Books), 1970. 
4. For the view that Aid is used for strategic as well as economic 
purposes of the donor countries, see e.g., N.B. Miller, 11 Under-
development and U.S. Foreign Policy 11 in N.D. Houghton (ed), 
Struggle Against History - U.S. Foreign P~licy in an Age of 
-Revolution (New York, 1968), p. 138; McAuley et al., 11 Soviet 
Foreign Aid 11 , 28 Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of 
Economics and Statistics (1966), pp. 261-71; L. Richards, "The 
Content of Foreign Aid: Modern Imperialism 11 • The Review of Radical 
Political Economics No. 9 (1977), pp. 43-72; and Tereas Haytes, ibid. 
5. See E.L. Nwogugu, The Legal Problems of Foreign Investments in 
Developing Countries (Manchester Uni.Press), 1965, p. 3. 
f 
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importing nations. 
Inter-State Loans 
As the name suggests, these are loans given by one State to 
another for implementation of a particular project in a recipient 
country. The loan is normally paid back with interest after a stipu-
lated time. This type of loan constitutes a major source of project 
funding in developing countries and normally is regulated through 
treaty arrangements governed generally by International Law. Because 
the donor is always a foreign State or an international organization, 
critics of the system, who in most cases favour private investment, 
argue that inter-State loans are likely to have "strings" attached 
to them. 6 However, the question ,whether a particular investment 
agreement has 11 strings 11 or not will not depend largely on the distinc-
tion of it being private or public. Experience· shows that even pri-
vate investments especially those undertaken by multinational corpora-
tions, are capable of having stri~gs as well. 
·private Investment 
As opposed to public investment, private investment is normally 
carried out by private persons, legal or natural, in pursuit of profi·t. 
': J. 
It is common knowledge that those who go out to invest their monies 
-·take advantage of cheap labour·,- availability of raw materials and~a 
good market for the finished goods. These elements are clearly 
abundant in most developing countries and it is therefore no accident 
that the foreign investors have been busy establishing themselves in 
these countries, sometimes under difficult conditions. 
6. See, F. Taylor Ostrader, "The Role of Foreign Capital in 
Africa", in Davis and Baker (eds}, Southern Africa in Transition, 
Praeger, 1966, p. 349. 
I , 
,, 
There are two types of foreign investments, namely portfolio 
investment and direct investment. While the former includes the 
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purchase of equity security and loans, the latter involves the actual 
control of the undertaking and generally takes the form of a branch 
or a subsidiary of a larger foreign company. 7 
Portfolio investment and direct investment are quite similar in 
a number of respects and have certain characteristics in common. Like 
direct investment, portfolio investment provides a transfer of 
capital albeit in different institutional channels and frequently 
from different sources. The transfer of capital is made in response 
to profit incentives, reflecting relative expected rates of return, 
risk and uncertainties. There are however, several major differences 
between these two types of private investment. The first difference 
is that portfolio investment in credit institutions implies a fixed 
obligation to repay interest as well as principal, whilst in direct 
investment it implies a flexible rep~yment obligation directly 
geared to the success of the investment. The second difference is 
that portfolio flows tend to be 11 industry specific 11 • Thirdly, port-
folio investment does not directly affect local ownership and control 
as is the case with direct investment which gives rise to non-resi-
dential ownership and control. Fourthly, portfolio investment involves 
only the movement of capital while direct investment is normally 
a package of some auxiliary factors as well as movement of capital .8 
It is mainly due to thse differences, expecially the last two 
differences, that some scholars have attributed direct investment 
with the creation of a variety of external economies and 
7. Portfolio Investment does not necessarily entail commercial 
control of the enterprise. See, G.L. Reuber, Private Foreign 
Investment in Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, 
p. 52; E.L. Nwogugu, supra note 5, p. 4. 
8. G. Reuber, ibid., pp. 52-4. 
I ~ ' 
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and disenconomies not associated with portfolio investment. 9 Despite 
of the advantages that portfolio investment has over direct invest-
ment, it is of very little significance to the developing countries 
in that only in rare cases do businesses in these countries buy 
equity shares in multinational and other foreign firms. The only 
form of portfolio.investment conman in developing countries is short-
term credits including bank loans, export credits and borrowing by 
bonds. Even then they are of less "significance when compared to 
direct investment which constitutes the major source of these 
countries• capital needs. 10 In brief, therefore, although foreign 
investment in Africa and the developing world as a whole comes through 
aid and public and private foreign investment, the bulk of capital 
needs of thse countries is met through direct foreign investment. 
The Need for Foreign Investments in Africa 
While there is considerable controversy amongst development 
scholars regarding the role of foreign investments in the process of 
economic development in the developing countries, 11 it would appear 
9. 
10. 
l l. 
Ibid.; See also Nwogugu, supra note 5, p. 4. 
Ibid. 
This is one area in which there is a great deal of disagreement 
among scholars. On one side there are those who ~rgue that 
foreign investments are necessary for economic development of 
LDCs·, and in order to induce investors,- spec;:ific attempts.,sh0ul.d 
be made to attract them, which include, E. Nwogugu, supra note 5, 
p. 4; .F. Taylor Ostrader, supra note 6, p. 347; and M. Brandon, 
11 Lega 1 Ownership and Incentives fo Private Foreign Investments 11 , 
"Transactions Grotious Society, 43 (1948), 39-40. While on the_, 
other, there are those, mainly radical development economists, 
who argue that foreign investment does not aid economic develop-
ment but perpetuates dependence .. See e.g. Paul Barran, The 
Political Economy of Growth (New York}, 1957; Andre G. Frank,: 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Iatin America (New York), 
1967 and Latin America: Underdevelopment or RevoZ.ution? (New .. , 
York), 1967; T. dos Santos, 11The Structure of dependence", :· 
American Economic Review 60 (1970) and Samir Amin, Unequal 
Devel.opment (London), 1976. 
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that most of the African leaders tend to accept the view that foreign 
investments are essential for economic development of their countries 
and therefore they should not only be encouraged to come but also 
\ 
protected while they are there, otherwise investors will be discour-
aged.12 Because of this belief, the African leaders look for foreign 
investments not just to fulfil the promises of rapid economic devel-
opment that they made to their people at the time of independence, 13 
but because they believe that economic betterment cannot be attained 
except by continually welcoming foreign capital which they badly 
need but seriously lack. The logic of post-independence economic 
policies in most African countries was to encourage the establish-
ment of an industrial sector through private foreign investments and 
try to balance it with the agricultura1 sector which dominated the 
economies.14 However other forms of capital flow supplemented 
private foreign investment in the industrial sector. The dominance 
of direct foreign investment in the development of an industrial 
sector in Africa is explained by the fact that rapid growth and 
development of the international market for portfolio investment has 
been concentrated largely in developed countries rather than develop-
. t . 15 l ng coun ries. In other words, the type of economy existing in 
these countries did not attract portfolio investments. 
Because of the emphasis in direct foreign investment, there 
' ~ • --1-... • -
emerged a wholly foreign-owned and controlled growth of manufacturing 
industries and other businesses such as tourism, owned mainly by 
12. See, The Investment Laws and Regulations in Africa, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.14/INR/28, 30 Oct., 1963. 
13. See, F. Taylor Ostrader, supra note 6. 
14. See, Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, University of 
California Press, 1974, pp. 118-147. f 
r 
15. G. Reuber, supra note 7, p. 54. 
"'\ 
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the newly established subsidiaries of multinational corporations. 
When foreign dominance became obvious the nationalist governments 
attempted to encourage indigenous people to enter business, with the 
view that after some time they may take over from foreign investors. 
In some cases the governments introduced deliberate policies of not 
allowing the resident Asian commercial elite to exchange their com-
mercial expertise for manufacturing. 16 This is because the indigenous 
businessmen aspiring to enter into partnership with foreign multi-
nationals feared to compete with the already business oriented Asian 
resident commercial elite. They therefore, appealed to the governments 
using nationalistic grounds, to eliminate the Asians in the manufactur-
ing industry. These policies influenced the investment laws together 
with indigenization programmes, the details of which will be examined 
in an appropriate section below. 
Economic Nationalism 
As already pointed out, the effect of post-independence economic 
policies in Africa was the creation of a foreign-owned and controlled 
manufacturing sector which was basically import-substitution in 
character. Alongside this there was also the creation of an indigenous 
capitalist class deliberately encouraged by the governments hoping 
that it would ultimately take over from the foreign investors. It was 
this group which later managed to influence their governments in 
adopting policies geared towards Africanizatton, Indigenization and 
joint-venture, the driving force of which was the notion of economic 
independence. The argument put fo_rward in support of this not~o~.was 
that political independence did not make sense if the country's 
economy was still dominated by foreign capital. Writing on the same 
16. Colin Leys, supra note 14, p. 54. 
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subject, Dr. Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana observed that, 
11 Political and economic independence must come together or liberation 
would be a farce 11 • 17 
The concept of economic independence therefore was militating 
against foreign ownership and dominance in'economic activities of 
these States. Different countries took different approaches to try 
to limit this foreign dominance. Before examining the different 
methods used to arrive at the desired goal, it would be proper at 
this point to see what the term economic independence itself means 
to scholars of different ideological persuasion. 
The term 'economic independence' has been used by people of 
different economic and ideological beliefs to mean different things. 
Hmvever, what is common is the fact that whether it is used by cl as-
sical, socialist or Marxist economists, the term is regarded as being 
synonymous with economic freedom. 
Economic Freedom 
Laissez-faire economists define economic freedom as meaning 
freedom of choice of economic agents, namely producer, employer and 
employees. In other words, the notion, of economic freedom according~ 
to this school of thought follows logically from the assumption under-
lying the system of competiti~~ c~pitalj?m. This is so because the 
hallmark of the laissez-faire movement has always been the passionate 
denounciation of any government intervention in economic life and it 
stands for glorification of the 11 invisible 11 hand of the market in 
-attaining efficiency, growth and-maximum welfare. The earlier ideo-
logues of this school of thought were the classical political economists 
17. K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, 
1965' 15. 
!I 
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who wrote against the evils of government intervention in the 
economy. 18 
On the other hand, the socialist conception of economic freedom 
is based on economic equality. According to this school of thought, 
all systems based on private ownership of capital are exploitive, 
and-thus real economic freedom can only be achieved through economic 
equality, which can be brought about through elimination of private 
property which, according to this school, is the most powerful instru-
ment of economic coercion. It should be pointed out in the outset 
that the present work is not concerned with the merit or otherwise 
of these economic theories and for this reason, no detailed analysis 
of them will be done. The intention here is to demonstrate how the 
concept of economic freedom is conceptualised by these different 
schools of thought. Because of what has already been said about the 
menning of economic independence it is also obvious that different 
African leaders mean different things when they talk of economic 
independence, depending of course on their ideological orient~tion. 
However, what is evident is the fact that the thrust of policies 
designed towards economic independence in Africa has aimed generally 
at progressive substitution of national-for the foreign capital, 
skills and enterprise, in order to enhance the national component 
in, the., ownership, management and .control. of the economtes 19 although .. 
there are some countries in the Continent, mainly those with a 
socialist ideological outlook, which attempt to bring about structural 
18. 
19. 
See, e.g., Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776): David 
Ricardo, "Principles of Political Economy (1817) and J.S. Mills, 
"Principles of Political Economy (1848). For more recent followers 
of this tradition, see in particular Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (Chicago, 1962); Peter T. Bauer, Economic Analysis 
and Policy of Underdeveloped Countries (Durham, 1956); Harry G. 
Johnson, Economic Nationalism in Old and New States (Chicago,1967). 
D.P. Ghai, 11 Concepts and Strategies of Economic Independence", 
11 JMAS (1973), 25. 
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change in production and exchange. In other words, these countries 
consider economic independence as being more than just substitution 
of nationa 1 for foreign capital. 
Localization of Capitalism 
Those who adopted this strategy employed a number of ·different 
meth9ds, all geared towards the transfer of assets from aliens to 
20 
nationals. One of the methods used especially in the early days 
of independence was to appeal to non-African businessmen to assist 
African entrepreneurs in various aspects of business management. 
The governments also introduced different programmes aimed to increase 
the competitiveness of African enterpreneurs. This included training, 
advice and favourable loans and subsidies but as one could expect, 
this strategy did not work out and because of that governments felt 
compelled to play a more active role. This was normally done through 
transfer of assets by way of sale of these assets to Africans. One 
of the earliest large scale transfers of property of this nature in 
Africa was the purchase of European farms in the Kenya highlands by 
the government, for the purpose of settling African farmers. This 
programme worked very favourably from the point of view of the 
European settlers who were bought out not only because the prices 
were high but also because the Kenyan government guaranteed repatri-
ation of the proceeds of the sales. 21 
Apart from an outright transfer of property through sale, the 
most frequent device used to accelerate Africanization is to place 
a number of restrictions on foreign ownership in certain business 
enterprises. Kenya again pioneered this method and her example was 
20. Different labels were used and these include Africanization, 
Indigenization, etc. 
21. Ghai, supra note 19, p. 34. 
' 
followed by Malawi. 
Some African countries introduced legislations to restrict the 
right of non-national businesses to trade in certain localities or 
commodities. Nigeria which pioneered this method, banned aliens in 
40 categories of business and required Nigerian participation in 
39 others. 22 Like Nigeria, Ghana excluded foreigners from retail 
trade' (except department stores) and from many other small scale 
. 
industries. Foreigners have also been restricted to fifty percent 
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ownership in many other enterprises such as brewing, bicycle manufactur-
ing, wholesale business and distribution, etc. 23 The effect of these 
measures is to create a monopoly in certain categories of commercial 
activities in favour of local businessmen. The question which comes 
almost immediately in relation to these monopolies is whether this may 
be regarded as a compensatable taking. This question was actually 
considered by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Osaa:r Chinri's Case. 24 The court in this case said that the Belgian 
government's action in subsidizing a partly government owned water 
carrier, had thrown Mr. Chinn out of business. However, it 
has been argued that the court in this case was dealing with a 
"de facto" monopoly and that it is highly d_oubtful wheth~r it 
would have had the same opinion had the Belgian government asked 
22. Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, 1977 in EEC, The Invest-
ment La:lus of ACP Countries (Brussels-Luxembourg, 1979}, p. 261-. 
89. See also Alan Hutchson, 11 The Tension between Indigenization 
and Foreign Investment 11 , December 1976, Afr.Development. 
23. L.L. Rood, 11 Foreign Investment in African Manufacturing", 
13 JMAS (1975), p. 31; Ghana Investment Policy Decree NRCD 
329 ( 1975) , as amended by 1975 ·SMCD 6 Decree. See a 1 so Koj o 
Yelpaala, "Costs and benefits frorn Direct Investment: A Study 
of Ghana", 2 (1980), New York, Jou.rnal of Int. and Comp. Law, 
pp. 72-105. 
24. PCIJ, 1934, Series A/B, No. 63. 
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25 Mr. Chinn not to operate as a water carrier any more. According 
to this view, therefore, indigenization measures are compensatable 
taking as they amount to forc~d sale but as pointed out earlier, if 
the alien decides to sell for what he can get then normally he 
should be prepared to sacrifice any future claims based on the inade-
quacy of his receipts from the sale. 11 If however the threats to the 
alien's property are accompanied by threats to his physical security, 
the rule should be otherwise 11 , 26 si"milarly if the State in question 
flatly declares that it will not pay any compensation. 27 
The Multinationals 
While the African governments adopted policies of indigenization 
with regard to small and medium scale foreign business enterprises, 
it is evident that they followed a different approach with respect 
to large foreign-owned companies, together with their local subsid-
iaries. The governments promoted local participation in these firms 
by encouraging replacement of foreign personnel by nationals as well 
as the appointment of local people to the boards of these companies. 
Apart from this, local participation in the equity of these companies 
was encouraged by asking the firms to sell some of their shares to 
residents and citizens. 28 Africanization of senior posts and share-
holdings in the private sector by locals was conceived as a way of 
controlling the power of private capital. However, it became abund-
antly clear that the local people who joined· the management in 
foreign firms identified more closely with the aspirations, interests 
and values of foreign capital. As a result of this, the foreign 
25. G.L. Christie, 11 What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under 
International Law 11 , 38 BYIL (1962), 322. 
26. Ibid., p. 329. 27. Ibid. 
28. Ghai, supra note 19, p. 35. 
_, 
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companies had the advantage of monopoly profits, high rates of 
surplus transfer and low shares of wages in the national income 
backed by tight control over trade unions. 29 This inconsistency in 
government policy towards the two groups of foreign owned enter-
prises originates from an analysis of their roles in economic develop-
ment as seen by ~he host States-. While the role of resident alien 
capitalist is often perceived as exploitive and disruptive of the 
growth of indigenous intrepreneurspip, international companies are 
courted as carriers of modern technology, management, capital and 
new products. The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree30 and Ghana's 
Investment Policy Decree31 a.re but two examples of legislation reflect-
ing the difference. The overall effect of such policies was the 
' 
creation of a nationalist petty bourgeoisie which replaced to a 
certain extent, the resident commercial bourgeoisie and acted as an 
auxiliary of foreign capital. 
Socialization Approach 
The first African States to adopt this method in order to 
increase the- national component in their economies are The United 
Arab Republic,Algeria, Guinea, Mali and Ghana. More recently, the 
socialization strategy has been pioneered by Tanzania, through her 
famous Arusha Declaration of 1967. Tanzania's example has been 
followed in rapid succession by-Zambia; Somal'ia;·sudan, -uganda'--ar\cf 
Ethiopia,to mention just a few. Invariably t~ese governments have 
sought to obtain complete or majority ownership of the large scale 
~nterprises in sectors such as export/import trade, banking, insurance, 
mining, manufacturing, agricultural oriented enterprises and tourism; 
29. Colin Leys, supra note 14, p. 147. 
30. Supra note 22. 31. Supra note 23. 
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In most cases, compensation for the nationalized property has been 
paid out of future profits, over a period ranging from five to 
fifteen years. Although most of these States based their socialization 
measures on socialist philosophy, State ownership in itself does not 
make a country a socialist State. The State itself has to undergo 
structural change.as well .32 It is also a well known fact that State 
ownership of the major means of production does not guarantee workers• 
control, which is the real meaning .of socialism on the economic 
level . 33 However, one may say that in adopting nationalization 
measures the countries concerned are fairly equipped for national 
economic control .34 
If economic independence is to be interpreted as national owner-
ship and control over economic activities, it is quite clear that 
nationalization is the most potent strategy. Nationalization of the 
key sectors and other enterprises such as banking, insurance, manu-
facturing, mining, plantation and so on, results in immediate national 
ownership of the 11 commanding heights 11 of the economy. The strategy 
which emphasizes localization of capitalism generally replaces foreign 
with national capitalists in small and medium scale enterprises. 
While this may be regarded as promoting local participation in 
managerial functions at grass root level, ownership ang control of 
the so-called 11 commanding heights 11 of the economy continue to be in 
the hands of foreign companies. 
32. See, Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggle in Tanzania (Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1976); J. Rweyemamu, Under development and 
Industrialization in Tanzania (Oxford University Press, · 
Nairobi, 1973), p. 65. 
33. J. Rweyemamu , ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
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Protection of Private Foreign Investment: Capital Exporting States 
Despite the limitations imposed on foreign investments in 
the majority of African countries, the fact still remains that the 
economies of these countries are heavily dependent on foreign invest-
ments. However, because of what has happened previously in relation 
to foreign investments in Third World in general, capital exporting 
States have found it necessary to formulate measures which will safe-
guard foreign investments in these countries. This section will 
examine the various methods used to protect foreign investment by 
capital exporting States as well as the extent of their effectiveness. 
Legal Deterrance 
Capital exporting States use diffe'rent methods to deter capital 
importing States from expropriating foreign owned investments 
situated in their countries. The best example of such measures are 
the United States• Hickenlooper Amendment, the Gonzalez Amendment 
and the Trade Act of 1974 already referred to. These legislations 
were aimed at suspension of foreign assistance to those capital import-
ing States which adopted policies hostile to American foreign capital 
including acts of nationalizations. Experience however demonstrates 
that suspension of bi lateral assistance to Peru for tak_ing IPC 1 s 
property did not deter the Peruvian government from taking the 
assets of ITT, Grace, and other U.S. companies in the country. 35 
Also the foreign aid sanctions against Sri Lanka, Peru and Bolivia 
did not deter the expropriation of U.S. properties in those countries. 36 
Briefly, therefore, one may say that although foreign aid sanctiQn 
was formerly regarded as deterrance, in practice it proved to be a 
35. A.A.Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in 
The Third World, Praeger, 1980, p. 327. 
36. Ibid. 
vehicle which brought hostilities between capital exporting and 
capital importing nations and therefore endangered rather than 
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protected foreign investments-. Because of this, it was not long __ 
before a call was made for an outright repeal of the Hickenlooper 
Amendment. 37 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 provided for a dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory application of the Amendment. 38 
Although on the other hand, the threatened application of a Hicken-
looper-type amendment may have deterred the Hunduran government from 
implementating its agrarian reforms39 and the threatened application 
of the Trade Act of 1974 may have compelled the governments of Benin, 
Sri Lanka, Somalia and Congo (Brazzeville) to open compensation 
negotiations, 40 the point still remains that this method is not only 
ineffective but also exacerbates relations with the countries concerned. 
Bilateral Agreements 
As well as the method examined above, capital exporting nations 
have tried to protect investments abroad by concluding treaties v1ith 
capital importing nations embodying the classical rules of international 
law with respect to expropriation of foreign-owned property. The 
United Kingdom for example, has signed treaties for the protection 
and promotion of foreign investment with Singapore and_ Egypt in 1975 
and with Korea and Indonesia in 1976. France signed similar treaties 
with Tunisia in 1972, Egypt, Mauritius and Indonesia in 1974 and 
Morocco, Singapore, Zaire and Malaysia in 1975. The Netherlands also 
concluded such treaties with the Ivory Coast and Morocco in 1971, 
Uganda in 1970, Senegal and Tunisia in 1972, Cameroon in 1973.~od 
37. R.B. Lillich, 11 Requiem for Hickenlopper11 , 69 AMJIL (1975), 
99. 
38. Ibid. 
~9. A. Akinsanya, supra note 38. 40. Ibid. 
Korea in 1975 while Italy entered into treaties of economic co-
operation with the Ivory Coast in 1971 and with Chad in 1969. 41 
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The United States has concluded bilateral treaties since the end of 
' . 
. 
World War II with many capital importing countries. These treaties 
invariably contained a clause which provided that 
Property of nationals and companies of either 
party shall not be taken within the territories 
of other party except for a public purpose, nor 
shall it be taken without payment of just compen-
sation. Such compensation-shall be in an effectively 
realizable form and shall represent the full 
equivalent of the property taken; and adequate 
provisions shall have been made at or prior to 
the time of taking for the determination and 
payment thereof. 42 
Whether these treaties have ensured continued foreign investment 
in capital exporting countries.is arguable, however what -is certain 
is that they have ensured resolution of investment disputes between 
the contracting parties without the need of government confrontation. 
Investment Guarantee Programmes 
Together with bilateral treaties some capital exporting states 
have tried t~_ protect their nationals' investments abroad by provid-
ing some form of insurance cover against common risks to which foreign 
investments are exposed such as inconvertability, war, revolutions 
and more importantly, expropriation. In the United Stutes, the 
.Overseas Private Investment Corporation- wa.s. created for that purpose~ 
This corporation is said to have provided, by the end of September 
1977, .new insurance coverage of more than $750 million out of which 
expropriation coverage accounted for $252 mi 11 ion, converti.bi 1 ity 
41. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
Ninth Annual Report 1974/75 (~~ashington, D.C., 1975), pp. 21-
26. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes; 
Tenth Annual Report 1975/76 (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 22-28.· 
42. See, 11 Expropriation of American-owned Property 11 , 
A. Akinsanya, Expropriation, p. 328. 
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$253 million and war risks $217 million. 43 These contracts covered 
investments in 39 Projects located in 35 developing nations. 44 
Japan has a similar system run by the Export Insurance Division 
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The Scheme pro-
vides insurance against expropriation, war and inconvertibility for 
its nationals with. equity, loans and other investments in all parts 
of the world. 45 Other countries which have similar agency, Denmark 
through the Danish International Development Agency, Australia 
through the Australian Export Finance Insurance Corporation. 46 The 
Netherlands, Canada, France, West Germany, Sweden and Great Britain, 
also have investment guarante~ programmes for their nationals abroad~7 
An investment guarantee progranme works by requiring capital 
importing states to enter into an agreement with a country initiating 
the scheme prohibiting expropriation (except for public purpose and 
on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation) and other 
risks mentioned above. In the event of expropriation, prompt compen-
sation is paid to the insured while the insurer pursues agreed upon 
procedures for settlement. Because of the way these schemes work, 
it is quite obvious that they are very favourable from the point 
of view of foreign investors because they guarantee foreign investors_ 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation,-which would 
_-not be p.ossible-under the norma.l ci_rcumstances. _It is beca_use _of 
these guarantees that one writer suggested that some foreign investors 
have in fact "welcomed and even forced nationalization in •.. Peru, 
Venezuela and Chile, realizing that their tax and insurance protection 
43. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 1977 Annual Report 
(Washington, D.C., 1978}, p. 12. 
44. Ibid. 
45. A. Akinsanya, supra note 38, p. 329. 
46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 
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will earn important short-term credits 0 • 48 Also it has been alleged 
that many alien investors have, by different methods, welcomed or 
encouraged expropriations because nationalization may have some bene-
fits which outweigh by far the benefits of continuing troubled 
business relations in a host country in which the business climate 
is growing increasingly hostile. 49 This may be the case in situ-
ations· where the business climate is hostile but even in cases where 
hostility is not evidenced foreign investors may welcome nationaliza-
tion especially when there is a possibility of joint ownership 
with management and technical consultancy. 
Submission to International Arbitration: International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Partly because of the large number of countries that are party 
to the World Bank Convention for the settlement of investment disputes, 
it has become more successful than any other multilateral convention 
for the protection of private property. 50 
48. See, Louis W. Goodman, 11 The Social Organization of Decision-
making in the Multinational Corporation 11 , in Multinational 
Corporations and Social Change~ and David E. Apter and Louis 
W. Goodman (eds), (New York, Praeger, 1976), p. 80. 
49. Ibid. 
50. 80 states had become parties to the Convention as of February 1979; 
see a 1 so A.S. Miller, 11 Protection of Private Foreign investment 
by multinational conventions 1\ 53_ AMJIL (1959), pp. 371-78. 
For the working of ICSID see, C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 SLib-mission to 
the Jurisdiction of International Centre for Settlement of _ 
Investment Disputes 11 , 5 Journal of Maritime Law and Comm. (1974), 
211-50; C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 Model Clauses for Settlement of Foreign 
Investment Disputes 11 , 28 Arbitration Journal (1973), 232-57; 
C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the 
convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other, States 11 , 47 BYIL (1974-75), 227-67; 
C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations 
Between States and Multination Ent~rprises with particular 
reference to International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 11 II. Int. Lawyer (1977), ,_45-59; C.F. Amerasinghe, 11 The 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes through 
the Multinational Corporation 11 , 9 ~AJIL (1979), 793-816; P.C. 
Szasz, 11 The Investment Dispute Conyention - opportunities and 
(contd) 
93. 
The World Bank Convention whose purpose is 11 to promote private 
foreign investment by improving the investment climate for investors 
and host states alike 11 , is essentially an instrument for the pro-
tection of private foreign investment. Thus many capital importing 
nations not only became parties to the Convention but have also 
enacted investment laws that provide for acceptance of the juris-
diction of ICSID as a means of settlement of investment disputes. 
The major problem confronting this system is the fact that many 
developing countries do not generally accept international arbitra-
tion. Almost all Latin American countries, for example, reject 
international arbitration and in fact are not parties to the ICSID 
Convention because it conflicts with the concEpt of national treat-
ment contained in most of these countries• constitutions. 51 Apart . 
from the Latin American countries, many nationalizing states do not 
submit investment disputes to arbitration because they regard the 
right to nationalize as not being an arbitral issue. Even those who 
are parties to the World Bank Convention sometimes, because of 
certain cons}derations, reject the jurisdiction of ICSID. The best 
example of such countries is Jamaica which refused to recognise the 
jurisdiction of the I CS ID in. the BauxiJe case. Consequently the 
Reynolds Metal Company, Reynolds Jamaica Mines and the.Kaiser Bauxite 
Company reached an agreement with th.e _gov.ernment of Jamaica to 
discontinue arbitration.proceedings before the ICSID. 52 However,. 
50. (contd) pitfalls 11 , 5 Journal of Law & Econ. Development (1970), 
23-44; A. Broches, 11The Convention of the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals af:other States 11 , of 
RecueiZ de Cou.rs (1972), 332-405. 
51. P.C. Szasz, 11 The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin 
Ameri ea 11 , II Virginia Journal of Int. Law (.1971), 256-65. 
52. See, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputesl 
Ninth Annuai Report, pp. 5-6, and Tenth Annuai Report, 
pp. 5-6. 
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Revere Copper and Brass Inc., another affected foreign company, 
commenced arbitration proceedings against the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) seeking compensation of approximately $80 
. 
million plus interest, for its bauxite~alumina operation in Jamaica. 53 
Proection_of Foreign Investment by Capital Importing Countries 
Like the rest of the developing world, African States accept 
the need to improve their investment climate as a means of attract-
ing more foreign investments, which is in accordance with the call by 
the United Nations General Assembly, requesting developing States 
to re-examine their policies.and domestic legislations in view of 
improving their investment climate. 54 Thus they have, apart from 
being parties to the Convention for the settlement of investment 
disputes, taken different actions all geared towards provisions of 
incentives to foreign investment. These include investment laws, 
policy statements and other domestic r~gulations. 
Economic Policy Statements 
Some countries have made various policy statements promising 
certain incentives to a new specific class of development projects 
financed by foreign capital. Addressing his party's Annual Congress,: 
in December 1977, President Mobutu of Zaire, for example, announced 
· a nationa 1 economic recovery i;?:l al'), ·a,imi=.P, at-:::at_trpcti,ng .for~i,,91\ ... ,ca_ptt.9.J "' ._ 
investment, giving assurance that the,alien investor could transfer, 
in hi·s own currency, his profits and qividends and eventual1y the 
initial capital .55 
53. 
54. 
55. 
See, 11 Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. - Overseas Private Invest-. 
ment Corporation: Arbitration Award in Dispute involving U.S . .,. 
Investment Guaranty Programme 11 , l7 ILM Cl 978}, 1321-84. 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 824(IX) of llth December, 1954. 
West Afriea (London), December 12, 1977, p. 2541. 
""\ 
Although in most cases these statements are made orally, in 
certain cases they are embodied in constitutions or development 
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plans. However, whatever the ~ource may be, all such statements are 
concerned with the need to increase the flow of foreign private 
capital from capital exporting states to thefr countries. The import-
ance of such statements is only to show a foreign investor the area 
in which the government of a host state encourages foreign investment. 
In other words, the investor may not rely on the guarantees given 
through such statements to argue that nationalization is unlawful 
because it is contrary to the assurance given. They nevertheless 
give him an idea of the sector of an economy which the government 
has set aside for foreign investment. 
Investment Laws 
The government of capital importing States also pass investment 
laws in order to attract foreign investments. The investment incent-
ives contained in these laws are, in most cases, in the form of 
fiscal concessions, which make the early years of investment projects 
very attractive. There are different forms of fiscal concessions 
but the important ones include the following: 
(i) Income Tax Relief 
Income tax relief is the most common incentive offered to 
---~~----~-.:- ·---~-~----:~.::~:......-----:_...,.~--~~- - __,,..--_..:,. _____ "" ,.~:..;- __ -=-~---- -- - -- ... -. .. 4 .: ~-- --- - ---- .;__:. ----
foreign investors by capitai"_i_mportingS-.fates-in-general and in Af~i~~:-:-· -.. -
in particular. The practice is either to extend total or partial 
exemption from tax for a period of five to ten years for new enter-
prises established through external financing. The Chad Investment 
Law for example, exempts profits earned by a new enterprise during the 
first five years of operation from income tax. Also the enterprise 
under consideration is entitled to a deduction for purpose of income 
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tax calculation of one half ~f the profits applied to the construct-
ion of industrial buildings and the purchase of heavy equipment. 56 
In Ghana, a tax holiday of up to five years may be granted to an 
approved enterprise if the technology of that particular industry 
is necessarily capital intensive. 57 In other States such as Sierra 
Leone58 and Gambia59 the investment laws give .the Minister or the 
Commissioner for Income Tax discretion to fix a tax holiday period 
applicable to each development project. 
(ii) Custom Duties Relief 
Apart from income tax relief, another common fiscal relief 
found in investment laws of most developing States is custom duties 
exemption. Like the income tax relief, this may be either full or 
partial exempti~on. They normally apply to building materials, 
plants and machinery and raw materials for new industries. 
Under the Gambian law, an approved project may be granted an 
exemption of up to one hundred pe~cent from import and customs duties 
for imported goods that are essential for the implementaiton of the 
-
projects, provided that the goods cannot be produced within reasonable 
60 . 
time 1n the country. The Decree provides that the exemption granted 
shall be for a period not exceeding ten years. 61 Some countries 
extend this relief not only in respect to goods which cannot be 
manufactured from within but also to the goods purchased in the 
country which attracted import duty or customs duty when they were 
56. The Chad Investment Code, 1973, Decree No. 156/PR. 
57. S.14 of Ghana Capital Investment Decree, 1973. 
58. S.12 The Development Ordinance 1960 of Sierra Leone. 
59. S.4 of Develop~ent Act, 1973 of Gambia. 
60. S.18(1) of Gambia Development Act, 1973. 
61. Ibid. 
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imported. The Republic of G~mbia is the best example of States with 
such exemptions. Under the Gambian Investment Law, a holder of 
a development certificate is entitled at any time between the 
effective dates of his certificate and the day the project starts 
production, to import into the country, subject to refund of customs 
duty, any of the articles and materials specified in the second 
schedule of the investment law. 62 The materials which enjoy this 
sort of exemption are normally building materials, tools, plants, 
machinery, pipes, pumps, conveyor belts and other appliances, and 
materials necessary for and used in construction, alteration, recon-
struction or extension of a mine, plantation or factory. 63 
(iii) Remittance of Profits 
Together with income tax and customs duty reliefs, remittance 
of profits abroad is used also by capital importing nations to attract 
foreign investment to their countries. 
Usually this is done by assuring the potential investors free-
dom to remit profits that their enterprises will make sometimes 
subject to exchange control regulations. The degree of freedom 
that foreign investors enjoy obviously differs from one country to 
another. Some African countries such as The Republic of Sudan offer 
general profit remittance incentives. Under its investment law, all 
the profits resulting from investments of any foreign capital in 
the establishment, is entitled to be transferred abroad, after payment 
of all taxes, duties and other obligations that are due to the 
64 
- governr!Jent. 
62. S.12(1) of Gambia Development Act, 1973. 
63. Ibid. 
64. S.17 of The Development and Encouragement of Industries 
Investment Act, 1974 (Sudan). 
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The investment law of Zambia also allows enterprises which 
employ a significant amount of foreign capital to remit any accrued 
profit or dividends during the twelve months period immediately 
following the end of the financial year in question, subject to ex-
change control regulations. 65 
The investment law of Somalia on the other hand, allows free 
remittance abroad of up to 30 percent of the capital invested. The 
law also provides for the transfer to be made in the currency origin-
ally invested. 66 
Investment Guarantees 
Apart from tax incentives, customs duty exemption and remittance 
of profits and dividends already discussed, capital importing states 
also provide various forms of investment guarantees to ensure that 
once the investments are in the country, they also are protected and 
encouraged. 
Legal guarantees to foreign investment may take different forms. 
They may be- in the form of an International Agreement, a Multilateral 
Convention embodying a code regulating treatment of foreign investors 
or, on the other hand, a host State may undertake to guarantee the 
security of foreign investors through its domestic laws. 
The most important form of legal guarantee offered by developing 
countries is one in which a host State, through its investment laws 
and other related legislations, undertakes to provide some guarantees 
against nationalization and other related risks. 
65. S.24(b) Zambia, Industrial Development Act, 1977. 
66. Article 8 of Somalia Investment Law, 1977. 
~ 
' 
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Guarantee Against Nationalization 
As already pointed out, most of the African States have enacted 
investment laws embodying some guarantees to foreign investments. 
The i~vestment laws generally contain clauses providing assurance 
against nationalization and normally guarantee that nationalization 
will be carried out only if it is for public purpose, whereupon fair 
compensation will be paid. The law protecting foreign investment in 
Tanzania, for example, provides for the payment of full and fair value 
of property nationalized. 67 The procedure to be followed according to 
this law is that full and fair value of the property concerned is 
ascertained by the government, after which a certificate in relation 
to the property or enterprise is issued to the affected alien 
investor. 68 
Other countries prefer to give these guarantees through constitu-
tional provisions rather than separate investment laws, the best 
example being Kenya. In her Constitution, Kenya provides conditions 
under which property or interest therein may be compulsorily taken 
into possession. The relevant article provides that 11 no property of 
any description shall be compulsorily acquired except where the tak-
ing of possession or acquisition is (1) in the public interest; 
(2) the necessity thereof is such as to afford reasonable justification 
for the causing of any hardship that may result to any person having 
interest in or right over the property and (3) provision is made 
by the law applicable to the taking of possession or acquisition 
for prompt payment of full compensation 11 • 69 
- I, '. 
The first Federal Constitution of Nigeria as well as the Sierra 
67. S.6 of Tanzania Foreign Investment Protection Act,1963. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Schedule to Kenya Foreign Investment Protection Act, 1964. 
~ 
\ 
Leone Independence Constitution have similar provisions to those 
found in the Kenyan Constitution already discussed. 70 
Effect of the Guarantees 
100. 
The question which is important especially from the point of 
view of a foreign· investor is whether these guarantees have any legal 
impact. In other words, whether the foreign investor may rely on 
these guarantees to show that the taking of his property is unlawful. 
This question is very important because if the guarantees have no 
enforcibility, they are bound to be devoid of the security which 
investors from capital exporling nations are keen to obtain and which 
the host countries are very anxious to provide, in order to attract 
flow of capital. Some commentators regard these guarantees as 
having legal effect only when they are incorporated into a contract 
between the host State and the foreign investor,7because they are of 
the view that this is the only way that the guarantees receive legal 
validity and hence are capable of being enforcect. 72 If this view 
is accepted as right, one may say that investment guarantees contained 
in Constitutions and investment laws of capital importing nations 
_are a purely unilateral measure which can be changed at any time. 
' \ 
However, even if these guarantees do not give a forei~n investor an 
automatic right of action against the host State, they nevertheless 
provide an expression of good faith that host States intend to apply 
in t_he regulation of foreign investments whi'ch come into the country. 
70. 
71. 
On the other hand, municipal law which provides incentives and 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963, 
Law No. 20 of 1963 and The Sierra Leone (Constitution) Orde? 
in Council, 1961. 
See, e.g. E.L. Nwogugu, supra note 1, p. 61. 
72. Ibid. 
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guarantees may be regarded as creating an estoppel against the host 
State. 73 The rationale of the principle of estoppel is clearly 
demonstrated in the maxim allegans constraris non audiendu est. 
The essential aim of the doctrine of estoppel is to preclude a 
party from benefitting from his own inconsistency, to the detriment 
of another party, who has in good faith relied on the representation 
of fact made by the former. 
The principle of estoppel is conunon in most modern legal systems 
and has been recognised widely as a general principle of interational 
law. 74 
Apart from the question of 1ega1 e rrect that these ·j nves t111en t 
guarantees have, another important question which has occupied the 
minds of some international lawyers as well as development economics 
scholars is whether these guarantees actually promote investments in 
capital importing nations. Because of the complexity of the issue, 
together with a lack of statistics to prove either way, one can hardly 
arrive at a straightforward answer to such a question. However, the 
available ev.idence tends to suggest.that investments are attracted 
not only into countries which have no investment guarantees but in 
some cases go to countries which have investment laws but have dis-
honoured their commitments under such guarantees. 75 The case of 
three East African countries (Kenay, Uganda and Tanzania) may be 
used to illustrate this point. 
A survey conducted in these countries indicates that al though a 11 
73. For this view, see, Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (1959), 
p. 456; A. Fatouros in Friedmann & Pugh, Legal Aspect of Foreign 
Investment (1959), p. 722. 
74. See, The Temple of Preah Vihear Case~ ICJ, Rep. (1967), p. 6. 
75. See, 11 Commercial Law and Foreign Investment: Why investment 
laws?" in Afrika Spectrum, March, 1969, p. 37. 
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three States have Foreign Investment Protection Acts in which similar 
guarantees are given to foreign investors, there is no evidence of 
any appreciable increase in foreign investments. 76 
Is Nationalization a Deterrent to Foreign Investments in Africa? 
There has always been a fear expressed by some scholars that 
nationalization without payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation is an outstanding deterrent to increased flow of private 
. 
foreign capital in developing countries. 77 Those who are of this 
view argue that developing countries should avoid this measure in 
order to attract foreign inyestment which is needed greatly. This 
view is of course based on an ~ssumption that a developing country 
cannot develop economically except on the basis of continuously 
welcoming private foreign capital that it essentially lacks. Whether 
this proposition is correct is arguable. However, even a'ssuming 
that it is correct, experience gather_ed by different African States 
already examined, shows that there is no evidence that fewer foreign 
investments go to those countries with higher incidences of national-
ization than those with fewer or none at all. 
A study conducted in Tanzania in relation to the effects of 
nationalization measures on foreign investments indicates that foreign 
investors were not deterred by the nationalization measures at all .78 
-
The study concluded that, 11 foreign in-vestors realized that, minority 
shareholding together with management· contracts will not only ensure 
them a regular flow of income in the form of royalties, patent fees, 
76. Ibid. 
77. See, e.g., Nwogugu, supra note 5, p. 21; M. Brandon, 11 Legal 
Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments 11 , 
43 Transactions Grotious Society (1957), 39-60. 
78. J. Rweyemarnu, supra note 32, p. 64. 
interest and miscellaneous fees, which to some extent will have 
similar result to export of capital, but will also enable them to 
pursue autonomous investment policies 11 • 79 Although this study dealt 
specifically with one country, the conclusion that resulted from it 
may be applied generally to other African States, as the picture is 
very similar. 
79. rbid. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY 
IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 
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In Africa, like in other developing countries, nationalization 
of foreign-owned property is a very common feature. The nationaliza-
tion measures have affected the multinational corporations as well 
as small· foreign-owned enterprises. The major takeovers however, , 
have occurred in extractive industry where they have been accomplished 
in a manner that has become familiar in other developing countries: 
government take--over of ownership and policy control of the industry 
without necessarily.being involved in its day to day management. 
These take-overs have more often than not been accompanied by promises 
of some form of compensation (other than prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation). There have been some protests by the 
companies as regards to these formulae but there has been little or 
no legal action taken against the host countries. The companies 
eventually accepted the situation and settlements were reached 
through negotiations. 
There has also been selective n~tionalizations of some essent-
ial industries owned by foreign companies such as Banks, Insurance, 
Petroleum distribution and public utilities; These measures have 
occurred mostly in countries pursuing socialist policies. 1 Selective 
nationalization normally covers a broad range of industries which 
1. Among the brands of socialism advocated by different African ; 
countries, includes 11 Socialism and Self-Reliance 11 ( Ujamaa rza. 
Kujitegemea) by Tanzania: "African Socialism" by Kenya; and 
"Ethiopia First 11 by Ethiopian Military government. 
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although may represent lower value in monetary terms as compared 
to extractive industries yet they may be very significant to the 
economy of a country. Unlike in the first category where the 
emphasis was to take-over just one sector of the economy, considered 
to be the nerve centre of the country 1 s economy, here the emphasis 
is on the take-over of all industries that have economic and 
strategic importance. 
The third group is that in which countries have reserved some 
categories of enterprises mostly small and medium sized ones, for 
local ownership thereby forcing foreigners to sell out to citizens 
usually hurriedly and sometimes at a loss. Indigenization which is 
the name given to this phenomenon is not strictly speaking national-
ization as the government is not taking the property for itself. But 
because of the effect that these.measures have on the alien owner, 
··some have considered them ~s ~reepin_g expropriation. 2 
Although most-of the take-overs were accompanied by promises of 
some form of compen~ation, there i~ no uniform pructice regurding 
the payment of compensation. While some countries promised to pay 
compensation out of future profits3 through government bonds,4 others 
2. On 11 creeping expropriation 11 , see e.g., Burns H. Weston, 
11 Constructi ve Taking Under International Law: A modest foray 
into the Problem of 11 creeping expropriation 1111 , 16 Virginia J. 
· INT 1 L Law (1975) 105; G. Christie, 11 What constitutes a Taking 
of Property under International Law?, 38 BYIL (1962), 307; 
Crea l , 11 Mexi cani za tion: A case of creeping expropriation 11 , 22 
SWL.J.281 (1968) and K.C. Kotecha, 11 Comparative analysis of 
n~tionalization laws: Objectives and Techniques 11 , 8 Comp. and 
INT 1 L L.J., S.Afr. (197~J,-s7. See also Collins, 11 The Political 
Economy of Indigenization: The case of Nigeria Enterprises 
Promotion Decree 11 , 4 Afr. Review [Afri.Dev.] 491 (1974): Law of 
April 24 1975, Investment Policy Decree [1975] N.R.C.D. 329 
(Ghana); As Amended by Investment Policy (Amendment) Decree 
S.M.C.D. 6 (1975). 
3. See e.g. Zambia 1 s nationalizations, in Keneth Kanude, Towards 
Economic Independence (Zambia Information Service, 1969), Lusaka. 
4. See e.g., Sierra Leone's agreement with Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust, a major diamond mining company, in Afr. Recorder, 
(contd) 
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promised to pay out of consolidated funds. 5 
Using factual examples of some selected African nationalization 
measures, this section will examine historical as well as philosophi-
cal foundations for such policies and the nature and extent of 
compensation paid in respect of the properties nationalized. 
4,. (contd) Feb 13-25 [1971], p. 2440 and S.K.B. Asante, 
11 International Transactions and National Development Goals 11 , 
10 Rev. of Ghana Law [1978], p. 12. 
5. See A.W. Bradley, 11 The Legal Aspect of the Nationalization 
in Tanzania 11 [1967], EALJ. 164, 
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PART ONE 
NATIONALIZATION OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
In August 1969 the Zambian government took over 51 percent 
ownership in Zambian Anglo-American Limited (ZAA} and Roan Selection 
Trust (RST), the two.companies which dominated the country's copper 
mining industry. 
In order to understand the power and influence that these two 
companies had over the mining industry of Zambia, formerly known as 
.. 
Northern Rhodesia,6 one has to examine the history of this country's 
mineral rights created by concessions signed between the local chiefs 
and Cecil Rhodes. 
In the 1890s Cecil Rhodes, representing British South African 
Company (BSA),entered into some concession arrangements with local 
chiefs in what is today part of the Zambian copper belt. 7 Through 
these concessions the BSA acquired exclusive mineral rights in the 
area, which enabled it to levy royalties in respect of miner~ls mined 
by other companies in the area. This continued up to 1950, when an 
agreement between the Territorial colonial government and BSA was 
signed;:- under which the Territorial government got the right to re:ceive 
20 percent of SSA's royalties in con?ideration of a confirmation of 
7~ 
Zambia got iridependence-in 1964 under the- name of. No.rthern . 
Rhodesia. It was part of Rhodesian Federation under British 
Rule. Although the Federation.broke down some years before 
independence, this country retained the name Northern Rhodesia, 
while Zimbabwe was Southern Rhodesia. 
See A. Martin, Minding Their Oum Business (Penguin Books), 13; 
G. Lanning with M. Mueller, Africa Undermined (Penguin Books, 
1979), p. 50; P. Slinn;·"The,Legacy of BSA Company: The Histori-
cal Background 11 , in M. Bostock and C. Harvey (eds), Econom1:c 
Independence and Zambia's Copper (New York, 1972) and Patrick 
Keatley, The Politics of Partn_ership (Penguin Books, 1963). 
The BSA was a mining company and giantspeculator with a character 
of an 11 empire 11 given to it by _the Royal Charter. 
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BSA 1 s mineral rights. 8 In the early 1960s, when the country was 
about to become independent it became apparent that both the Colonial 
government and the UNIP9 leadership were of the view that the question 
of mineral rights had to be resolved before the granting of responsible 
Self-government. In 1963 a series of discussion was held in which a 
number of elaborate proposals were made. 10 One of the proposals made 
was.that BSA should remit its royalties to the Northern Rhodesia govern-
ment in return for bonds to be isstled by the government. 11 The nego-
tiations broke off because the British government refused BSA 1 s 
demand that it guarantees the bonds issued by the Northern Rhodesia 
Territorial government. 12 
When UNIP came to power in 1964, the new nationalist government 
commissioned a high powered historical research into the archives in 
Lusaka, which had the effect of ca~ting doubt over BSA 1s claim to the 
mineral rights at all. The government put up an argument that, on 
the basis of the research conducted, what now constitutes the copper 
belt was actually outside the terrorial jurisdiction of the chiefs 
from whom BSA had acquired concessions in 1890s. This argument was 
strengthened by the fact that the British government, the former 
colonial power, was also aware of.the BSA 1s doubtful claim over the 
area. The British government became aware of this error through 
previous disputes over the area which took place towards the end of 
8. J. Potter, 11 The 51% Nationalization of Zambia in Copper Mines", 
in M. Faber and J. Potter, Towards Economic Independence 
(Cambridge Uni. Press, 1971), 91-133. 
9. United National Independence Party, the political party 
which led Zambia to Independence. 
10. A. Martin, supra, op.cit., note 7, p. 129. 
11. Ibid. where he points out that, 3 per cent was somewhat 
arbitrary figure current at the~ time: a higher and more realistic 
discount would of course reduce: the present value. 
12. Ibid. 
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1940s. 
This historical discovery obviously strengthened the National-
ist government's bargaining power. The findings were pu~lished in_ 
a White Paper on 2lst September 1964, hardly a month before independ-
ence.13 Because of this discovery the Zambian government said that, 
it had no legal duty to pay any compensation to BSA in respect of the 
mineral rights and that it was the British government which, being a 
protecting power, signed an invalid agreement, that had an obligation 
to settle the matter. The Zambian government however, agreed under 
purely moral considerations to pay a nominal sum towards compensation 
payable, provided the British government agreed to pay the same amount.14 
This was followed by long negotiations out of which an agreement was 
finally reached that both Zambian government and British government 
would each pay 2 million pounds to BSA as compensation for its 
mineral rights created by the concessions. 15 
This meant that the Zambian government had)by independence day, 
acquired the mineral rights formerly owned by BSA Company and through 
this it stepped into the shoes of BSA and levied royalties against 
the mining companies. This however, did not affect the mining 
companies which still owned and controlled the exploitation of copper 
and thereby controlling the country's economy)which relied heavily 
on the export of minerals. 16 ·-
13. "Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) White Paper on British South 
African Company's Claims to Mineral Royalties 11 i'h3 ILM (1964) 
1133-1170; The British South African Company's CZa.ims to Mineral 
Royalties in Northern Rhodesia, Govt.Printer, Lusaka, Sept. 21 ,1964. 
14. A. Martin, supra, note 7, p. 130, where he argues that in . 
offering to pay this nominal sum, Zambia had the intention of 
ensuring the future investors of her good faith. 
15. Ibid., p. 132. 
16. The importance of mining industry to Zambia's economy is 
d~monstrated by the following statistics:- 40 percent of 
National Income is derived from the industry, 90 per cent of 
(contd) 
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The Mulungushi Declaration 
Although the Zambian government acquired the right to levy 
royalties, it soon became obvious that it was the mining.companies 
which actually controlled the economy. Probably the mere realization 
by the government that these foreign companies were in control of the 
economy would not have worried the government very much had it not 
been for the fact that it was also evident that these companies were 
expatriating increasingly large amounts of money from the country in 
the form of dividends. This meant that there was very little capital 
left for further developrrent of the mines or for opening of new ones.17 
In order to rerredy the situation-, the Zambian government 
announced through the Mul ungushi Deel arati on of l 9th April, 1968, ', 
that, a company could not declare more than 40 percent of its profit 
as dividends and that repatriation would only be permitted if remit-
tance did not exceed 30 percent of equity capital of the company. 18 
Through the Mulugushi De~laration, the government also invited 
twenty-seven foreign companies dealing with construction, transport, 
retail and brewing businesses to offer to the government 51 percent 
stake in their enterprises. 19. One may wonder why the government even 
bothered to invite these businesses to offer 51 percent of their shares 
to the government instead of nationalizing them. The reason why it 
adopted this method is because the independence constitution contained 
an entrenched clause prohibiting among other things, expropriation of 
1.6. (contd) the country's export earning originates from the mining 
industry and 60 percent of government revenue is from copper 
companies. Source: Afr. Development, Jan, 1970, p. 15. 
17. See: Introduction to Mulungushi Declaration in K. Kaunda, 
supra, note 3. 
18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 
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20 foreign owner property. Having realised the effect of this 
Constitutional safeguard, the companies simply ignored the govern-
ment's i nvi ta tfon. 
Before going any further, it would be appropriate to consider 
whether the restrictions regarding transfer of funds introduced by 
~he Mulungushi Declaration amount to creeping expropriation. A 
similar question was raised in relation to the controversy over the 
Indonesian seizure of property of 'Dutch nationals, by the editors of 
the NetherZands InternationaZ Law Revie~. 21 
In their comments the editors were of the view that, refusal on 
the part of Indonesian government to grant permission in advance for 
the transfer of funds abroad to the owners of the enterprises expro-
priated, in effect "deprived the owners of all enjoyment of their 
property and therefore amounted to expropriation". 22 This view is ap-
. parently shared by Wortley, who seems to suggest that the British 
currency regulation in the late 1940s, which severely restricted the 
transferability of Sterling outside the Sterling area, may as well 
h t d t . t. 23 ave amoun e o an expropr1a ion. 
Cormnenting on restriction of transfer of funds abroad, Prof. 
Christie24 pointed out that, exp~riance gathered from successful 1 
repudiation of gold clauses suggests that in this field, when the 
20. See Independence Constitution in Lanning and Mueller, op.cit., 
note 7, p. 208. 
21. 5(1958) Netherlands International Law Review, pp. 227-242, at 
p". 235. 
22. Ibid., at p. 242. A 'Taking of Property' is defined in Paragraph 
3(a}, Article 10 of The Harvar~ Draft Convention on the Inter-
national Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, to include 
not only an outright taking of property but also any such 
unreasonable interference with1the use and enjoyment of property. 
23. B .A. Wortley, Expropriation in ·Pub Uc InternationaZ Law ( 1959), 
pp. 108-9. But cf. HeZbert Wagg and Co. Ltd. [1956], l eh. 323. 
24. G. Christie, op.cit., note 2, p. 333. 
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necessity is gre~t enough, almost any interference will be permitted. 
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission also held that, the refusal 
to permit the transfer of funds abroad, does not constitute confisca-
tion. 25 The fact that there is a difference of opinion on this 
question among commentators on International Law can hardly be denied. 
But the overwhelming view would seem to be that, the mere refusal to 
give permission for the transfer of funds abroad, does not by itself 
amount to expropriation. However, when this is coupled with other 
interferences with the use of property, the refusal may be a relevant 
factor in determining whether expropriation has occurred from the 
combined effect of all the interferences imposed on the alien's use 
·of his property. 26 
In the present case there was neither evidence of such other inter-
ferences nor were they alleged by the affected owners. It may, 
therefore be said that the restriction imposed by the Zambian govern-
ment on foreign firms on repatriation of funds abroad was a normal 
foreign exchange measure which did not amount to expropriation. 
The Matero Declaration 
The Matero Declaration of the llth August, 1969,27 had the effect 
of accomplishing what was not possible under the Mulungushi Declaration: 
acquisition of majority shareholding in major mining companies. In 
order to prepare ground for this_ declaration, the government had to 
amend the con sti tuti ona 1 cl a use regarding expropriation of forei gn7"owned 
property. This was done through a referendum held in June, 1969, 
·25-;· See. Rex v. International Trustee and Co. [1957], A.L.500, 
where the House of lords gave effect to the United States' 
abrogation of gold clauses in bond agreement. 
26. See, Christie, supra note 24, p. 333. 
27. See,Kenneth Kaunda, Towards Economic Independenoe (Zambia 
Information Service, 1969), Lusaka, p. 36. 
' ' ' ' ~ 
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seeking approval to amend the constitution. The declaration 
provided among other things that, the government would take over 
51 percent shareholding in major mining companies. 28 The 
companies mostly affected by this move were the two mining giants, 
ZAA and RST. 
The official reason given by the government was that it wanted 
to ensure that new mines were developed and that the country's 
resources were utilized in the national interest. 29 
Compensation 
The Matero declaration contained a promise to pay compensation 
to owners of the affected comoani.es. 30 It provided that compensation 
shall be negotiated between the companies on one hand and INDECO, a 
government owned corporation on the other. The government however, 
directed INDECO to negotiate compensation on fair value basis repre-
senting the book value of the property nationalized, to be paid out 
of future profits. The government also directed that, the advantages 
the shareholders will derive from association with the State 
should also be taken into accoµnt. 31 
28. Ibid. See also J. ·Potter, supra.(note 8; Muna Ndulp,,, __ ,, -,- ~ _ ,_. 1 
11 The Nationalization of the Zambian Copper Industry 11 , · 
6 Zambian Law Journal (1974); 11Anatomy of Zambia Copper 
Nationalization", Afr.Dev. [Jan. 1970], London, pp. 15-21; 
M. Burdette, 11 Nationalization in Zambia: A Critique of 
Bargaining Theory 11 , Vol. II, CJAS (1977), 480. Martin, 
supra note 7; Lanning and Mueller, supra note 7, p. 206; 
and R. Libby and M. Woakes, 11 Nationali_sation and Oisplace-
men't of Development Policy in Zambia 11 , Vol. XXIII,--No.1. 
Afr. Studies Rev. [April 1980], pp. 33-50. 
29. K. Kaunda, ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid., p. 37. 
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When negotiations were· opened both ZAA and RST indicated their 
objections to book value formula. RST, for example, argued that 
the accounting practice for the mining companies was so conservative 
that the assets could be expected to be valued well below their 
true va1ue. Because of this, RST recommended that compensation be 
based on an inventory of assets, which would be given fair va1ue. 32 
When this request was refused by the government, RST brought anotherrequest 
to the effect that one of its mines at Luansha, be treated differently 
because in its normal accounting practice, its assets were under-
valued in its books of accounts. This was accepted by the government 
which promised to take it into account when computing 
compensation. 
An agreement was finally reached between INDECO and the two 
companies, which J)ecame part of the Mining Acquisition (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1970,33 · enacted to imp11ement the Matero 
Declaration. 
Final Arrangement 
Two separate agreements w~re reached between INDECO and the 
two companies. These agreements provided for payment of compensation 
as well as the management of two jointly owned firms)which emerged 
out of government participation. 
As far as ZAA is concerned, it was agreed that the assets, under-
takings and liabilities of Nchanga, Rhokana, The Rhokana Copper 
Refinery and Bencroft, in which the government acquired 51 percent 
32. See .. Muna Ndulo, supra note 28, p. 57; A Martin, supra note 7, 
p. 169, see also 11The Financial Times 11 of 4th October 1970. 
33. Act No. 3 of (1970) Zambia. 
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shareholding, would be merged into one operating company to be known 
as Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mining Limited (NCCM). 51 percent of 
the shares in NCCM will be distributed to a newly formed government 
company called MINDECO Limited, while the remaining 49 percent together 
with the compensation security will be vested in a new company called 
Zambia Copper Investment Limited (ZCI). 
The audited accounts of ZAA operating assets as at 3lst December 
1969, gave the book value of K.246.58 million, 34 51 percent of which 
is K.125.76 million. If three months interest at 6 percent per annum 
is added the amount of compensation payable comes to K.127,643,137. 
According to the agreement, the compensation_ stock would be pa)8ble 
in 24 semi-annual instalments with interest of six per cent per.annum 
each being 10,551,639 U.S. dollars, to commence on lOth october,1970. 35 
Acceleration Terms 
The Master Agreement provided that 1if in any year after the fourth 
repayment, the total amount of interest and principle repayment in 
that year will be less than two-thirds of dividends that MINDECO had 
received from NCCM, there would be an accelerated repayment such 
that a total of two-thirds of the dividends would in fact be applied 
to the debt repayment. 36 
In brief, the Zambian government had acquired 51 percent of ZAA's 
operating assets for the price of U.S. $178,698,992 repayable over. 
twelve years at 6 percent interest. 
34. Until 1969, One Kwacha =U.S. $1.40. 
35. See, Master Agreement quoted in Potter, supra note 28, p. 109. 
36. Ibid. 
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Compensation for RST 
The direct financial compensation terms were similar to those 
under the agreement with ZAA. 
The operating assets of RST were consolidated into one operating 
company known as RCM valued at K.165 million. Repayment was to be 
in 16 semi-annual instalments at 6 percent interest. Each instalment 
was to be U.S. $9,519,638, payment to commence on the lOth October, 
1970. RST Shareholders received 49 percent shareholding in RCM 
together with compensation stock. 
Acceleration Terms 
This agreement also contained acceleration terms similar to those 
discussed in relation to ZAA except that in this case the terms applied 
after the first year and not the second year. 37 
Guarantees 
Payment of both sets of bonds was guaranteed by the government. 
The bonds were ranked pari passu with all other unsecured 'indebtedness 
arising out of money borrowed or guaranteed by Zambia. 38 
Tax Relief 
The government promised that, the schemes of arrangement involv-
ing the reorganisation of ZAA and RST, pursuant to acquisition of 51 
percent of their shares by the government, shall be exempt from all 
taxes, stamp duty, transfer fees and registration fees, which they 
39 
would otherwise be subject to, under the Zambia Company Law. The 
government also guaranteed that, all payments made wi~h.respect t9 
37. Ibid. 38. S.4. Act No. 28 of 1970. 
39. See Section 5 of Act No. 28 of 1970; See also the Zambian 
Company Law, cap. 216, Law of Zambia. 
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the bonds and loan stock, .would be exempt from all taxes in Zambia, 
and that both R.C.M. and NCCM would not be subject to any discrimin-
atory stamp duty, excise tax or import duty. 40 The Master Agreement 
also contained an arbitration clause which provided that 1
11 any dispute 
arising out of the Agreement \-Joul d be referred to the Internati anal 
Centre for the settlement of investment disputes 11 • 41 
Management Agreements 
As pointed out earlier, most of African countries which nation-
alized high technology industries, found the need to enter into some 
arrangement~with former owners of these enterprises, to ensure the 
continued flow of technology and skills necessary for the operation of 
the industries concerned. Zambia was by no means an exception. 
Under the Master Agreement, each jointly owned operating company, 
i.e. RCM and NCCM, had to sign exclusive management and consulting 
agreements with its previous parent company. Pursuant to this, RCM 
signed an agreement with RST and NCCM with ZAA for managerial,finan-
cial, commercial,technical and other services, in consideration of 
a fee of 374 percent of gross sales proceeds, plus 2 percent of profit 
after 51 percent mineral tax. 42 In addition there is an engineering 
service fee of 3 percent>with all costs reimbursable. 43 
The services to be provided, include the normal administrative 
and technical services such as project consultancy, preparation of 
reports and financial statements, work studies, computer and manage-
ment information services, industrial relations, recruitment of 
4Q,,.See, Income Tax (Special provisions) Act 1970 and_ Income 
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1970. 
41. See, the Master Agreement, supra note 35. 
42. See, Potter, supra note 35, p. 110. 
43. Ibid. 
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expatriate staff, external purchasing services and the provision of 
personnel .44 
As it has rightly been pointed out, 45 these management agreements 
cover some functions on which there is likely to be some divergence 
of objectives between the government and the companies providing 
services. These functions include preparation of business plans, 
viability studies and advising on production scheduling and policy 
towards ore reserves and research and development. However, in view 
of lack of expertise locally, together with the importance of the 
industry to the whole economy, 46 Zambia, like most of the other 
developing countries, had no option but to enter into such arrange-
ments at ·least for the first few years. 
Having seen the final arrangements contained in the ~~ster Agree-
ment, it would be appropriate at this juncture to examine the valid-
ity of 'book value' method, used in the assessment of compensation 
payable. 
The book value method, which is favoured by the Third World 
govenments,47 involves the calculation of compensation due, based on 
the actual historical cost of ·the assets involved, less the amounts 
historically deducted and written off against income tax for depre-
ciation. This amount will generally be much lower than the replace-
ment cost,48 favoured by developed countries, since the current cost 
44. Ibid.; Bostock and Harvey, supra note 7, p. 235. 
45. Potter, ibid., p. 110. 
46. See, note 16, ibid. 
47. The method was used by Chile for its participation.in the 
Anaconda Subsidiary in 1969, by Guyana fQr it? 
participation in the Alcan Subsidiary in 1970-71, and by Arab 
oil producers in their participation agreements in 1972. 
48. See-, Joseph S. Mccosker, 11 Book Value in Nationalization on 
Settlement 11 in R.B. Lillich, Valuation of Nationalized Property 
in :International La:w., Vo l . I I, (Vi rgi ni a, 1973), p. 51 ; See 
al so, C. F. Amerasi nghe, 11 The Quantum of compensation for 
{contd) 
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of capital goods is higher than in the past and since the capital 
is purchased at market price before deduction of depreciation. 
Because of this, the method nas been criticised as being an unfair 
basis for settling nationalization claims and that it should not be 
used for that purpose. 49 However, those who advocate the use of this 
method argue that the equity of book value method is.supported by 
the fact that it utilizes the value officially and formerly recorded 
by the nationalized company in its books, for purposes of its prior 
dealings with government authorities. 50 According to this school of 
thought therefore, these foreign companies should not be allowed to 
employ double standards. 
The existence of dispute as to what standard should be used to 
determine the amount of compensation payable indicates how strong 
the conflict of interest is,in the question of quantum of compensation 
in nationalization cases, since practice does not seem to indicate 
an acceptance of any particular method of valuation, different 
standards should be applied in different situations, depending of 
course on the circumstances of each case. 
2. Nationalization of Copper Industry in ZAIRE 
In 1967, the government of Zaire, passed a law;51 nationalizing 
the properties and holdings of a Belgium owned mining company, Union 
. 48_. (contd.) Nationalized Property", ibid· . ., p. 91. 
49. Joseph S. Mccosker, ibid. 
50. 
51. 
See Normar, Girvan, "Expropriating the Expropriators: Compensa-tio~ criteria from a Third World Viewpoint", in R.B. Lillich, 
Valuation., Vol. III, p. 167. ' 
Ordinance-Law No. 67-55 of January 28, 1967, Reprinted in , 
6 ILM (1967), p. 915. See particularly Article 3, whic~ says~ 
"The ownership of all property, real or personal, tangible or 
intangible, belonging to Union Miniere du Ha~t Katanga, as well 
as all rights, real or personal, movable or immovable, of the 
aforesaid company, shall be vested in the Congolese governme.1.1t 11 • 
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Miniere due Haut Katanga (UMHK). The law also prohibited UMHK from 
conducting any business in the territory of the Republic of the 
Congo. 52 A government owne~ company, Soci~t~ G§n~rale Congolaise de 
Minerais (GECOMIN) was formed to take over the assets of UMHK. 
In order to facilitate a better understanding of a chain of 
events that led to the nationalization of UMHK, it is important to 
trace the history of UMHK which is closely related with this country's 
colonial occupation. 
Hi story of UMHK 
In 1878, Sir Henry Stanley and King Leopold II of Belgium, 
established a survey committee for the Congo. This comnittee was later 
replaced by what was to be known as The International Congo Associa-
tion, which is considered to be the foundation of effective colonial 
occupation of the Congo. The area it occupied was regarded as the 
personal property of King Leopold II, by the Berlin Conference of 
1884-85,called by the big powers of that time, to discuss 11 the scramble 
for Afri ea 11 • 
This area was ironically renamed the 11 Congo Free State 11 • King 
Leopold, being a sovereign of the area in question, declared that, 
all mineral rights together with all unoccupied land·in the area, 
belonged to his State. The property xights to the land in the Colony 
were subdivided into three different categories. The first category 
of Jand belonged to the natives, the second was made a private estate 
of the Crown which could transfer such land and issue concession 
for the purpose of its development, while the third category of land 
was registered land owned by the State in respect of which concessjons 
52. Ibid.; Zaire became independent on June 30, 1960, under the name 
of the Republic of Congo Leopoldville. In July 1966 the name 
was changed to Republic of Congo Kinshasa and finally in Octo_per, 
1971, the country was renamed Republic of Zaire. 
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for mineral rights were issued. 53 
In April 1891, a company called Compagnie du Katanga, was form-
ed, in order to annex, occupy, organi.se, administer and create an_ 
economic infrastructure in the area. In consideration for this work, 
the company was given one-third of unoccupied lands in the territory, 
together with a 99 year concession for the exploitation of the 
subsoil with a 20 year option on any concession for mineral exploit-
ation in respect of the lands owned by the State. 54 
In ·June, 1900, Compagnie du Katanga in conjunction with the 
State, formed a company ca1led Comite Special du Katanga (CSK), the 
stated aim of which was to facilitate development of the area owned 
by the State and Compagnie du Katanga. 55 The Statute incorporating 
CSK, provided among other things, an operation period of 99 years. 
At the end of this period, the assets were to be divided into two-
thirds to the State and one-third to Compagnie du Katanga. When 
the Congo Free State formally became a colony of Belgium, CSK became 
a chartered company, with full concessionary powers. 56 It was during 
this period when it became a chartered company, that CSK entered 
into a prospecting agreement with another company called Tanganyika 
Concessions Limited, with the aim of jointly prospecting for minerals 
in Southwest Katanga. 57 According to the agreement forming this joint 
venture, each party would provide ha-lf of the capital- required for· 
53. See, Alan P. Merriam, Congo - Background of Conflict (North-
western University Press, 1961), p. 12; Wolf Radmann, 11 The 
Nationalization of Zaire's Cooper from Union Miniere to GECOMINES 11 • 
25 Afr.Today (1978), p. 26. 
54. See, Jules Gerald Libais, Katanga Secession (University, of ,,. 
Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 316; W. Radmann, ibid., p. 26. 
55. Ibid., p. 316. 56. Radmann, supra note 53, p. 2fr. 
57. The Tanganyika Concessions Limited combines interests of Oppen-
heimer Group of Companies and of American interests mainly the 
Rockfeller Group. However when first established in 1899 the 
Company represented British interests only with its headquar~ers in 
.Salisbury until recently when it has been moved to Nassaij,Bah~mas. 
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the development of mineral deposits that will be discovered, and 
that if there are any mineral deposits discovered, a company will 
be formed to carry out the ~xploitation of such minerals. This agree-
ment provided further that CSK would receive 60 percent of profit 
from such operation, while Tanganyika Concession Limited will get 
40 percent. 58 
It was in accordance with this agreement between CSK and Tangan-
yika Concession Limited that on 28th October 1906, UMHK was estab-
lished, and developed to become the world's third largest producer 
of copper, the largest producer of cabolt and radium and one of the 
world's most important producers of germanium. 59 
By 1959 UMHK had already issued 414,000 voting shares, 134,016 
of which were held by Tanganyika Concession Limited and 248,000 by 
CSK. 
The Company was under the control of a six member board of repre-
sentatives, four of whom were appointed by the Congolese Colonial 
government, while the remaining two were appointed by Campagnie du 
Katanga. 
This arrangement, whereby the running of UMHK was done jointly 
by CSK, Congolese Colonial government and Tanganyika ~oncession 
Limited, worked perfectly well during the colonial era. This was so 
because it made little difference whether the four of the six member 
board of UMHK were appointed by the Congolese Colonial government or 
the Belgian government for they were in fact one and the same. How-
ever, this was not the case. when the colonial rule came to an e_nd. _ 
In the late fifties, when the country was heading towards independence, 
there were already some fears among the shareholders of UMHK, that 1 
58. Radmann, supra note 53, p. 29. 59. Ibid. 
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the new nationalist government that was going to replace the Colonial 
government, would adopt some radical policies which may have serious 
repercussions both to CSK and Tanganyika Concession Limited, as far as 
the affairs of UMHK were concerned. 60 
It is probably ~ ' this fear of impending radical changes 
• which made the proprietors of UMHK allow themselves to be involved 
in the unfortunate events which followed the country's independence 
- the attempted secession of Katanga. It is undoubted fact that 
UMHK featured very prominently in the affairs connected with the 
attempted secession, the details of which are not within the limits 
of this work. 61 
Nationalization of UMHK. 
The chain of events that led to the nationalization of UMHK 
began on 6th May, 1966, when the company made decisions on some 
matters relating to the price of copper without first consulting the 
government. The government retaliated against this move, by raising 
export tax on copper from 17 to 30 percent. The government also 
issued a directive providing among other things, that, 11with effect 
fr0m l January, 1967, a 11 companies legally constituted in the Congo 
shall have their Headquarters in the country 11 • 62 In another move, 
60. See, Lanning and Mueller, supra note 7, p. 253. 
61. For detailed account of the attempted Secession of Katanga see . 
e.g. Catherine Hoskins, The Congo Sinee Independence (Oxford 
University Press, 1965); See also the critical review of this 
book by C.C. O'Brien, in New Left Review, No. 31 (May-June, 1965); 
See also C.C. O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (Hutchinson, 1962); 
Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (Nelson, 1967); Thomas 
Kanza, Conflict in the Congo, ~~nguin Books, 1972; Andrew Tull, 
CIA: The Inside Story (New York, 1962); J. Gerald-Libais, 
Katanga Secession (Uni. of Wisconsin Press), 1969; Allan P. 
Mer.riam, supra note 53; C. Young, Politics of Congo (Princeton 
Uni. Press, 1965); see also Alvin ~lolfe, "Capital and the Congo 11 
in -A. Davis and J. Baker (eds), Southern Africa in Transition 
(Praeger, N.Y., 1966), and La~ning & Mueller, supra note 7. 
62. See, Lanning and Mueller, supra note 7, p. 245, UMHK had its 
Headquarters in Brussels. 
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the government stopped the export of copper through the neighbouring 
Angola in a bid to increase the country 1 s share of the revenue. 
UMHK was not happy with these changes especially the one relat-
ing to movement of its Headquarters from Brussels to Kinshasa. 
According to the company executives, this move would have the effect 
of subjecting their company to higher taxes. 63 
Bakaji ka Bill 
Just ten days after the government directive on export tax, the 
President issued a Bill which empowered the government to take back 
all the rights over lands; forest and mineral resources given to UMHK 
before independence unless it complied with the requirement of shift-
ing its Headquarters into the country. The company therefore had to 
choose between moving to Kinshasa and subject itself to high taxes 
and other regulations or stay in Brussels and risk the possibility of 
losing the mineral rights in Zaire. However, due to tht company 1 s 
strong bargaining position the government could not implement its 
threats contained in the Bill, and thereby decided to go to a 
negotiation table with UMHK. 
Negotiations 
The government opened negotiations with UMHK, to determine the 
future operation of the company. By November, 1966, it was apparent 
that an agreement in principle was already underway, at least it seemed 
so to the Congolese government. While the talks were still continuing 
the government made an announcement that UMHK would cease to operate 
from early January 1967, and its place would be taken by a new co_mpany 
called Union Miniere du Congo, in which the goverment was to holq 
63. Ibid. 
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50 percent of the shares. 64 This plan did not materialize because 
although UMHK agreed on the formation of a joint company with the 
government, they insisted on retaining the control of copper market-
ing, a proposition which was not accepted by the Congolese govern-
ment. Consequently the agreement collapsed. 65 In response to the 
collapse of this agreement on the -formation of a joint venture company, 
th~ government suspended all shipments of copper from the country 
and announced the formation of a new company to take over the assets 
of UMHK. The government achieved this by ordinance law of 28th 
January, 1967, which transferred the ownership of the properties and 
holdings of UMHK in the country, to the State.66 Apart from taking 
over the properties, the law also prohibited UMHK from carrying out 
any activity in the Republic of Congo. 67 
The company, on the other hand, responded by announcing that, 
i~ would intervene in all sales of the metal originating from their 
expropriated concession area. But as the Congolese government had 
I 
already stopped all copper exports through its decree issued towards 
the end of 1966, there was no way that UMHK 1 s threat could be carried 
out. 
The Belgian government, as expected, denounced the move, and. 
declared that neither from political nor legal points of view, could 
it have any part in the act and that it would take measures to safe-
guard the shareholders and company's interests. 68 But as events 
turned out, there was no drastic measure taken by the Belgian govern-
ment against the Republic of the Congo. 
64. Ibid., p. 246. 65. Ibid. 
66. Ordinance-Law No. 67-55 of 28tD January, 1967, supra note 51. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid.; see, Radmann, supra no.te 53, p. 37. 
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GECOMIN 
The new company formed by the Congolese government to take 
over the nationalized asse~s of UMHK was Societe Generale Congolese 
de Minerais (GECOMIN). The government's initial plan was to split 
off Tanganyika Concession Limited from the Belgian companies by offer-
ing it 15 percent in the new company (equal to Tanganyika Concession's 
stake in UMHK). According to this plan, the government would hold 
55 percent of the shares, Tanganyika Concession Limited 15 percent, 
and th~ remaining 30 percent would be offered for sale to the public. 
. ' 
But as one would expect, Tanganyika Concessions, a long time 
partner of CSK in UMHK, could not side w1th the Congolese government 
against UMHK. By the beginning of 1967 there was a need on the part 
of the government to review its plans in relation to the prospective 
shareholders in the new company, now that Tanganyika Concessions 
had turned down the offer. 69 
The government therefore decided that it'would take 60 percent 
of the shares and the remaining 40 percent would be offered to the 
public. But even this revised plan did not work out smoothly as the 
40 percent shares offered to the public remained unsubscribed for a 
very long time, which made the gove'rnment realize that the possible 
investors (mainly from outside the Congo) were not willing to invest 
in -the new company. As a result -of· this ·hesitancy on -the ·pa·rt -of-·- -
private investors, President Mobutu ·approa~hed one Belgium based 
bank, Banque Lambart, with the view of forming a consortium. This 
bank on the other hand, approached some mining companies such as The 
Newmount Mining Corporation, Roan Selection Trust and The Panarroys 
Company, with a suggestion of forming the Consortium. When the news 
69. Ibid., p. 38; Lanning and Mueller, supra note 62, p. 246. 
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of the possible consortium between the Congolese government, Banque 
Lambart and these mining companies,reached UMHK Headquarters in 
Belgium, it issued a strong communique threatening legal action 
against anyone who acquired interest in GECOMIN. 70 As a result of 
this threat, the thre~ mining companies withdrew from the proposed 
consortium. 71 The UMHK also threatened that if the plan for the 
formation of the proposed consortium went ahead, it would withhold 
the maps of Katanga subsoil, compiled over a period of sixty years, 
72 which provide a key to the mineral deposits of the Katanga area. 
Because of these threats, coupled with the fact that the Congo-
lese government could not afford to continue the stoppage of copper 
mining, which in turn cut-off the much needed revenue, any more, the 
government decided to begin negotiations with UMHK. Because the 
government wanted to resume shipment of copper while negotiations 
for compensation were going on, it signed a marketing agreement with 
Soci~t~ G§n§rale des Minierais (SGM), a marketing organization subsid-
' 
iary of UMHK. 
Under this agreement GECOMIN agreed to pay a commission of 4.5 
percent of the value of the products in Belgian francs. GECOMIN-also 
agreed to pay salaries of foreign technicians on the basis of 130 per-
cent of the cost of living in Belgium. 73 
Fina 1 Accord 
70. 
After the signing of the marketing and technical agreement 
Lanning and Mueller, ibid., p. 248; Richard Gott, Mobutu's 
Congo tFabian Society, 1967), p. 24. 
71. Ibid. 72,. Ibid. 
73. Union Miniere's Directors' Report. Annual General Meeting of 
20th May, 1970, and a Press release dated 6th October,1969 
in Radmann, supra note 68, pp. 39-40. 
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between GECOMIN and SGM in February, 1969, negotiations for compen-
sation for the UMHK 1 s nationalized assets went on up to September, 
1968, when a final accord was reached. There was a compensation 
agreement in the accord under which SGM, the successor to the UMHK, 
was to be paid 6 percent of the value of the price that Zaire's copper 
export fetched on the world markets, for 15 years. 1 percent of this 
was to pay for the management and sales contract, under which SGM 
provided technical services. SGM·also provided planning and various 
other services in return for exclusive right to market Zaire's copper, 
cabolt and other metals. The remaining 5 percent was to be compensa-
tion for the loss of UMHK's Zaire copper assets. 74 
This accord was regarded as a very satisfactory arrangement by 
UMHK, through its communique issued following the signing of the 
_, 
accord, which said, 
The provisions of the accord will allow Societe 
Generales des Minerais, to provide our company 
during the next 15 years with satisfactory 
compensation for the loss of our Con~olese assets. 
The exact amount of this compensation will depend 
on the production of GECOMIN and the value of its 
products. It is thus ~ied to the prosperity of 
·the mining industry. 7 
As one influential newspaper on financial matters put it, "the 
agreement is one of the major conditions for a sizeable World Bank 
loan to the Republic of Congo 11 • 76 
As payment of compensation was tied to the sales of copper, the 
government started to pay immediately after resuming the sales under 
74. See, 6 Afr.Res.Bull. (1969)(Financial,Economic and Technical 
series), p. 1483; Radmann, supra note 68, p. 40; See also the 
statement by UMHK's chairman in'Radmann, ibid., p. 38. 
75. See, the Communique in 6 Afr.Res.Bull .[1969](Fin., Econ. & Tech. 
Ser.), p. 1483; 17 Keesings Contemporary Arch, 23903; The 
Financial Times of 26th September 1969. 
76. The Financial Times, ibid. 
'· 
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the new arrangement. By 1973, SGM had already received about 170 
million U.S. dollars, which was more than half of the book value of 
the nationalized assets. 
In 1974, the agreement was revised. Under the revised agreement 
Zaire was to pay a lump-sum of 4,000 million Belgian francs, in 
complete and final settlement of the compensation debt. 77 SGM on 
the other hand, agreed to collaborate with the government of Zaire 
in the construction of a copper refinery. 78 It is reported that by 
1976, the government of Zaire had already paid about 90 percent of 
the 4,000 million Belgian francs. 79 
3. SIERRA LEONE 
Nationalization of major mining companies 
The government of Sierra Leone announced, towards the end of 
1968 1that it would take over 51 percent shareholding in all major 
mining companies in the country. 80 
Because of this announcement, the Sierre Leone Development Co. 
(DELCO) which is the iron ore mining subsidiary of William Baird Inc. 
of Scotland, decided to go into liqujdation rather than be national-
ized.81 The company started by writing down its assets from £10 mil-
lion to £1 million in 1973, and registered a trading loss, which it 
reported to the government. Because of this 11 trading loss 11 the 
77. See, Financial Times of 14 February 1974; 11 Afr.Res.Bull .[1974] 
(Fin., Econ., & Techn., Series), p. 3014. 
78. Ibid. 
79. 13 Afr.Res.Bull. [1976], p. 3814. 
80. See, Afr.Recorder, Jan 1-14 [19JO], pp. 2425-26. 
81. See, The Report of Deputy Governor, The Central Bank of Sierra 
Leone, in African Development, December 1975, p. 19. 
,_ 
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government abandoned its p1an to take over 51 percent shares in the 
company and extended substantia1 amounts of money to the 
company in the form of 1oans, to keep the mine going. The company 
kept on asking for. further 1oans from the government and in its 
attempt to keep the mine going, the government, which was a1ready in 
financia1 crisis, scraped together the money to serve the mines, 
being the major source of revenue. At this time DELCO had-
not paid taxes to the government for-four years, 82 whi1e it continued 
to bank the foreign exchange earned by the iron ore. 83 
The government approached Bethlehem Stee1, with an intention 
of inviting it to take over management of the mine. However, there 
was no agreement reached, as Beth1ehem was more interested in the 
concession to mine Tonki1i1i iron ore deposit rather than taking 
over management of DELCO. In 1975, DELCO fina11y liquidated its 
assets and repatriated its capita1, leaving Sierra Leone with an' 
abandoned mine, a railway and a port. Mor.eover, the iron ore deposit 
was a1most exhausted and the government was therefore left with a 
substantia1 and unsecured debt, a redundant work force and financial 
chaos. 84 
The government however, went on with its 51 percent take-over 
plan, in relation to other mining companies. By early 1970 negoti-
ations with three other mining compani~s affected by this move had 
already started. The three companies were The Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust (SLST), the Diamond producer, The Sierra Leone Ores and Metals 
(SIEROMCO), the bauxite producer, and Shirbro Minerals, the rutile 
82. Lanning and Mueller, supra note 7, p. 440. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid.; Afr.Development, December, 1975, p. 19; Afr.Development, 
April, 1976, pp. 383-5. 
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producer. 85 
Diamond being the biggest foreign exchange earner, the government 
decided to start negotiations with SLST, the major diamond producer 
and use the agreement reached out of these negotiations as precedent 
for other companies. 
Agreement with SLST. 
By February 1970, an agreement had been reached, under which 
SLST's Sierre Leone assets were to be vested in a new company, DIMINCO 
in which the government holds 51 percent shares while SLST holds 
the remaining 49 percent. 86 According to the terms of this agree-
ment, management of DIMINCO was left to SLST which will be under the 
supervision of a Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board will 
be appointed by the government while SLST will appoint the Managing 
Director. 87 
Compensation 
The Agreement provides for payment of £2,550,000 to SLST as 
compensation for its nationalized assets, to be paid in the form of 
government bonds bearing interest of 5.5 percent. 88 The bonds were 
to be p~~d out in 16 equal half yearly instalments, the first falling 
due on 20th June, 1971. It was also agreed that all payments were to 
be made in Sterling Pounds, in London. 89 
85. See, Afr.Recorder, Feb. 12-28 [1970], p. 2460. 
86. See, Afr.Recorder, Feb. 13-23 [1971], -p. 2740. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid.; See also S.K.B. Asante, 11 International Transactions 
and National Development Goals 11 , 10 Rev. of Ghana Law 
[1978], p. 12. 
89. Ibid., Afr. Recorder [1971], p. 2740. 
133. 
Agreement with SIEREMCO 
In February, 1976, the government announced that it had reached 
90 an agreement with SIEREMCO, the major bauxite producer. Under the 
terms of this agreement, SIEREMCO will continue to operate without 
government participation, provided that taxes and royalties will be 
raised. The agreement provided that royalties ~nd mineral-fees will-
be doubled, while company tax will be increased from 52 percent to 
60 percent up to 1978 when the m1ning lease will expire and will have 
to be renegotiated. 91 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the leading role that extractive industry has in 
these countries• economies it is not surprising therefore to find 
that immediately after they became independent, these states sought 
to have a firm control over the exploitation and marketing of the 
minerals. It was realized that whoever was in control of the mining 
industry, was in fact in control of their economic and hence 
political survival. The question as to how far these countries have 
managed to control their destinies through nationalization measures, 
can be answered elsewhere. Suffi cES it iD say however, that it can not 
be denied that through nationalization measures, these countries have 
acquired more say, power and revenue from the exploitation of minerals 
within their boundaries. 
As far as payment of compensation is concerned, it has been 
pointed out above that, an agreement was reached between the Zambian 
Government and the two Mining Companies i.e. ZAA and RST as-a--rest:Jlt 
of this agreement, payment of compensation was guaranteed based o~ 
90. Afr. Recorder, Jan 15 - Feb. 14 [1976], p.3784; supra, p.2358. 
91. Ibid. 
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Book value of the assets taken over, to be paid in 12 years at 
an interest rate of six per cent per annum. 
sation was to be paid out of future profits. 
The amount of compen-
Accordi ng to the 
compensation Agreement reached between the Government of Zaire and 
SMG, UMHK's successor, the Company was guaranteed payment of 6% 
of the value of copper export earnings for 15 years. Out of this, 
5% was to be paid as compensation for UMHK's assets, while the 
remaining 1% was to be paid to SMG' as management fees. In 1974 the 
arrangement was revised and the sum of 4,000 million Belgian Francs 
was to be paid by the Government in final settlement of compensation 
debt. 
The case of Sierra Leone is not different from that of Zambia. 
The Government agreed to pay the value of nationalized assets which was 
valued at [2.5 million. The amount was payable in Government Bonds 
' bearing interest rate of 5.5%, to be paid in 8 years (in 16 half 
yearly instalments). 
The Book value standard of valuation is one of the valuation 
methods recognised in international law. It takes into account the 
actual historical cost of the assets less amounts deducted annually 
as depreciation. The value of compensation reached through this way 
is of course smaller than that calculated through replacement value 
on full market value preferred by capital exporting nations. Since 
the standards of valuation which requires payment of full market 
value of assets nationalised has been refused by the larger majority 
of international community and_since there is no universally accept-
able standard of valuation, applica~ion of Book value whenever 
appropriate cannot be over-ruled. 
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As regards the lump sum compensation in case of Zaire's 
nationalizatioh measures, it is important to note that although 
it is not clear what particular principle{s) has been deployed 
in reaching the agreement, the agreement was reached through 
negoitation and since both parties were happy with the final 
arrangement it can be assumed that the question of violation of 
international law principles cannot arise. 
Regarding effectiveness of.the compensation paid it can be 
said that since the term "effective compensation" normally 
refers to the currency used to make payments and that in all cases 
examined in this section payment of compensation was guaranteed to 
be made in convertable currencies, there could hardly be any dispute 
regarding this requiremen~. Having seen that the compensation paid 
was effective in accordance with the definition of the term 11 effective 11 
it would be interesting to see whether they were also prompt and 
adequate. 
As regards the requirement of promptness, it has been pointed 
out in all leading text books and judicial decisions that the term 
11 prompt 11 refers to time of payment of compensation. Although some 
authorities maintain that prompt payment means immediate payment 
in cash, contemporary state practice· however, tends to show that 
some governments are prepared to accepted deferred payment as 
satisfying the requirement of prompt compensation in accordance with 
international law, if the total amount due is fixed immediately, 
allowance for interest for late payment is made and there are 
guarantees that future payments will be made. If this wider 
definition of the term prompt is acceptable, it follows therefore\ 
that the three compensation agreements seen above provided not only 
the payment of prompt but a 1 so effec,ti ve compensation. 11 
'" 
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The remaining question which needs to be answered is whether 
the requirement of 11 adequate compensation 11 was complied with. The 
definition of the term adequate has been the source of controversy 
between capital exporting and importing states. The definition 
which requires payment of full market value of the property taken 
over, has been rejected as being inconsistent with the meaning of 
nationalization. This fact has been clearly demonstrated in the 
case studies in that compensations based on standards other than 
market value have been given. 
Although compensation made fell short of full rrarket value of 
the properties affected it is interesting to note that such compen-
sations were accepted by the mining companies concerned. This 
shows that the multinational companies are willing to accept standards 
of compensation other than those insisted by their home countries, if 
there is a possibility of continuing operations under new arrangements. 
Apart from the new arrangements which are in the form of equity 
participation and marketing arrangements other factors which had 
bearing on the bargaining position of the Mining Companies were the 
Management Contracts tied to the final accords as well as the technical 
skills and the backing the Mining Companies had from their home 
governments and international agencies such as World Bank and IMF, 
themselves being major sources of foreign aid. 
On the part of the host states the major factors which have 
determined their bargaining power include their over reliance on 
the mining sector, lack of managerial and technical skills to run 
the mines independently and fear not to scare other foreign investors, 
whose home countries are the traditional suppliers of financial 
and technical assistance. 
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In brief therefore, the compensation agreements examined in 
this section of the study, indicate that whenever there are some bene-
fits which will accrue to the foreign party, out of the new arrange-
ments, the multinational companies are prepared to accept standards 
other than those insisted by their home governments. 
In this particular case the amounts of compensation agreed, 
were not conforming with the definition of the term ''adequate 
compensation", which is interpreted by the capital exporting states 
to mean full market value of the property nationalized, an interpre-
tation which has always been rejected by the capital importing 
states. It may be too early to conclude on the acceptability of the 
new norms propagated by developing countries, but what has been 
seen above is a clear evidence of the fact that whenever appropriate, 
the notion of "appropriate compensation" may be used in assessment 
of compensation payable. 
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PART TWO 
NATIONALIZATION OF ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES 
l. Nationalization in Tanzania 
Although public ownership has been part of Tanzania 1 s economic 
policy since independence,1 it was not until February 1967, with the 
adoption of Arusha Declaration, that, for the first time, it was cate-
gorically stated that, the coutry was aiming at building socialism, 
2 through public ownership of major means of production and exchange. 
Arusha Declaration 
This document, which may be considered as the philosophical founda-
tion of all nationalization measures in Tanzania after 1967, was 
adopted by the Party 1 s National Executive Committee on 5th February, 
1967. The declaration contained a statement on public ownership of 
means of production and exchange1 ~art from the general theme regard-
ing the policy of socialism and self-reliance. As far as public owner-
ship is concerned, the document emphasised that, 
The way to build and maintain socialism is to 
ensure that the major means of production are 
under the control and ownership of peasants and 
workers themselves through their Government and 
co-operatives ... These major means of production 
are: land; forests; mineral resources; water; 
oil and electricity; communications; transport; 
banks; insurance; import and export trade; whole-
sale businesses; the steel, machine tool,arms, 
motor-car, cement and fertilizer factories; the 
textile industries; and any other big industry 
upon which a large section of the population 
l. In each of the three East African States, many forms of public 
ownership were ·already present through the East African 
Common Services organisation. 
2. See, The Arusha Declaration and Tanu's Policy of Socialism 
and Self Reliance, Dar-es-Salaam, 1967. 
', 
depend for their living, or which provides 
essential components for other industries; 
large plantations, especially those which 
produce raw materials. 3 
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lhe dec1aration may be regarded-as· the Party's directive to the 
government, to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance. 
As-the events turned out, the government responded to the directive 
very quickly. Within a week from the announcement of Arusha Declara-
tion, the government made it public t.hat all commercial banks, a dozen 
importing and exporting firms, eight milling firms, and the National 
Insurance Corporation were wholly brought under public ownership. 4 
The government also announced that it would acquire a monopoly of the 
insurance business. In taking over these businesses, the government 
promised to pay "fair and full 11 compensation to the affected owners. 5 
The government's decision to nationalize was legalized by the 
National Assembly, which unanimously approved and passed five national-
; zati on Bi 11s. 6 
The main characteristics of the nationalization legislations 
which resulted from these Bills is that they did not nationalize all 
firms carrying out a certain business but they specifically related 
to a particular firm to be nationalized. The only exception is the 
insurance business, whereby there was an outright nationalization, 
3. Ibid., p. 3. 
4. See President Nyerere 1s speech on 11 Public ownership", The Sunday 
News (Dar-es-Salaam), 12th February, 1967. Reprinted in J.K. 
Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, 1968, 
pp. 251-56. 
5 • Ibid. , p • 2 5 3 • 
-- 6. The Acts of Parliament which came.,.out of these five Bills are: (l) The National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and vesting of 
Assets and Liabilities) Act, Act. No. 1, 1967. As Amended by Act 
No. 21 of 1967; (2) The State Trading Corporation (Establishment 
and vesting of interests) Act, Act No.2 of 1967. As Amended by 
Act No. 14 of 1967; (3) The National Agricultural Products Board 
(vesting of Interests)Act, Act No. 3 of 1967. As Amended by Act. 
No. 14 of 1967; (4) The Insurance .(Vesting of interests and 
(contd) 
140. 
through the creation of a monopoly of insurance businesses in the 
National Insurance Corporation. 7 
(a) Nationalization of Commercial Banks 
The nationalization of Commercial Banks in the country was done 
through The National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of 
Assets and Libailities) Act. The first two parts of this Act, deal 
with the establishment of a government owned commercial bank, called 
the National Bank of Commerce, while the actual taking over of banking 
businesses is provided for under the third and fourth parts of the Act. 
As far as the assets and liabilities of the nationalized banks are 
concerned, the Act provides that, "All the assets of the banks which 
are Tanzanian Assets5 subsisting upon 6th February 1967 (the effective 
date) shall by virtue of this Section be vested in the National Bank 
of Commerce 11 , 8 . 'and that all the liabilities of the banks so national-
ized shall be vested in the National Bank of Corrunerce as well. 9 
Compensation 
The Act provides that, "the United Republic shall pay 'full and 
fair' compensation in respect of net value of the assets taken over 11 • 10 
The Act however does not specify the way the amount of compensation 
payable shall be determined. But it says that, when the amount of 
compensation payable to any person entitled has been determined, "the 
Minister shall issue a certificate setting out the amount which shall 
constitute a charge to be paid out of the consolidated fund, provided 
6. (contd) Regulations) Act, Act No. 4 of 1967; (5) The Industrial 
Shares (Acquisition) Act, Act No. 5 of 1967. 
7. See Act No. 4 of 1967, ibid. 
8. See S. 8(2) of Act No. 1 of 1967. 
9. See S. 8(3) of Act No. l ofl967. 
10. See S.10(1), ibid. 
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that the said amount of compensation shall be payable in such manner 
and in such instalments as the Minister for Finance
1
after consultations 
with the person entitled, shall determine 11 • 11 
The banks whose assets and liabilities were taken over by virtue 
of part three of this Act were The National Grirtdlays Bank; The Stand-
ard Bank; Barclay's Bank DCO; Algemene Bank Nederk and N.V.;. The 
Bank of India Ltd.; Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd.; The National Bank 
of Pakistan, and Tanzania Bank of Commerce Limited. 12 
(b) Nationalization of Trading Companies 
In this category, the government, through the State Trading Corpor-
ation (Establishment and Vesting of Interest) Act, 1967, took over 
Import/Export forms, who~esale dealers and other trading companies. ~ 
The Act established a public corporation called The State Trading 
Corporation whose main function was to take over the businesses of the 
nationalized firms. The Act provides that 11with effect from llth 
February 1967, the State Trading Corporation shall take ov~r prospective 
businesses in Tanganyika of some firms registered in Tanganyika while 
for those registered outside the country, the Corporation will take 
over the assets and liabilities existing within Tanganyika upon the 
effective date 11 • 13 
The affected firms included: Smith McKenzie and Co.Ltd., incorpor-
ated in Kenya; Dalgety (E.A.) Limited, incorporated in Kenya; Dalgety 
and Co. Ltd., incorporated in England; A. Baumann and Co. Ltd., incor-
porated in Kenya; Twentsche Overseas Trading Company Ltd., incorpor-
ated in Kenya; African Mercantile Company (Overseas) Ltd., incorporated 
in England; Wiggleworth and Co. Ltd.~ incorporated in England; 
11. Section 10(2), ibid. 
12. See, Schedule I to Act No. l of ·1967. 
13. S.9 Act No. 2 of 1967. 
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Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika, registered under Cap. 
211 of Tanzania Laws; and East African Cotton Export Ltd., incorporat-
ed in Uganda. 14 
Compensation 
The Act provides two different ways under which compensation is 
payable, depending on the nature of nationalization. Where the nation-
alization involved a foreign finn and therefore it is only the Tanzan~ 
ian assets and liabilities of the company subsisting on the effective 
date, that were affected, the government undertook to pay "full and 
fair" value of the assets, less the liabilities also taken over. 15 
But if the company affected is registered in the country and therefore 
it is the Tanzanian business that was taken over, the government offer-
ed to pay full and fair value of the shares now vested in the new 
Corporation. 16 The mode of payment as well as the issuance of a 
certificate by the Minister for Finance, are identical to those found 
in Act No. 1 of 1967. 
(c} Nationalization of Agricultural Companies 
Through the National Agricultural Products Board (Vesting of 
Interests) Act, 1967, the government nationalized the shares in local 
companies• dealing with agricultural products and like in the case of 
Trading firms, ~ook over the assets of those firms which were register-
ed outside the country. 17 The firms whose businesses were taken over 
include: Rajwani Mills and Pure Food Products Ltd., while those whose 
assets and liabilities were taken over.are: Pure Food Products (T.) 
Limited; Tanzania Millers Limited; Nurmohamed Jessa & Company Limited; 
Associated Traders Ltd. and Kyela Satter Rice Mills Ltd. 
14. Ibid. 15. S.12(2) of Act No. 2, 1967. 
16. S.22(1} of Act No. 2, 1967. 
17. S.4, Act No. 3, 1967. 
'· 
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·Compensation 
The Statute contains provisions relating to payment of 11 full and 
fair" compensation and the procedure to be followed is similar to 
that found in Act No. 2, 1967 above. 
(d) Nationalization of Insurance Businesses 
Through the Insurance (Vesting of Interests and Regulations) Act, 
1967, the government nationalized the minority shareholding in the 
National Insurance Corporation and thereby making the National Insur-
ance Corporation a wholly government owned corporation. 
The relevant Section dealing with the nationalization of the 
privately owned minority shares in the Corporation provides that, 
All shares in the Corporation (National Insurance 
Corporation of Tanganyika Limited) other than the 
shares already vested in the Treasury Registry, 
shall and without further assurance vest free of 
any trust, mortgage, charge, lien, interest or 
other incumberances whatsoever, vest in the 
Treasury Registry and shall be deemed to have 
so vested upon the effective date. 18 
The Act provides for the payment of "full and fair" compensation 
in respect of the shares taken over by the government. 19 It also 
contains similar provisions relating to the certificate to be issued. 
by the Minister. 
In brief, therefore, the government here, unlike in other cases, 
created a monopoly by taking over minority shareholding in the only 
insurance corporation, in which it had already majority shareholding. 
(e) Nationalization of majority shareholding in Industrial firms. 
The government also passed the Industrial Shares (Acquisition) Act 
1967, which had the effect of acquiring a majority shareholding in some 
18. S.3, Act No. 4, 1967. The effective date is 12th February, 1967, 
1 9 • s . 6 ' ibid. 
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specified industrial companies. 20 In rrost cases the number of shares 
taken did not exceed 60 percent. The specified industrial companies 
are: The Metal Box Company of Tanzania Limited; Kilimanjaro Breweries 
Limited; Tanzania Breweries Limited; BAT Tanzania Limited; Tangan-
yika Export Company Limited; East African Tobacco Company (T.) Limited 
and Tanzania Bata Shoe Company Limited. 
The Act also contained similar compensation prov1s1ons found in 
other nationalization legislations already examined. 21 
SUMMARY 
What may be said in relation to the nationalization measures in 
Tanzania is that the government made a distinction between the 
companies registered in.the countries and those which were incorpor-· 
ated under foreign law. Whenever the take-over concerned companies 
registered under Tanganyikan law, acquisition of entire share capital 
of the company was enough to bring it under public ownership. But . 
if it is foreign company,· the rule against extra-territorial expro-
priation made the government refrain from acquiring more than the 
-
Tanzanian businesses of the companies concerned and therefore the 
gove~nment took over the local assets. 
Another common feature in all nationalization legislations 
examined above, is that they all have provisions for payment of 11 full 
and fair 11 compensation. This is so, even though in some cases compen-
sation is paid in respect of the value of local assets taken while 
in others in respect of the shares. In every case however, the liabi-
lity to pay compensation was imposed on the United Republic of 
Tanzania. There is no reason given why the liability to pay was 
20. S.3 Act No. 5, 1967. 
21. Ibid., S.4. 
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imposed on the United Republic, to be paid out of consolidated fund 
and not out of future profit of the new companies fanned. But it 
may well be that this is one way of ensuring the foreign investors 
v 
of the government's intention to pay. It is a foregone conclusion 
that an investor whose property has been nationalized will be more 
in favour of this formula than the one in which payment is payable 
out of future profits. 
What is "Full and Fair 11 Compensation'? 
Although all nationalization legislations employ the phrase 
11 full and fair" compensation, it is not easy to determine exactly 
what the phrase implies, since the legislations do not contain any defini-
tion of such term. Examination of the way it has been used however, 
reveals that although the term has been used equally in cases where 
it was the shares that were nationalized as well as in those cases 
where it was the assets which were taken over, what is actually payable 
in case of assets is the net value of the assets less liabilities 
while in case of shares, is the interest in the business as a going 
concern. If this is the case, one may say that, although the phrase 
"full and fair 11 has been used indiscriminately, what it actually 
meant is that, where it is the local businesses that were national-
ized, the phrase refers to the net-value of the assets taken, while 
if it is the shares that were acquired, the phrase refers to the 
value of the shares. 22 
Assessment Procedure 
The nationalization legislations mentioned above, provide that, 
once the amount of compensation payable has been determined, the 
Minister for Finance will issue a certificate setting out the amount 
22. See, A.W. Bradley, "The Legal Aspects of the Nationalizations 
In Tanzania" [1967], EALJ, p. 164.\ 
\ 
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to be paid as compensation. The amount payable shall be paid out 
of the consolidated fund. 23 But it is not clear who determines the 
amount to be paid as compensation. Even if one assumes that it is 
the Minister for Finance who determines it, as it is he who issues 
the certificate, the procedure to be followed in assessing this 
· comp·ensa t ion is not i nd i ea ted·. In the absence of such information--
one is forced once again to assume that, the legislature gave the 
Minister a discretion to determine the procedure to be followed. 
Experience however, shows that settlements were reached through 
negotiations between the government and the affected owners. But 
the important question to be asked is, what if no agreement was reach-
ed between the former owner and the government? In other words, can 
the government go ahead and unilaterally fix the amount payable as r. 
compensation which the former owner considers to be inadequate? 
and if so, what are the remedies open to the former owner? 
It would appear that if such a situation happens, the affected 
former owner has a choice between taking the matter before the High 
Court or before an arbitration tribunal. If he chooses to refer the 
matter to the Court system, the owner has to comply with the provisions 
of the Government Proceeding Act, 24 which provides a machinery for 
suing the government. If this procedure is complied with, the affect-
ed owner could seek a declaration against the government of the amount 
of compensation due to him. But what should be borne in mind is 
the fact that, even if the High Court determines the amount of com-
pensation payable, the actual recovery of the sum will still depend 
on the government's willingness to pay. This is so because the provi-
sions of the Government Proceedings Act, 1967, do not authorise 
23. See, Act No.l, S.12(2); Act No. 2, SS.12(2), 22(2}; Act No. 3, 
SS 7(3), 17(2); Act No. 4, S.6(2) and Act No. 5, S.4(2). 
24. Act No. 16 of 1967. 
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execution against the government. 25 Whether the cou~t system is the 
best forum forassessment of compensation payable is another matter 
but what may be said here is that the courts could not do more than 
determine the total amount due and the principle on which it should 
be assessed. They co~ld not detennine the manner of payment of 
compensation-.· In a way, therefore, the discretionary power ··given to 
the Minister to determine the amount of compensation payable may be 
reviewed by the Courts, in cases where the Minister fixes the amount 
of compensation unilaterally or if he refuses to fix any amount. 
However, judicial assessment has not often been used in these instances 
of nationalization. 
The other alternative would be for the parties to go to arbitra-
tion, which appears to be the most satisfactory course especially on 
the point of view of the previous owner. But apart from those cases 
in which the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act26 apply, there is a 
need for both parties to agree to assessment through arbitration. The 
government which decides to fix the amount of compensation unilater-
ally may very easily refuse to submit to an arbitration and there is 
no way (apart from political and economic pressure from other countries) 
that the government could be compelled to adopt this method. 
But as pointed out earlier, this discussion is of academic value 
only as events following the nationalization measures in Tanzania 
proved that most of the compensation claims were settled through nego-
tiations between the parties concerned, and therefore there was no 
need to refer any case to an arbitration tribunal or a court of law. 27 
25. Ibid. 
26. Cap. 533, Rev.Laws. Under this Act, there is recourse to arbi-
trati:on in cases of dispute arising as to what is full and fair 
value of property concerned. 
27. O.C. Eze, The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in East African 
Common Market (1977}, Nijhoff, p. 296; The Afr.Recorder [1969], 
pp. 2394-5. 
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2. Nationalization Measures in Ethiopia 
The history of Ethiopian nationalization of key sectors of the 
economy, is related to the coming to power of the military govern-
ment, which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1973. The ruling 
council of the military government proclaimed a socialist policy 
based on "social and economic equality" 28 which, among other things, 
provided for effective control over the financial institutions and 
the principal means of production. The declaration gave categories 
of enterprises that were preserved exclusively for the State, joint 
ownership between the State and private investors and those which 
were exclusively preserved for private ownership. 
The Sector which was exclusively preserved for the State owner-
ship included mineral exploitation; large scale salt mining; basic 
industries such as iron and steel; cement; leather and leather pro-
ducts manufacturing; large scale rubber manufacturing and fertilizer 
industry; drugs and medicines; tobacco; glass and bottle manufacturing; 
large scale printing and publishing; electricity generation; water, 
rail and sea transport; radio, television, post and telecommunication. 29 
·rhe enterprises preserved for joint venture were exploration of 
carbons and hydrocarbons, e.g. petroleum and coal; mining of ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals; mining of chemical and fertilizer materials 
e.g. potash, phosphate and sulphur; processing, canning and preserv-
ing of meat, fruits and vegetables (which are mainly export oriented); 
paper and pulp industry; manufacturing of plastics and other synthetic 
. materials; large scale construction work and _tourism. 30 
Finally those which were preserved for private ownership include: 
28. See. Afr.Res.Bull. [1974], p.3359, quoting Radio Ethiopia 1 s Broad-
cast of 20th Dec. 1974; Afr.Cont.Records Ll974-75], p. 8195. 
29. Afr.Cont.Recorder, ibid., p. 8195. 
30. Ibid. 
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food processing, canning and marketing; quarrying, dairy, grain 
milling and pressing of oil seeds; bakery; manufacturing of wood 
and wood products; fabricated metal products; small scale weaving, 
knitting, spinning, sewing and tailoring; and other small businesses. 31 
Following this political declaration, the government announced 
on lst January, 1975, the nationalization of all banks, insurance 
companies and financial institutions. 32 
The government announced further nationalizations on 3rd February, 
1975, under which some 72 foreign and locally owned manufacturing 
and trading businesses were taken over by the government. The govern-
ment also took majority shareholding in 29 other businesses in the 
same move. 33 
The nationalized companies included 14 textile companies; 13 food 
processing plants; 9 leather and shoe factories; eight beverage 
companies including Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola; eight chemical companies; 
five iron and steel works and four printing establishments. 34 While 
the Sector in which the government took over the controlling stake 
included oil companies (Shell, Agip, Tobal and Mobil); foreign 
manufacturers; two major Dutch sugar firms and several other companies 
d b f . f' 35 owne y ore1gn irms. 
Compensation 
The goverment promised to pay 11 appropriate 11 compensation to 
the affected owners, based on the net asset value of the property 
31. Ibid. 
32. See [1974] Afr.Res.Bull ., p. 3360. Six Banks and fourteen 
insurance companies were affected. 
33. Afr.Res.Bull. [1975], p. 3491; Afr.Cont.Record [1975-76], p. B207. 
34. Ibid. 
35. -Ibid. 
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at the tine of nationalization. 36 
The actual assessment of the amount of compensation payable 
was to be done by a special body set by the Governor of the Central 
Bank. 37 
3. .UGANDA 
(a) Government take-over of Industries in 1970 
In accordance with the socialist policies contained in "The 
Common Man's Charter", the Ugandan President, Dr. Milton Obote, 
announced in his 1970 May-day speech, that his government would take 
over certain sectors of the economy. 38 Through this, the government 
acquired majority shareholding in export/import businesses; all 
manufacturing and plantation industries; banks; oil companies; 
public transport companies and the Kilembe copper mine. 39 
Nationalization Bill 
In order to give legal validity to this presidential proclama-
tion, a Bill was presented to the National Assembly and 
unanimously approved, enabling the government to take over 60 percent 
shareholding in 85 major firms. 40 The Act provided that, compensation 
for the acquired shares, shall be paid from future profit within a 
period of 15 years. 41 
36. Afr.Res.Bull. [1975], p. 3464A. 
37. Ibid. 
38. The Common Man's Charter was a socialist manifesto announced 
earlier which was the foundation of Socialism, Uganda under 
Obote, wanted to build 
39. See, 0. Eze, supra, note 27. 
40. See, The Companies (Government and; Public Bodies Participation) 
Act, Act No. 3, 1970 (Uganda). 
41. Ibid., S.2(3). 
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Assessment of Compensation 
The Nationalization Act, provided two regimes through which 
compensation due, may be determined. The first one involved direct 
negotiations with the companies whose shares were taken by the govern-
ment. According to the Act, the government may enter into direct 
negotiations with the companies concerned and if any agreement is 
reached, that agreement becomes the basis of payment of compensation, 
in which case the Act ceases to apply. 42 But if there is no direct 
negotiations between the parties, or if there were negotiations but 
no agreement was reached, the value of shares or premises' fixture 
or fittings (whichever thecase may be) will be determined by the 
valuer appointed by the Minister and that valuation will be the basis 
for the payment of compensation. 43 An appeal from the decision of 
the valuer lies to a special tribunal formed under the Act, from 
' 44 
which appeal lies to the High Court and East African Court of Appeal. 
Constitutional Amendment 
The National Assembly also approved an amendment to the Consti-
tutional clause relating to the payment of compensation for expro-
priation of foreign owned property. The amendment had the effect of 
substituting the words "prompt payment of adequate compensation 11 for 
payment of "reasonable compensation 11 , 45 thereby dropping the word 
11 prompt 11 and su bsti tuti ng 11 reasonab 1e 11 for 11 adequate 11 • But there was 
a need to amend the Foreign Investment Protection Act as well which 
also contained a clause providing for 11 adequate compensation 11 • 47 
This was also done by dropping the word 11 prompt 11 and substituting 
42. Ibid.~ S.2(3). 
43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 
45. Afr.Rec. [1970], p. 2599. -
46. The Foreign-Investment Protection 1 Act, 1964 (Uganda) as 
amended by the 1970 Amendment Act, Act No. 3, 1970. 
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11 adequate 11 for 11 ~easonab le 11 • 47 
The overall effect of these Amendments in relation to the 1970 
nationalizations is that the government could acquire 60 percent 
shareholding in different firms and promised to pay 11 reasonable;· 
compensation to be paid out of future profits. 
There is no definition of the term 11 reasonable 11 compensation. 
But in view of the assessment methods provided by the Nationalization 
Act, one would consider reasonable to imply that the amount reached 
out of negotiations between the parties or the amount determined 
by the valuer (whichever case is applicable) is reasonable compensa-
tion. 
(b) Further Nationalizations, 1972 
In 1972 the Civilian government was replaced by a Military govern-
ment headed by Iddi Amin. This military government introduced further 
nationalizations thro~gh a Decree which came into force on l8th 
December, 1972.48 This however, should not be understood to imply 
that the mi~itary government shared the philosophy contained in the 
Common Man 1 s Charter. 
Through the 1972 Decree, the government took over complete owner-
ship of some foreign owned businesses. Included in the businesses 
taken over are: some tea companies; British Metal Corporation; the 
Uganda Transport Company Limited and the Uganda Urgus (Newspapers) 
Limited. 
The military government 1 s Decree provided that compensation 
47. See, Schedule No. 1 of Act No. 3, 1970. 
48. The Properties and Business (Acquisition) Decree, 
No. 32, 1972. 
payable for any property or business acquired 
shall be based upon the excess of value of property 
or obligations ... attaching to such property or 
business and such liabilities or obligations shall 
include any taxes, rates, or other levies imposed on 
the said property or business by law. 49 
Valuation of compensation payable 
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The Decree also provided that -compensation payable will be paid 
in accordance with a valuation made by a Board of Valuers appointed 
by the Minister for Finance. Like. the 1970 nationalizations, appeal 
from the determination of the Board, lies to the Special tribunal and 
thence t; the High Court. 50 The Decree also provided for payment of 
compensation payable out of -future profits. To be sure, the Decree 
provided that 11when the amount of compensation has been determined, 
that amount shall be paid within such period as the Min{ster shall 
determine, having regard to the period within which such property 
or business may generate sufficient income to offset the amount 
payable 11 • 51 
(~) Expulsion of Non-Citizen Asians (1972) 
In 1972 the Military government also took over the properties 
of some non-Ugandan Asians whom it exp.ell ed from the country. 
The events leading to their expulsion started on 9th August, 1972, 
when a Presidential Decree was issued, revoking most entry permits 
and certificates of residence of non-dtizen Asians and giving them 
90 days to leave the country. Those mostly affected by the Decree were 
the Asians of British, Indian, Pakistan andBangladesh citizenship. 52 
49. S.2(2) of Decree 32, ibid.~ as amended by Decree No. 28 of 1973. 
50. S.2 of Decree 32, 1972. 
51. S.2(3), ibid. 
52. See Supplement to Ugan?an Gazette, llth August 1972. 
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Another decree was issued on 4th October, 1972, to be applied 
retrospectively from 9th August, 1972, providing among other things, 
that those departing non-citizen Asians might not transfer their 
properties and other business concerns to any other person. 53 
The decree also contained a prohibition against mortgaging the 
property. 54 It however, required the departing Asians to make declara-
tion of their assets. This declaration was registrable with the 
Ministry of Industries and Commerce, and failure to make such declara-
tion resulted in vesting the property in the government. 55 Although 
the decree allowed the departing Asians to appoint agents for the 
sale of their properties, 56 it categorically prohibited the agents 
appointed by virtue of S.2(2)(d) of the decree from selling or leasing 
the property in question. 57 Because of this contradiction, the 
decree was amended on 24th October, 1972, by Decree No. 27. The new 
decree gave the agents appointed in accordance with Decree No. 27 of 
1972, the power to sell, lease, acquire and transfer Asian property, 
provided that a consent of a Board appointed for that purpose is 
. 58 given. 
The Board was also empowered to declare property to be vested 
in it, which was abandoned by departing Asians, or left in such a 
way that no adequate arrangement had been made for its proper and 
efficient management. 59 
Although the properties vested in the government were to be 
sold, the government later decided to rent them to indigenous Ugandans. 
53. Decree No. 27, 1972, 54. S. l{a), ibid. 
55. SS. l(a), 1(1 )(b) and 4(5), ibid. 
56. S.2(2)(d), ibid. 57. SS.2(4)(a)-(e), ibid. 
58. S.8, Decree No. 29, 1972. 
59. S.4(l)(e), ibid.; see also Uganda Statutory Instruments 169 and 
172 -of 1972 for a list of properties which vested in the 
Board according to this Section. 
The rentals accruing from such properties are to be paid into a 
fund, and compensation is payable from this fund to the former 
owners. 60 
Payment of Compensation 
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Decree No. 29, provided for the appointment of valuers for the 
purpose of determining the value of abandoned properties vested in ~ 
the Board, in respect of which compensation was payable. 61 Those 
who were aggrieved by the decision of the valuers could appeal to an 
appeal tribunal appointed for that purpose, from where appeal lies 
to the High Court. 62 
Details regarding the actual payment of compensation are very 
scarce. However, in 1975 an agreement was reached between India and 
Uganda, under which the Ugandan government agreed to pay compensation 
in respect of the properties of about 1,000 Indian citizens, expelled 
from the country. 63 
Also in 1978 the Ugandan government entered into an agreement 
with the UNHCR to pay the sum of shillings, 40,510,000, being the 
total value of assets belonging to Asians of 11 undetermined national-
ity11, settled in different countries as refugees. 64 The government 
agreed to pay the first instalment of shillings 510,000 immediately, 
while the remaining amount was to be paid in equal half-yearly 
instalments, without interest, for a period of 10 years. The payments 
60. Qecree No. 5 of 1973, SS.6 and 7(a); See also Presidential 
Decree of 16th December 1973 in which President Amin reiterated 
his intention to pay compensation to the expelled Asians from 
the income of assets left by them. 
61. S. 16(2), Decree No. 29, 1972. 
62. SS.16(3) and 16(4), ibid. 
63, See, Afr.Cont.Record.[1975-76], pp. 8364-70; the cheque was 
actually handed over to the visiting Indian Government Minister~ 
64. See, 32 U.N. GAOR Para 68(1978): Daniel Nsereko, 11The Right 
to Return Home", 21 IJIL (1981), p. 349. 
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were to be in convertable currency. 65 
There was no agreement reached in respect of about 40,000 Asians 
with British Passport. Although several attempts were made, negotia-
tions finally broke down, when Britian suspended diplomatic relations 
with Uganda. 66 The value of the assets of British citizens in Uganda 
was estimated to be £250m. 67 
The major criticism that the Ugandan government received regard-
ing the expulsion of non-Ugandan Asians is that the subseqeunt expro-
priations were discriminatory and therefore contrary to international 
law. 68 This criticism is mainly premised on the ground that it was 
the proper.tyofAliens which was affected while that of nationals was 
left intact. 69 But the measure does not bec0me discriminatory 
simply because it was directed towards foreign nationals. The test 
of discrimination is the intention of the government. If the measure 
was governed by economic or social motives and carried out in good 
faith, it is immaterial whether it only affected aliens or not. 70 
In other words the emphasis is not on the quantity of property or 
businesses n~tionalized but whether in exercising its rights to 
nationalise, the State did so in compliance with its economic or 
65. Ibid. 
66. Afr.Cont.Rec., supra, note 64. 
67, Ibid. 
68. See,' e.g., F. Woo-ldridge~and V. Sharma, "The Expropriation of 1-
the property of Ugandan Asians 11 , 14 I JIL ( 1974) , 61 . 
69. For those who consider the measure to be discriminatory simply 
because the property affected was that belonging to aliens and 
not that of nationals as well, see M. Domke, 11 Forei gn National-
i zations11, 55 AMJIL (1961), pp. 500-03; S.D. Blanchard, 11 The 
Threats of U.S. Private Investments in Latin America 11 , 5 JIL 
& Econ. (1971), 230; F. Wooldridge and Sharma, supra. 
70. On this view, see C.F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for 
Injuries to Aliens (Oxford, 1967), p. 141; see also I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Interrnational Law (Oxford), p. 524. 
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social motive and in good faith. 
In the Ugandan situation, it should be pointed out that the 
government did not set out to nationalize the Asian properties. 
But it started by terminating residence certificates in respect of 
the non-citizen Asians. The take-over of the property left by the 
departing Asians was subsequent upon their being expelled. In fact 
the government took over only those properties and businesses which 
were left undeclared by their owners in accordance with Decree No. 
27, 1972. 
In principle the power of a State to expel non-nationals is with-
in the domestic jurisdiction and it can be exercised according to 
the discretion of the State. 71 However, this discretion is not with-
out limitations. Tribunals and some writers have at times, asserted 
that the power of expulsion must not only be exercised in good faith, 
but it must also be measured against human rights standards. 72 
Whether the expulsions were carried out in good faith or not is argu-
able. However, what is certain i~ the fact that the goverment take-
over became necessary only after the departing aliens refused to comply 
with the requirement of the Decree relating to their properties. 
In brief, therefore, one may submit that even if it is assumed 
that the expropriation of the property left by the departing Asians 
was discriminatory in that only the property of people beloITging to 
one race was involved, the social motivation behind the whole move (the 
expulsion of non-citizen Asians) makes the expropriation justifiable. -
And the fact that the Ugandan government made available the machinery 
~nder which compensation may be paid, de~nstrates the good faith 
which the government had. This however, does not mean that compensation 
71. See Brownlie, ibid., p. 519. 72. Ibid. 
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was paid to each and every alien affected by these measures. 
But this should be viewed as a problem of implementation rather 
than evidence of bad faith. 
4. MOZAMBIQUE 
When- Mozambique became independent in 1974, the Nationalist 
government issued a directive, 73 outlining its intention to nation-
alize all major means of production in accordance with its 
socialist economic policy. In pursuance of this policy the govern-
ment nationalized all private banks in the country with effect from 
lst February, 1977. 74 The only private bank which was not affected 
by this move is Banco Standard de Mocambique, which had local 
ownership of about 20 per cent. Those taken over included Casa 
Bancaria de Mocambique; Banco de Credito Comercial and Banco 
Commercial de Angoloa. 75 
73.· See [1978] Afr. Res. Bul,. (Econ. Tech and Financial Series) 
p.4922. 
74. See the government's statement in [1977] Afr. Rs. Bull. 
(Econ; Financial; Technical Series), p.4550. 
75. Ibid. 
' 
The assets and liabilities of the three nationalized banks 
were transferred to the Bank of Mozambique, the State Central 
Bank. According to the Statement issued by the government, 
anyone entitled to compensation had to lodge his claim with the 
Central Bank within thirty days. 76 Apart from these three 
commercial banks, the government in another move, took over the 
assets and liabilities of Banco de Fomento National and Banco 
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Pinto e Setto Mayor, which were transferred to Peoples Development 
Bank. 77 
Insurance Firms 
Through a Decree of the Council of Ministers published on llth 
January, 1977, the government took over all insurance and reinsurance 
"78 business in the country. In this move, twenty firms were affected. 
Only four of the twenty firms affected had their headquarters in the 
country, while the rest operated through agencies. 79 The government 
created a State owned company Empesa Mocambicana de Seguros, EE [EMOSE] 
having a share capital of 150 million Escudos, to carry out the 
businesses of the nationalized firms. 
Compensation 
The decree provided that nationalization to the shareholders in 
the nationalized companies, now integrated into EMOSE, would be 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid. 
78. See, Ibid., p.4132. 
79. Ibid. 
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80 
assessed by the Minister for Finance. There is no indication 
however of the method that was to be adopted by the Minister. 
Further Nationalizations 
In early 1978, the government carried out further nationalization 
measures, in which Campanhia Carbonifera de Mozambique, the only 
. 81 
coal. mining company in the country and Campanhia Mozambican de 
, B2 Navigazao, a big shipping company, were nationalized. 
Compensation 
The communique announcing the take-over of the coal mining 
company promised that compensation to the ex-owners will be paid in 
accordance to the procedure to be fixed. However, it specifically 
stated that compensation shall not cover land rights and concessions 
aJ 
granted before independence. The government did not specify 
whether the former owners of the nationalized shipping company will 
receive any compensation. However the Statement issued said that, 
the nationalized company owed the Mozambique government the sum of 
84 
60 million Escudos. 
Abandoned Businesses 
Apart from the nationalization measures carried out in accord-
ance with its economic policy, the Mozambique government also took 
over a number of businesses which were abandoned by their owners just 
after independence. Among the firms affected i ncl u.ded eight 
oc: 
different companies taken over towards the end of January, 1976,0 v 
gQ..J Ibid. 
31. 
8,.., c... 
83. 
85. 
See, the:Government's Communique of 12th May, 1978 in .[1978] 
Afr.Res.Bull. (Econ; Financial; Technical Series), p. 4713. 
Ibid. , p . 3 713 . 
Ibid., p. 4713. 84.Ibid. 
See the Statement of Minister of Commerce and Industry of 28th 
January, 1976 in [1976] Afr.Res.Bull .(Econ;Fin;Tech Series), pp. 
3779-81. Five out of the eight companies were owned by Kruger 
(Contd) 
06 
and the country's only fertilizer company, Quimica Generale. 
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The government categorically stated that no compensation will 
be payable to the former owners of these companies.87 
5. ANGOLA 
When Angola became independent in 1975, its government declared 
its total commitment to Socialism and said further that it intends 
38 
to make Angola 11 a model Socialist State in African Continent". 
In accordance with this commitment therefore, the government publish-
ed an economic plan under which the country's natural resources 
. 89 
were to become the 11 collect1ve property of al1 Angolans". 
In accord with this declared policy the government nationalized 
various industries ranging from oil companies to mining companies 
and agricultural companies. Among the big forei gn..:owned companies 
affected are Diamanq Diamond Company in which the government increased 
go 
its shareholding to 60. 8 percent, ·· and Secil Ultramar, a cement 
company, from which the government also took over the majority share-
91 -holding. 
Compensation 
In both cases the government promised to pay compensation to the 
92 former shareholders, as shall be determined by the government. 
86. (contd) group of companies of South Africa. 
87. See, the Government Statement [1979] Afr.Res.Bull., p. 5353. 
88. Ibid. 
09. See, The Prime Minister's Speech in [1976] Afr.Res.Bull .(Econ; 
Fin; Tech.Series), p. 3910. 
90. Ibid. 
91. [1977] Afr.Res.Bull. (Econ;Fin;Tech.Series), p. 4405. 
92. [1978] Afr.Res.Bull. (Econ;Fin;Tec~.Series}, p. 4815A. 
93, Ibid. 
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However the case of the cement company, the government Statement 
provided that compensation shall be determined after the publication 
of government investigations on alleged acts of sabotage on the 
94 part of some of Ultramar's shareholders. 
Abandoned Firms 
Like Mozambique, Angola also took-over some foreign firms, 
abandoned by their owners, just after independence for fear of 
reprisals from the new nationalist government, due to their collabor-
ation with the Portuguese Colonial government during the War of 
Independence. Among the firms taken over are 36 Agricultural 
companies, including Campanhia Angole de Agricutural (CADA), the 
country's biggest coffee empire and one of the biggest in the world,95 
occupying about 15,000 hectares. The others were eleven different 
96 
companies, including four largest fishing companies. 
In 1978 the government announced the take-over of more abandoned 
97 
companies. This covered over twenty foreign-owned companies such 
as glasswork factory, a furniture factory, a plant for manufacture of 
electric apparatus, and a rubber plant, and a number of industrial 
98 
enterprises in Cabinda, Huambo, Benquela and Lubango. The govern-
ment completed its programme of taking over abandoned firms in June, 
1978, by taking over seventy other firms, bringing to a total of 178 
industrial and commercial concerns taken over this way.99 
As was the case with Mozambique, no compensation was payable to 
the owners of the abandoned firms. 
94. Ibid. 
95. [1976] Afr. Res. Bull. (Econ; Fin;Techn.Series), p. 3935. 
96. Ibid. 
97. [1978] Afr.Res.Bull. (Econ; Fin;Techn.Series), p. 4573. 
98. Ibid. 99. Ibid., p. 5135. 
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CONCLUSION 
The nationalization measures examined in this category were 
mainly based on ideological reasons. The countries concerned had 
already made it clear that they wanted to build their economies 
through Socialist ideology and therefore these measures should be 
vfev/ed as the mean-s through which these countries sought to have 
firm.control of major means of production and exchange. 
The main characteristic of these nationalizations is the fact 
that it is not a whole sector which is nationalized but individual 
business concerns which are regarded by the host country concerned, 
as important in its economic survival. 
Th~se nationalization measures also demonstrate the rather con-
flicting situation in which African countries find themselves when 
trying to implement Socialist economic policies e.g. trying to have 
firm control of key sectors of their economies through nationalization, 
while at the same time attempting to encourage private investment 
especially in those industries involving high level technology. 
Regarding payment of compensation, the study has demonstrated 
that despite the radical nature through which these measures were 
carried out almost all governments paid or promised to pay some 
form of compensation in respect of the foreign-owned nationalized 
property. Although this may be interpreted as one way of creating 
confidence to foreign investors however it is, more than anything, 
an evidence that these governments realized that there is a duty 
to pay compensation. This being the case it will be interesting 
to see the standard of compensation paid and whether it complied with 
the "international law standards of compensation". 
164. 
Starting with Tanzanian nationalization measures, almost all 
nationalization legislations enacted following Arusha Declaration 
promised payment of "full and fai r 11 compensation to be oai d out 
of consolidated funds. Although the Acts do not contain a definition 
of the phrase "full and fair" examination of what has actually been 
paid or agreed to be paid shows that the term means the net value of 
the assets in case it was the assets which were taken over and the 
value of the shares if it was the shares that were nationalized. 
As to the method of assessing the amount·of compensation payable 
the Minister was given discretion to determine the procedure to be 
adopted. Although it is hard to pin-point exactly what assessment 
procedure was employed in each case (as each case was being dealt 
with separately) it is however certain that the notion of full 
market value was not employed in any of these cases. 
The case of Ethiopia is not very different from that examined 
above. When the Government nationalized various businesses following 
the 1973 11 revolution 11 appropriate compensation was promised, to be 
based on the net asset value at the time of nationalization. 
The Ugandan nationalization law on the other hand, promised 
payment of compensation out of future ·profits within a period of t' 
15 years. The law provided further that assessment of compensation 
payable.was to be done through negotiations, failing which a govern-
ment valuer will be appointed to value the property concerned on the 
basis of which compensation will be paid. Although it is not 
clear what standards were used by the Government valuer certainly 
they could not use the market value method as there is a constitutional 
provision saying that in case of nationalization reasonable compensat-
ion will be paid to the affected owner. 
165 ~ . 
In brief therefore, like in the first category of national-
izations examined above the countries concerned settled compen-
sation issues through negotiations the outcome of which is payment 
of what may be termed as "appropriate compensation". 
It is probably worth noting that though valuation methods used 
. . 
fell well below.that insisted by the investors• home governments, the 
arrangements were finally accepted by the companies concerned and 
although some of the nationalization laws provided machinery for 
arbitration or lodging of appeals against government valu~tion, these 
were hardly put into use. What one can learn out of this is the 
fact that whenever it is possible for the foreign investors to 
benefit, through new arrangements, some of the "cardinal principles" 
can easily be compromised. 
\ 
-v' 
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PART THREE 
INDIGENIZATION 
(a) NIGERIA 
Although Nigeria has taken.majority shareholding in major 
petroleum companies in the country, 1 it is famous for its indigeniza-
tion programme initiated through the 1972 Nigerian Enterprise Promo-
tion Decree, strengthened and extended in 1976. 
The Indigenization programme involves prohibition of aliens 
from participation in certain categories of enterprises, either wholly 
or in part, depending on the amount of capital investment in that 
particular industry. The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, pro-
vides categories of enterprises which should have 100, 60 and 40 
percent Nigerian interest.2 
The category in which the investment decree requires full Niger-
ian ownership includes a wide range of small businesses such as 
furniture manufacturing, passenger bus services, small department 
stores, supermarkets, etc. While the 60 percent Nigerian ownership 
applies to businesses such as banking, insurance, brewing, mining, 
fertilizer manufacturing, plantation agriculture, texti1e, large 
department stores and supermarkets, construction industries and other 
1. In 1970, the government formed the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNOC) to take over stake in.main oil firms. In 
1977 NNCO merged with the Federal Ministry of Petroleum resources 
and a new body, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
was created. NNPC increased its stake in oil operations from 
55 to 60 percent in July 1979. In August, 1979, it nationalized 
BP's interests in Nigeria in retaliation of that Company's 
11 Qil Swap 11 which led to the oil being made available to South 
Africa. See. Afr.Res.Bull. [1973], p.2755; Africa South of thei 
Sahara [1981-82], p. 770. 
2. See, Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1972, as amended 
by 1976 Decree: Alan Hutchinson, "Tension between Indigenization 
and Foreign Investment" [Dec.1976], Afr. Development, 1283. · 
similar medium scale enterprises. 
All other enterprises not included in the first and second 
categories above, are to have a minimum of 40 percent Nigerian 
participation. 3 
(b) GHANA 
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Like Nigeria, Ghana initiated an indigenization programme in 
order to 11 capture the commanding heights of the economy". This was 
done through the Investment Policy Decree of 19754 as subsequently 
amended by the Investment Pol.icy (Amendment) Decree, 1975. 5 These 
two decrees divided the economy of Ghana, for investment purposes, 
into four broad categories. 
The first category deals with sectors which are preserved for 
the State, such as public utilities and the manufacture of arms and 
ammunition. The second category delineates areas in which there can 
be joint venture between the State and foreign ownership whereby the 
equity participation of the State 'ranges between 55 percent and 20 
percent. In-the third category, joint Ghanian/foreign ownership is 
requi_red. 7 In those industries- where Ghanian participation is 
mandatory, the decree stipulates a date by which participation is to 
commence. 8 The fourth category deals with areas where foreign investors 
can operate freely; enterprises that require high level of technology 
and foreign skill usually fall under this category. 9 In addition to 
3. Afr.Development, ibid.; Afr.South of the Sahara, supra note 1, 
p. 771. 
4. ··investment Policy Decree N.R.C.D. 329 (1975). 
5. Investment Policy Decree S.M.C.D. 6 (1975). 
6. Investment Policy Decree N.R.C.D. 329(1975) as amended by Invest-
ment 'Policy (Amendment) Decree S.M.C.D. 6 Part III (1975). 
7. Ibid., Part II. 
8. Ibid.;, Part I. 9. Ibid. 
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the categories already mentioned above, there is a fifth category 
previously designated only for Ghanian private citizens. This 
includes enterprises that do not require substantial capital outlay 
and high level of technology. In this category, aliens are effective-
ly eliminated.10 
As already pointed out earlier, indigenization is not strictly 
speaking an expropriation measure. However, because of its effect on 
foreign-owned property, some commentators have categorized it as 
"creeping expropriation 11 • 11 Discussing this problem, Christie 
concluded that, due to the difficulty and inconvenience of claims based 
on forced sales, the alien must in most cases take his chance of 
ultimately obtaining compensation from the Sta~e involved. 12 But if 
he decides to sell to the first buyer, for what he can get, then he 
should normally be prepared to sacrifice any future claims based on 
inadequacy of receipts from the sale. Unless the threats to an alien's 
property are accompanied by threats to his physical security, whereby 
the rule should be otherwise;13 similarly if the State in question 
flatly declares that it will not pay any compensation for alien-
owned_ property in question. 14 T~e author states further that, even 
in situations where there is threat to his physical security or a 
flat denial on the part of the host State to pay any compensation, 
the alien should be denied the right to assert a claim based on the 
insufficiency of the price he has re·ceived, unless he can show that 
he received an obviously inadequate price for his property. 15 In 
· 10. See, Ghana Investment Policy Decree, Part I (1975). 
11. See, Note 2, Part I, supra. 
12. C. Christie, "What Constitutes Taking of Property under Inter-
national Law 11 , 38 BYBIL (1962). 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 
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biref, what is suggested is that, the rule regarding 11 creeping expro-
priation11 involving forced sales, should require the alien not to sell 
his property at a lower price unless there is threat of his physical 
security or a denial by the State to pay any compensation. And even 
then the burden of proof in relation to the existence of such circum-
stances will be on the alien owner. 
If this is accepted as the right position in law, it would 
follow that the indigenization measures carried out in Nigeria and 
Ghana would not justify any claim for compensation, because there was 
neither evidence of threats to physical security nor flat denial by 
' 
the States concerned regarding payment of compensation. It is true 
that both the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, 1972 (as amended 
by 1976 Decree) and the Ghana Investment Policy Decree, 1975, did not 
contain provisions regarding payment of compensation. But this does 
not imply that these two governments flatly ruled out the possibility 
of payment of compensation, in case it was necessary to take over the 
enterprises concerned. 
It is interesting to note that in both cases, the issue of compen-
sation did not arise because the.aliens affected by these indigeniza-
tion progrannnes chose to sell their enterprises, and it would appear" 
that they were satisfied with what they got. 
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CONCLUSION 
-Like other developing countries, African States have made it 
abundantly cl ear that they do not wish to1 be bound by the tradi ti ona l 
no~ms of international law, regarding payment of compensation, upon 
nationalization of foreign-owned property.· This departure from the 
classical international law position, which can be attributed to the 
desire of these new nations to have their economic interests accommo-
dated, gave rise to formulation of new norms. The new norms which 
were developed include deduction of excess profit from the amount of 
compensation due, claims that nationalization is revindication for 
which no compensation is necessary and more importantly, the claim 
that nationalization should be accompanied by payment of 11appropriate 
compensation 11 • 
While the first two norms have been very rarely put into effect, 
the one requiring payment of appropriate compensation, seems to enjoy 
the support of most of the Third World countries. This concept was 
asserted for the first time in 1962 when the United Nations' General 
Assembly passed a resolution regarding permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources. 1 The norm was strengthened by subsequent resolutions 
passed by the United Nation's as well as its agencies. Resolution 3117 
(XXVII) for example, sought to give each State the right to-determine 
the amount of 11 possible compensation 112 while the resolution on New 
International Economic order asserted the right of each State to deter-
mine the amount of compensation3 and the Charter of Economic Right and 
l. See Article 4, GAOR 1803 (XVII) of 1962. 
2. See 12(1974) ILM, p. 238; 68 AJIL l1974), 381. 
3. 13 (1974) ILM, p. 715. 
' 
' 
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Duties of State demanded that, "appropriate compensation 11 be paid in 
accordance with the domestic laws and regulations of nationalizing 
states. 4 Although it is true that these resolutions have no law 
creating effect5 it is however conceded even by those who are 
against these resolutions, that they are at best de lege ferenda. 6 
Regarding valuation of compensation it has been demonstrated 
that not even in a single case has compensation been assessed on the 
basis of the nationalized property's market value. The case studies 
have demonstrated that payment of compensation has in most cases been 
based on the book value of the assets concerned, lump sum amounts 
readied through negotiations and sometimes the parties concerned 
reached agreements to pay compensation in respect of the national-
ized properties but left the question of valuations open, to be 
discussed in future. 
While it is possible to ascertain the extent of compensation in 
cases of lump sum and book valu~ compe~sation it is extremely hard to 
do that in those cases where governments promise payment of compensat-
ion according to future legislations. Book value methods have been 
criticised as being unfair methods as they do not take into account 
contingent assets and liabilities 11 • 7 
The ·rejection of the book value method by capital exporting nations 
is understandable as it is in direct conflict with the notion of fuJl 
compensation represented by 11 prompt adequate and effective" compensation, 
4. 13 (1974) ILM 
5. See e.g. Dupuy's decision in Texaco Arbitration 
35 ILR (1976), 389; 17 (1978), ILM Pg.1 
6. Ibid., R.C. White, "A New International Economic Order" 
24 (1975) ICLQ 544-7; I. Brown.lie Principles of International Law 
(3rd Ed. 1976) 54-45 
7. See :J .S. McCosker, Book va.lue in National,i?-ed Settlements 
in R.B. Lillich,, ValuationVol. II. pg.::>!. 
I 
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which has in some cases been interpreted to mean the market 
value of the property affected by nationalization measures. 
· Although there is no uniform practice among developing countries 
regarding the payment of compensation, circumstances and equities 
involved in new norms advocated by these countries should be assessed 
by the international community as a whole and applied wherever possible. 
This is believed to be important since it wilJ be futile to cling on 
the monolithic norms such as full compensation as it is not only 
difficult to establish that it has at any time been accepted as a 
rule of international law but also because it is now obvious that it 
is unacceptable to a large majority of States. 
Regarding the question of foreign investment in general, this 
study has shown that investment protection policies on the part of 
capital exporting countries (these include suspension of bilateral 
assistance, withdrawal of support or non-support of multilateral 
loans) have not been effective as bilateral treaties in deterring 
nationalization-or protecting alien investments. It has also been 
demonstrated that foreign aid sanctions against States taking alien 
investments without prompt, adequate and effective compensation have 
been generally counterproductive. Although the investment guarantees 
provided by most of the developing countri'es -are of-little legal 
effect, they are nevertheless helpful to the investors, in that they 
give the general direction regarding investment policy in a particular 
country. 
While some foreign investors may have decided to move their 
capital and put it to use in a country or region providing more 
favourable investment climate (which includes less instances of 
_, 
f 
' t 
I 
" 
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nationalizations) this study has demonstrated that some alien 
investors are still capable of satisfactorily using their capital in 
an atmosphere of economic nationalism. This is even more so if they 
are assured of some sort of monopoly and smooth operation through 
joint ventures with the State-owned companies as well as technical 
and management consultancy. 
174. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akin~anya, A.A. The Expropriation of Multinational Property in 
The Third World, New York, Praeger, 1980. 
Akinwamu9 A.M. 
"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
and the future of Private Foreign Investments 
in The Third World 11 , l8 (1978), Indian J.Int'l. L., 
pp. 175-86. 
"Host Governments' Responses to Foreign Economic 
Control: The Experience of Selected African 
Countries 11 , 30 (1980), ICLQ, pp. 769-90. 
Economic Independence and Indigenisation of 
Pr>ivate Foreign Investments: The Experience of 
Nigeria and Ghana (Columbia, S.C.; Institute 
of International Studies, University of South 
Carolina, 1981). 
11 Indigenisation or Nationalisation of Private 
Foreign Investments: Alternative Strategies for 
dea 1 i ng with transnati ona 1 corporations in member-
States of ECOVJAS 11 in Development Planning Priorities 
and Strategies for the 1980s in the ECOWAS, 
Ibadan: Heinman. 
11 A Plea for the Harmonization of African 
Investment Laws 11 , 19 ( 1975) , JAL., pp. 134-53. 
Alexandrowicz, C.H. The IauJ Making Funation of the Specialized 
Agencies of the United Nations, London, 1973. 
Amerasinghe, C.F. State Responsibility for Inju:roes to Aliens, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 
Amin, S. 
Armstrong, 
Anand, R.P. 
Asante, S.X.B. 
"Choice of Law in Concession Contracts", 58 (1964),, 
AMJIL. 
"Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa 
- Origins and contemporary forms 11 , 10 (1972), 
JMAS, pp. 503-24. 
"The Future of Mining Investment in Afri ca 11 , 
10 (1976), Afr.Sev., p. 581. 
11 The Role of the 'New' Asian Countries in the 
Present International Order'.', 56 (1962), AMJIL 
384. 
11 International Transaction and National Development 
Goals 11 , 10, Review of Ghana Law (1978). 
11 Stabi 1 i ty of Contractua 1 Re 1 a ti ons hip in 
Transnational Investment Process 11 , 28 (1979), 
ICLQ, pp. 401-23. 
175. 
"Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreements 11 , 
73 (1979), AMJIL, p. 334. 
Baade, H.W. 11 Indonesian Nationalization Measures before 
Foreign Courts: A Repli', 54 (19601, AMJIL, 
p. 801 . 
Babatunde, T.D. Capital Accumulation and Techn.ology Transfer: 
A Comparative Analysis of Nigerian Manufacturing 
Industries, New York, Praeger, 1973. 
Balasubramanyan, V.N. International Transfer of Techn.ology to 
India, New York, Praeger, 1973. 
Barnet, R. and Muller, R. Global Reach: The Pou:Jer of the Multi-
national Corporations, New York, Simon and 
Barran, P. 
Bergerol, J. 
Bernstein, H. 
Bishop, W.J.R. 
Blankenheimer, B. 
Boker-Szeg6, H. 
Bonte, P. 
Borchard, E. M. 
Se buster, 1974. 
The Political Econ.omy of GPou:Jth, New York, 1957. 
11 Industry: Nothing Attracts 1 i ke Success 11 , 
7 Afr.Dev. (Nov. 1973}. 
Underdevelopment and Development,Penguin Books, 
1973. 
International Law - cases and materials, 
Boston: Little Brown, 1962. 
"The Foreign Investment Climate in Nigeria 11 , 
10, Va.J.Int'l.L., 589. 
New States and International Lalu, Budapest, 1970. 
11 Multinational companies and national development 
Mifrema and Mauritania" [1975], Rev.Afr.Pol.Econ., 
p. 93. 
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 
New York, 1915. 
Bostock, M. and Harvey, C. (eds) Economic Independence and Zambian 
Copper: A Case Study of Foreign Investment, 
Bradley, A.W. 
Bradley, D. G. 
Breton, A. 
New York, Praeger, 1973. 
11 Legal Aspects of the Nationalization in 
Tanzania 11 [1967], EALJ, pp: 149-76. 
11 Managing Against Expropriations: An Analysis 
of Risk Factors 11 [1977], Harvard Bus.Rev., 
pp. 75-83. 
11 The Economics of Nati ona 1 i sm 11 , 74 ( 1964}, 
Journal of Political Economy, pp. 376-86. 
Briggs, H.W. 
Brown, R. 
Brownlie, I. 
Burnett, R. . 
Caporso, J.A. 
Castanada, J. 
Chenery, H.B. 
Chengs B. 
Christie, G.C. 
Chudson, W. 
Cliff, L. 
Coleman, F. 
Creel, L.J. 
176. . 
LauJ of Nations, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1952. 
11 Choice of Law Provisions in Concession and 
Related Contracts, 39 (1976), MLR, 625. 
International LauJ and Use of Force by States 
London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
Principles of International L(Jl;), Third Edi~~on, 
Clarendon, 1979. .. -
11 Negotiation of International Agreement in the 
field of commerce and investment - Problems of 
Relevance to Ne\:/ly-Independent States 11 , 9 (1975), 
JWTL, pp. 231-65. 
Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities 
in Development Studies 11 , 34 {_1980), Int.Org., 4. 
The Legal- Effect of United Nations' Resolutions, 
New York, 1968. 
11 The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development 
of International Law 11 , 15 (1961), Int.Org., 38. 
110ptional Patterns of Growth and Aid: The 
Case Study of Pakistan", [1966], Pakistan Develop-
ment Rev., 209. 
General Principles of LaziJ, London, Stevens, 1953. 
11The Rationale for Compensation for Expropriation". 
44 (1948), Grotius Trans., 267. 
11 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute Case 11 [1951], 
World Affairs, 387. 
11 Wha.t Constitutes a Taking of Property Under 
International Law? 11 , 38 SYBIL (1962), pp. 307-38. 
11Africa and the Multinational Enterprise 11 in 
Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise 
(H.R. Hahlo, J. Smith and R. Wright, eds), 1973. 
11 Arusha Deel arati on Cha 1 lenge to Tanzanians 11 , 
3 (1967), EALJ, pp. 3-9. · 
The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt 1899-1962, 
Manchester University Press, 1971. 
"Mexicanization: A ·case of Creeping Expropriatforl 11 , 
22 (1968), S.W.L.J., 281. 
Cronje, S., Ling, M. and Cronje, G. Lonrho Potrait of a Multinatio'nal, 
Penguin Books, 1976. 
177 .. 
Curry, R. and Rothchild, 11 Economic Bargaining Between African 
Dawson, J.P. 
Governments and MNCs 11 , 12 (1974), JMAS, pp. 173-89. 
Unjust Enrichment, Boston, Little Brown, 
1952. 
Dawson, F.G. and Head, I.G. International Law National Tribunals 
and Rights of Aliens, Syracuse University Press, 
1971. 
Doman, N.R. 
Drucker, A. 
Dunn, F.C. 
Egloton, E. 
Emmanuel, A, 
Ewing, A.F. 
Eze, O.C. 
"Postwar Nationa 1 ization of Foreign Property in 
Europe 11 , 48 (1948), Columbia L. Rev., p. 1125. 
11 Compensation for Nationalized Property: 
The British Practice 11 , 49 (1955), AMJIL, 477. 
"International Law and Private Property Rights 11 , 
28 (1928), Columbia L.Rev., 166. 
The Responsibility of States in International 
Law, New York, 1928. 
Unequal Exchange: A Study of Imperialism of Trade, 
New Left Books, 1972. 
11 Prospects of Economic Integration in Africa 11 , 
5 (1967), JMAS, pp. 53-67. 
The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in East 
African Comnon Market, Sijthof, 1977. 
Faber, M.L.O. and Potter, J.G., Towa:rds Economic Independence, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
Fachiri, A.P. 
Fatauros, A.A. 
Foi ghe l , I . 
Fortman, D. 
Francioni, F. 
11 Expropriation and International Law 11 [1925], 
BYBIL, pp. 159-71. 
"International Law and Internationalized Contract 11 , 
74 (1980), AMJIL, pp.134-41. 
"Towards more Diplomatic Protection of Private 
Claims: Aris Gloves, Barcelona Traction and 
Beyond 11 , 65 (1971), ASIL (Prodgs.) 316; 65 (1971), 
AMJIL, 333. 
Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 
New York, 1962. · 
11 The Quest for Legal Security for Foreign 
Investments - Latest Developments 11 , 17 Rutgers 
Law Review, 257. 
Nationalization, Copenhagen, 1957. 
After Mulungushi, Nairobi, EAPH., 1968. 
11 Compensation for Nationalization of Foreign 
Property: The Borderland between Law and Equi ty 11 , 
24 (1975), ICLQ, 255. 
Frank, A. G. 
Friedman, S. 
Friedman, W.G. 
178. 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 
New York, 1967. 
La.tin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?, 
New York, 1967, 
Capital Investment in Africa, Wedenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1967. 
Expropriation in International Law, 
London, 1953. 
law in Changing Society, 2nd edn., 
Penguin Books, 1972. 
The Changing Structure of International Law, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 
Friedman, W.G. and Pugh, R.C. Legal Aspect of Foreign Investments, 
London, Stevens, 1959. 
Friedman, W.G. and Benguin, J. Joint International Business 
Ventures in Developing Countries: Case Study and 
Analysis of Recent Trends, New York, 1971. 
Fucham, R. 11 Economi c Dependence and Deve 1 opment of Industry 
i n Za mb i a 11 , 1 8 ( 1 9 80 ) , J MAS , pp . 2 9 7 -31 3 . 
Garcia-Amador, F.V. 11 The Proposed new Internation::tl Economic 
Gardner, R.N. 
Garibaldi, O.M. 
Ghai, D.P. 
Girvan, N. 
Grantz, D.A. 
Order: A new approach to the law governing 
nationalization and compensation", 12 (1980), Lawyer 
of Americas. 
Fourth Report on International Responsibility 
[1959], 2 VB Int 1 l .Comm., U.N. Doc. A[CN4], 
Ser A/1954. 
11 International Measures for the Protection of 
Foreign Investments [1959], ASIL ( Prodgs), 255. 
11The Legal Status of General Assembly Resolutions: 
some conceptual observations 11 [1979], ASIL (Prodgs), 
324. 
11 Concepts and Strategies of Economic Independence 11 , 
11 ( 1973) , JMAS, 37. 
Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and expropriation, 
Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
11 The Question of Compensation: A Third World 
Perspective 11 , 3 (1972), Vena.J., Trans.--L. 340; 
In Lillich, R.B., Valuation of Nationalized Property 
in International Law, vol. 3, Virginia, 1972, 
p. 180. 
11 The Marcona Settlement: New forms of negotiations 
and compensation for forei gn-property 11 , 71 (1977), 
AMJIL, 474. 
179. 
Gregory, T. Ernest Oppenheimer and the Econorrric DeveZopment 
· of South Africa, Oxford University Press, 1962. 
Greig, D.W. InternationaZ Lcau, 3rd. edn, London, 1979. 
Guha-Roy, S.N. 11 Is the Law of Responsibility of State for 
Injuries to Aliens a Part of International Law? 11 
55 (1961}, AMJIL. 
Hayter, T. Aid as InrperiaZism, Penguin Books, 1971. 
Herz, J.H. 11 Expropriation of Foreign Property 11 , 35 (.1941), 
AMJIL, pp. 243-63. 
Heiben, A.N. 11 The Chilean Copper Nationalization: The 
foundation for the standard of appropriate 
compensation 11 , 23 (1974} Buffalo Law Rev., 765. 
Huggins, R. The Development of International Lcau and the 
Organs of the United Nations, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1963. 
Jessup, P.C. A Modern Law of Nations, New York: Macmillan, 
1948. 
Kalsi, S.S. 11 Encoura9ernent of private foreign investment 
in the developing countries: Provisions in the 
laws of Kenya 11 , 6 (1972), Int.Lawyer, 599. 
Kamanu, 0. 11 Compensation for Exprppriation in the Third 
World 11 , 10 (1975), Studies in Comparative Int. 
Development, 3. 
Kanza, T. Conflict in ~he Congo, Penguin Books, 1972. 
Katzarov, ~. The Theory of Nationalisation, London, Oxford 
University Press, 1964. 
Kaunda, K.D. 
Keatley, P. 
Ki 11 i ck, T. 
Kimaro, S.N. 
Kotecha, K. C. 
Kunz, L. 
Kuusi, J. 
&anbia, Independence and Beyond: The speeches 
of Kaunda, London, Nelson, 1966. 
The Politics of Partnership, Penguin Books, 1963. 
11 Trends in Development Economics and their 
Relevancy to Africa 11 , 18 (1980), JMAS, 367-86. 
11 The Growth of Economic Imperialism in AFrica 11 , 
Vol. VI, EAJ (1969). 
11 Comparative Analysis of Nationalization Laws: 
Objectivies and techniques_", 8 (1975), Comp. & 
Int.L., Jour. of Southern Africa, p. 87. 
"The Mexican Expropriations 11 , 17 (1940), NYULQ, 
327. 
The Host States an·d Transnational Corporations: 
An Analysis of Legal Relationships, Teakfield, 1979. 
.. ~ \ • ., -,.""<, 
' ,_, - (> •• l-
180. 
Lanning, G. and Mueller, M. Africa Undermined: Mining Companies 
and Underdevelopment of Africa, Penguin Books, 
1979. 
Lauterpacht, H. 11 The Con temporary Practice of the United Kingdom 
in the Field of International Law 11 , 6 (.1968), 
ICLQ, 327. 
Leonard, H.J. MNCs and Politics in Developing Countries, 
Boulder, Westview, 1979. 
Leys, C. 
Li 11 i eh , R. B. 
Underdevelopment in Kenya, University of 
California Press, 1974. 
11 The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: 
An Elementary Principle of International Law 
under Attack 11 , 69 ( 1975 L AMJIL, 539. 
The Protection of Foreign Investments: Six 
Proeedu:r:'al Studies, Syracuse, New York, 1965. 
Valuation of NationaZized Property in International 
La1;J (Volumes I, II & III), Charlottesville, 
University of Virginia. 
Lillich, R.B. and Weston, B.H. International Claims: Their 
Settlement by Lwrrp-sum Agreements, Charlottesville, 
Va. University Press of Virginia, 1975. 
Lubar, C.G. 11 Government Protection of Foreign Investments 
in East Africa 11 , 7 EALJ (1971), pp. 108-27. 
McLaughlin, R.U. Foreign Investn;ents and Development in Liberia, 
Praeger, New York, 1966. 
Mann, F.A. _ "Outline of a History of Expropriation 11 , 75 (1959), 
LQR, pp. 188-219. 
Martin, A. 
Martin, R. 
Meagher, 
11 State Contracts and State Responsibility 11 , 
54 ( 1960)' 574. 
Minding Their OWn Business: Zambia's Struggle 
Against Western Control. Penguin Books, 1972. 
11 The Use of State Power to Overcome Underdevelop-
ment11, 18 (1980}, JMAS, pp. 315-,25. 
-
An International Redistribution of Wealth and 
Power, New York, 1979 . 
. Mehren, R.B. and Kourides, P.N. 11 International Arbitration between 
States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan 
Nati ona 1 i zation Cases 11 , 75 ( 1981), AMJlL, 477. 
Michelman; F. I. 11 Property Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law 11 , 
80 Harv.L.J. (1967), 1165. 
Mi kesse 11, R. 
Mittelman, J.H. 
Morran, T.H. 
Muller, M.H. 
Mummery, D.R. 
Murphy, C. 
Nabudere, D.W. 
181. 
Foreign Investments in Copper Mining in Papua-
New Guinea and Peru, New York, 1977. 
11 Underdevelopment and Nationalization: Banking 
in Tanzania 11 , 16 (1978), JMAS, pp. 597-617. 
The Politics of Dependence: Copper in c:hile, 
11 Compensation for Nationalization: A North,-South 
Di al ogue 11 , 19 (1981) , Columbia~ J. Trans . Law. 
"The Content of the Rule to Exhaust Local 
Judici a 1 Remedies 11 , 58 ( 1964}, AMJI L, 401. 
11 Economic Duress· and Unequal Treaties", 
11 Virginia Journal of Int. Law, p. 51. 
The Political Economy of Imperialism, 
London, 1977. 
National Christian Council, Who Controls Industries in Kenya?, 
Nairobi, 1968. 
Ndulo, M. 
Niki, T. 
Nkrumah, K. 
Nwogugu, E.[. 
Nyerere, J.K. 
11 The National i za ti ori of the Zambian Copper 
Industry 11 , 6 (1974), Zambian Law Journal. 
11 Lega l Aspect of Foreign Investments in Nigeria", 
18 (1978), Indian J.Int.L., pp. 175-86. 
Neo-Colonialism The Last Stage of Imperialism, 
1965. 
The Challenge of the Cango, Nelson, 1967. 
The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in 
Developing CountJ.•ies, Manchester, 1965. 
Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, 
1968. 
Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After, ·Government 
Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1977. 
O'Brien, C.C. To Katanga and Back, Hutchinson, 1962. 
O'Connell, D.P. The Law of State Succession; Cambridge University 
Press, 1956. 
0' Keefe, P • J. 
Okeye, F.M. 
Internatianal Law (Vol.2, 2nd Ed.), London, 1970. 
"United Nations and P'ermanent Sovereignty over,_ .. _ , "1 
Natural Resources, 8 (1974}, JWTL, 239. 
International Law and the New African States, 
London, Sweet and Maxiwell, 1972 (Law in Africa 
Series). 
Orego-Vicuna, F. 
Rado, A. 
Reuber, G. 
Richards, L. 
Rodman, L. L. 
Rohwer, J .A. 
Rood, L. L. 
Root, E. 
Rweyemarru , J. S. 
182. 
11 The Internationa 1 Regulation of Va 1 uation 
Standards and Processes: Re-examination of Third 
World Prospective 11 , in Lillich, R.B., Valuation 
of Nationalized "Property in International Law 
Vol. 3, Virginia, 1975. ' 
11 Czechoslovakia Nationalization Decrees: Some 
International Aspects 11 , 41 (1947}, AMJIL, pp. 
795-806. 
Private Foreign- Investment in Development;·· 
·Clarendon Press, 1973. 
11 The Content of Foreign Aid: Modern Imperialis111 11 , 
The Review of Radical Political Economics, No. 9 
(1977), pp. 43-72. 
"The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper from Union 
Miniere to Gecamines 11 , 24, Afr.Today (1978), 
pp. 25-47. 
11 Nationalization: International Minimum Standard 
- Chilean Excess Profit Deduction", 14 Harvard Int. 
L. J.' 383. 
11 Compensation for Takeovers in Africa 11 , 
11 (1976-77), JIL & E., 521. 
11 The Basis of Protection of Citizens Residing 
Abroad", (1910), ASIL (Proc.), 21. 
Underdevelopment and Industrialization in 
Tanzania, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1973. 
Seidl-Hohenveldern, I. 11 The Social Function of Property in 
Present-day International Law". In F. Kalshovel 
et. al., Essays on the Development of the Internat-
ional Legal Order, Sijthoff, 1980. 
11 Chilean CopP._er Nation_alization before 
the German Courts 11 , 69 (1975), AMJIL, 110. 
Schwalzenberger, G. Foreign Investment and International Law, 
Schwebel, S. 
Shaw, T. M. 
Shea, D. 
London, 1969. 
11 The Story of the U.N 's Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources", 49 (1963), 
ABAJ, 463. 
11 The effect of Re solution of the United Nati ons 
on Customary International Law 11 , 73 ( 1979), 
ASIL (Proc.), 301. 
Dependency and Development: The Development of 
Foreign Policy in Za.nibia, Ohio, 1976. 
The Calvo Clause a Problem of Inter-American 
International Law and Diplomacy, 1955. 
,• 
'· 
Shivji, I.G. 
Simpson, A. 
S_inha, S.P. 
Sornarajah, M. 
Starke, J.G. 
183. 
Class Struggle in Tarzzan:ia, Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1976. 
The Seven Sisters, New York, 197~. 
"Perspective of the Newly-Independent States 
On the Binding Quality of International Law" 
(1965), ICLQ, 1. 
"Compensation for Expropriation: The Emergence 
of New Standards", 13 (1979), JWTL. · · 
11 The Myth of Internationa 1 Contract Law", 
15 (1981), JWTL, pp. 181-217. 
Introduction to International Law, 8th Ed., 
·London, 1977. 
Steiner, H.J. and Vegts, D.F. Transnational Legal Problems, 
2nd Ed., 1975. 
Taylor-Ostrander, F. "The Role of Foreign Private Capital in 
Africa" in J.A. Davis and J.K. Baker (eds), 
Southern Africa in Transition, Praeger, New York, 
1966. 
Temu, P. 
Umuzorike, U.O. 
Vegts, D.F. 
Vernon, R. 
Walde, T.W. 
White, G. 
White, R.C.A. 
· Wil Hams,·· J. F. 
"Nationalization in Tanzania" [1967] EALJ. 
"Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property and 
Economic Self-Determination", 6 (1970), EALJ, 
pp. 79-99. 
"Coercion and Foreing Investment Rearrangement", 
72 (1978), AMJIL, 28. 
Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread 
of U.S. Enterprises, Penguin Books, 1971. 
"Review of Transnational Agreements: Contractual 
Flexibility in Natural Resources Development", 
10 (1978), Lawyer of Americas, pp. 265-298. 
Nationalization of Foreign Property, London, 1961. 
11A New International Economic Order?", 16 (1976), 
Va.J.Int 1 l.Law, 223. 
"Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions: 
Two conflicting international arbitrations 11 , 
30 (1981}, ICLQ, pp. 1-19. 
"International Law and the Property of ·Aliens" 
(1928), BYBIL, pp. 1-4. 
Windstrand, C. (ed.) Multinational Firms in Africa, Uppsala, 1975. 
Wolfe, A. 
Wolfe, R. 
184. 
11 Capital and the Congo 11 , in A. Davis and J. Baker 
(eds.), Southern Africa in Transition, Praeger, 
New York, 1966. 
11 The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper from Union 
Mini ere to GECAMIN~ 11 , 25 ( 1978), Afri ea Today, 
pp. 425-47. 
Wooldridge, F. and Sharina, V., 11 The Expropriation of the Property 
of Ugandan Asians, 14 (1974}, Indian Jour.Int. 
Law, p. 61. . 
Wortley, B.A. 
Ye l paa la, K. 
Expropriation in Public International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 1959. 
11 Costs and Benfi ts from Foreign Direct Investment: 
A Study of Ghana 11 , Vol. II (1980), New York Journal 
of Int. and Comp. Law. 
